The dissemination of the Soul City 4 Evaluation results takes place through two processes: the first represents a purely descriptive account of research findings, demonstrating impact where it has been observed. In line with this dissemination objective, a series of summary reports are disseminated. Titles are as follows:

- Soul City – Theory and Impact (synopsis) – August 2001
- Soul City 4 Evaluation Results – Integrated Summary Report, July 2001
- Soul City – Audience Reception, October 2000
- Soul City 4 Impact Evaluation – AIDS, October 2000
- Soul City 4 – Cost Effectiveness, September 2001

The second dissemination strategy represents a more reflective, analytical process, and will take place through publication of a series of articles in peer reviewed academic journals.
This summary report was compiled by Esca Scheepers (an external evaluation research methodologist independently contracted as co-ordinator of the Soul City 4 evaluation) and Nicola Christofides (principal researcher and project manager, Women’s Health Project):

- Sue Goldstein is the research manager of Soul City: Institute for Health and Development Communication;
- Shereen Usdin managed the fourth series of Soul City;
- Lebo Ramafoko co-managed the Youth Sexuality aspect of the fourth series of Soul City;
- Garth Japhet is the executive director.

This summary report represents a descriptive account of the impact of Soul City 4 in the area of domestic violence, at a community and societal levels of analysis. The primary source document is “Impact of Soul City in Partnership with the National Network on Violence Against Women”, researched for Soul City by Women’s Health Project - project manager and principal researcher, Nicola Christofides.

Data from the following sub-components of the overall Soul City 4 Evaluation have been integrated into the above mentioned report:

1. An Evaluation of Soul City 4, researched for Soul City by Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), T Samuels, J Mollentz, R Olusanya, M Claassens, S Braehmenr and Z Kimmie.
   - An Evaluation of Soul City 4: Assessing the Effectiveness of a South African Entertainment-Education Intervention Based on National Survey Data. Field Report (subsumed under the national survey analysis) by Dhaval S. Patel, Department of Communication, Michigan State University.

2. Soul City Series 4 – Sentinel Site Study, data collection and data processing by Social Surveys, under supervision of K Hall. Data analysis by Z Kimmie, Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE).

3. Soul City Series 4 - Qualitative Impact Assessment, data collection and data processing by Social Surveys, under supervision of K Hall and K Daniels, data analysis done by E Scheepers, K Daniels and K Hall.


5. Media monitoring and analysis, subsumed under the Partnership Evaluation Study. Coding co-ordinated by Mweru Mwingi and Irene Muriuki, Rhodes University and data processing by Janey See (independent contractor).


7. Raw data was obtained from Telkom SA Ltd

8. Statistics South Africa provided census data in support of analysis of Telkom data.
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Executive Summary:

The Soul City Institute for Health and Development Communication is a South African non-governmental organisation which uses the power of mass media for social change. Soul City’s approach to health communication is informed by the Soul City model of social change which is an eclectic integration of existing models of social and behaviour change – such as Social Learning Theory, the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Johns Hopkins Steps to Behaviour Change model, Social Network Theory, the Diffusion of Innovation Model, the Stages of Change Model, and the BASNEF Model. Soul City further bases its intervention on the Ottawa Charter of Health Promotion, and maintains a human rights focus.

Health promotion theory and social / behaviour change theory emphasize the importance of impacting on factors primarily outside of individual control in addition to impacting on determinants of health within individual control in order to have a positive impact on health and social outcomes. The Soul City 4 intervention set out to impact positively on health and social outcomes by addressing the broader social and community environment (e.g. policy implementation, public debate as reflected in the media nationally, community action and collective efficacy, community norms and access to services) and the immediate interpersonal environment (e.g. social norms and peer pressure, support-giving behaviour, as well as interpersonal dialogue and debate) in addition to impacting on individual determinants of health (e.g. knowledge and awareness, personal attitudes, self-efficacy, perception of risk, support-seeking behaviour and intention to change) in the behaviour change process.

The Soul City 4 core multi-media edutainment vehicle comprised of a 13 part prime time television drama, a 45 part radio drama in 9 languages and three full-colour information booklets - one million of each were distributed nationally. The vehicle dealt with the following topics: violence against women (domestic violence and sexual harassment); AIDS (including youth sexuality and date rape); small business development and personal savings and hypertension. Soul City 4 extended the core Soul City vehicle to include a partnership with the National Network on Violence Against Women as part of the series 4 initiative to address violence against women, with an emphasis on domestic violence. The NNVAW brought together many sectors, including government, non-governmental organizations and civil society at large: the Network is a coalition of over 1 500 activists and community organisations from rural and urban areas.

Investigating the impact of a mass media communication vehicle is difficult, especially where behaviour is complex and where there are numerous influences on peoples' behaviour - both positive and negative. The Soul City 4 evaluation design deliberately engaged with these evaluation research difficulties, and set out to document in great detail the extent to which the series (and its partners) succeeded or failed as a comprehensive health promotion intervention. A complex evaluation of Soul City 4 was undertaken consisting of nine interlinked components, all contracted out to external researchers or research organizations - including the overall evaluation management. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were methodologically rigorous and comply with international standards and data analysis

1 The Soul City model of social change is discussed in detail in Soul City – Theory and Impact (synopsis), available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za.

2 Detailed reports on the Soul City 4 evaluation methodology are available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za: Soul City 4 Evaluation Methodology, Volume I and Volume II.
conventions as applied in this particular field of study. The evaluation was supported by an international and local panel of experts in evaluation, communication and entertainment-education, and was funded by the European Union.

The impact of the Soul City 4 intervention in the area of violence against women is published in two volumes: the first volume in the violence against women series primarily describes the impact of the Soul City 4 edutainment vehicle on individuals, and this second volume primarily describes the impact of Soul City in partnership with the National Network on Violence Against Women on creating a supportive environment for change. The following aspects are described: the impact of a) the advocacy initiative (including media advocacy, community mobilization and direct lobbying of Government) and b) the impact on connecting people affected by violence against women to services.

Facilitating an enabling environment for change:

Connecting people affected by violence against women to services:

One of the Partnership’s operational goals was to link people affected by violence against women to services.

The Stop Women Abuse Helpline (SWAH), together with raising awareness of local services accomplished through the multi-media intervention, fulfilled this objective to a large degree – limited primarily by availability of resources (infrastructure and human resources) in the case of the SWAH and the fact that (initially) demand by far outweighed the system’s capacity to deliver. However, the helpline increased access to crisis counselling and referrals. Thus, judging by the overwhelming response to the Stop Women Abuse Helpline (SWAH), setting up this helpline addressed a substantial national need as far as connecting people affected by violence against women to services is concerned.

The Soul City 4 intervention further succeeded in giving exposure to the National Network on Violence Against Women (NNVAW) and its membership organizations, thereby facilitating awareness of and access to local support organizations working in the area of violence against women.

On a very sober note, the impact of the Partnership on connecting women to services must be interpreted in relation to the broader context in which services function in South Africa. Such a contextualised interpretation introduces a number of factors that fall outside of the scope of the Soul City 4 intervention, but that nevertheless impact on the intervention’s ability to fulfil its objective of connecting people affected by violence against women to services: barriers such as access to and poor quality of services in some areas of the country inevitably limit the Soul City 4 intervention’s positive and sustainable impact on creating an enabling environment for change in the area of service delivery.

Advocacy:

The partnership operationalised their advocacy objectives through direct lobbying of government (national and provincial), through media advocacy and through community mobilization. With the exception of direct impact on the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) at a provincial level of government, the advocacy initiative was successful in facilitating the speedy implementation of the DVA.
Implementation of the Act in 1999 (as opposed to at some later date) was an achievement that can largely be attributed to the advocacy initiative, and the multi-media component of the Soul City 4 intervention.

- As significant role-players, the partnership contributed to the changing discourse on, and concomitant prioritisation of domestic violence within National Government. (This does not hold true for Provincial Government.)
- The Soul City / NNVAW Partnership succeeded in putting pressure on National Government to speed up the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act.
- The partnership succeeded in playing a facilitating role in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, through mobilizing funding for training of service providers, through facilitating training and support, and through community education.

Both the edutainment vehicle as well as the NNVAW’s direct organizing in communities contributed to heightened community action or community involvement around domestic violence over the evaluation period. Media analysis over the intervention period suggests that the partnership succeeded in increasing public debate in the media, and giving more prominence to domestic violence through increasing coverage of domestic violence.

In the health promotion framework, the Partnership, in the short term, achieved their key objectives, and was instrumental in creating an enabling environment as far as implementation of legislation goes. In the longer term and against the background of poor service delivery mentioned earlier, sustained advocacy for successful operationalization of the DVA (i.e. improved service delivery, including more sensitive service delivery) is crucial.
Background

The Soul City Institute for Health and Development Communication is a South African non-governmental organisation which uses the power of mass media for social change.

Soul City is a national multi-media “edutainment “ project. It aims to impact positively on people’s quality of life through integrating health and development issues into prime time television and radio dramas, backed up by full colour easy to read booklets.³

The Partnership between Soul City and the National Network on Violence Against Women (NNVAW):

Soul City 4 extended the core Soul City vehicle to include a partnership with the National Network on Violence Against Women as part of the series 4 initiative to address violence against women, with an emphasis on domestic violence.

The NNVAW brought together many sectors, including government, non-governmental organizations and civil society at large: the Network is a coalition of over 1 500 activists and community organisations from rural and urban areas.

The Partnership’s aim was to increase the effectiveness of both partners through combined efforts and to establish key mechanisms to assist in the creation of an environment supportive of change⁴. While knowledge on health is important at an individual level, the social, economic and political environment is critical⁵. Mass media can be an effective catalyst for change when combined with community activism⁶ and government intervention⁷.

The partnership between Soul City and the NNVAW was a collaboration that aimed at connecting people affected by domestic violence with support and at establishing concrete mechanisms through which to take action and advocacy. In short, it was designed to assist in the creation of an enabling environment for change with reference to domestic violence⁹.

³ For more detail about the Soul City edutainment vehicle, the Soul City model of Social andBehavioural Change, as well as the broader context in which violence against women was prioritised as a Soul City 4 theme, refer to Impact Evaluation: Violence Against Women – Vol I and Soul City – Theory and Impact (synopsis).
Specific partnership objectives were articulated as follows:\(^{10}\):

- To convey information on women’s rights, raise societal discussion, shift attitudes, practices and social norms on gender-based violence;
- To connect audiences to help through a toll free helpline, providing crisis counselling and referral to community-based support structures;
- To promote individual and community action;
- To advocate for the implementation of enabling legislation to create a supportive environment for change;
- To develop training material on gender-based violence for counsellors, police, judiciary and health workers.

Key partnership activities were:

- Lobbying of Government and facilitation of the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act;
- The production of a domestic violence training video;
- The establishment of the Stop Women Abuse Helpline;
- Training of NNVAW members in advocacy skills with a strong focus on media advocacy;
- Media advocacy;
- A resource book on violence against women for journalists;
- A workshop with partner journalists;
- Community mobilization.

The impact of the Soul City 4 intervention in the area of violence against women is published in two volumes: the first volume in the Violence Against Women series primarily describes the impact of the Soul City 4 edutainment vehicle on individuals, and the second volume primarily describes the impact of Soul City in partnership with the National Network on creating an enabling environment for change. The following aspects are described: the impact of a) the advocacy initiative (including media advocacy, community mobilization and direct lobbying of Government) and b) the impact on connecting people affected by domestic violence to services.

The two reports need to be read together, since the distinction between the intended impact of these components of the Soul City 4 intervention is largely a matter of emphasis. Thus, airtight distinctions between either the intervention components or documented impact become artificial and does not do justice to the synergy (both in intervention design and in documented impact) between the different components of the intervention. This point is clearly illustrated in the following vignette:

---

The Soul City 4 television drama went on air on the 7th of July 1999. For the subsequent 13 weeks, South African audiences followed Matlakala, a much-loved character as her husband (Thabang) becomes emotionally and physically abusive - with severe consequences for her and their children’s well-being. Audiences see the once confident Matlakala’s self-esteem plummet and depression sets in as she is under increasing family pressure to ‘make her marriage work’ and accept her predicament. With the support of friends and community, and through the toll free helpline, she learns about her legal rights and other forms of support, and begins an inspiring journey to reclaim her life. Thabang, a highly respected teacher in the community, also goes through a journey of self-examination as his life crumbles around him. The series also depicts the community’s shift from ‘silent collusion’ with the abuse to active opposition, at one point, all banging pots outside the abuser’s home to make him stop11. Soul City’s emphasis on domestic violence in the fourth series received widespread media publicity in the period leading up to the broadcast, as well as during the airing of the series:

Community mobilisation and media advocacy formed part of the advocacy initiative of the partnership between Soul City and the National Network on Violence Against Women (NNVAW). The following illustration of public protest undertaken during the evaluation period under the auspices of the Partnership was reported in the Mamelodi Rekord (20 August 1999), a community publication distributed free of charge in Mamelodi: “Members of the National Network on Violence Against Women … took to the streets of Mamelodi campaigning against women abuse over the weekend.” They publicly protested against violence against women by travelling through Mamelodi in an open-deck bus, distributing pamphlets and disseminating information about violence against women.

Amidst the heightened awareness around domestic violence resulting from the powerful account of domestic violence in the Soul City television drama, as well as the community mobilisation described above, a 42-year old Mamelodi resident “handed himself over to the police after he allegedly battered his 39-year old wife

---

"to death" on Thursday, 26 August 1999 – less than a week after the public protest in Mamelodi, and at the height of the unfolding of Soul City’s television drama on domestic violence. (Reported in The Sowetan, 30 August 1999)

The Sowetan, 30 August 1999

The alleged perpetrator was granted bail. This sparked renewed community mobilization on the 31st of August 1999, organised by the NNVAW and demanding that the suspect be rearrested: “About 100 women marched to the Mamelodi Court on Tuesday to hand over a memorandum protesting bail to men who murdered their wives.” (Reported in the Mamelodi Rekord, 3 September 1999)

Mamelodi Rekord, 3 September 1999

It has been reported anecdotally that women chanted “Thabang, Thabang” (the abusive husband in the Soul City television series) as they gathered outside the court.

This account demonstrates the synergy between different components of the Soul City 4 intervention: the impact of the edutainment vehicle, as well as that of the advocacy component (community mobilization and media advocacy) in partnership with the NNVAW. It will become clear in the impact evaluation report summarised here that community mobilisation and media advocacy as initiated and implemented by the partnership between Soul City and the NNVAW, together with lobbying of Government very successfully increased the pressure on Government to speed up the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act.

The Sowetan, 30 August 1999

Mamelodi Rekord, 3 September 1999

Thus, the series of Violence Against Women summary reports need to be read against the background of the interaction and synergy between the different components of the Soul City 4 intervention, and the subsequent holistic impact thereof. For reporting purposes though, a more linear conceptual demarcation is followed in the summary reports – i.e. as differentiated in Volume I and Volume II of the impact on violence against women.
Evaluation Methodology\textsuperscript{12}

The Soul City / NNVAW Partnership Evaluation used a health promotion framework as conceptual framework to evaluate the impact of the Soul City 4 intervention (see Table 1). The Model presented in Table 1 is based on the five pillars of health promotion described in the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, 1986. These include, healthy public policy and organisational practice, mobilising communities, supportive environments, health services and health literacy.

Four different levels of outcomes are identified in Table 1: the table shows the hierarchical relationship between health outcomes, intermediate health outcomes, health promotion outcomes, and actions. This evaluation focused on measuring the impact on health promotion outcomes (those personal, social and environmental factors that indicate people’s improved control over the determinants of health) and on intermediate health outcomes (the determinants of health and social outcomes)\textsuperscript{13}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Table 1} & …
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{12} Full detail of the methodology is available in Soul City Evaluation Methodology - Volume II available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za.

Table 1: An outcome model for the evaluation of Soul City in partnership with the NNVAW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health and social outcome</th>
<th>Safety and well-being of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate Health Outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Empowerment of women and men; greater self-efficacy; intention(s); support seeking / support giving behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better services – Government: health, welfare and police; NGO sector: counselling and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Healthy environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output and Health Promotion Outcomes</strong></td>
<td>* Greater knowledge and awareness of VAW / DV; * Changed attitudes, &amp; social norms relating to VAW / DV; * Increased interpersonal dialogue and debate * Community events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased: * Organizational capacity, * Referrals * Service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Media coverage, * Changes in the policy environment – e.g. (speedy) implementation of Domestic Violence Act, * Community Mobilization - e.g. marches, rallies etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions</strong></td>
<td>* Soul City multimedia edutainment vehicle – TV, radio, print material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* SC / NNVAW Partnership activities: community workshops; training, awareness raising etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* SC / NNVAW Partnership activities: - Stop Women Abuse Helpline: Referrals Counselling - Organizational capacity building activities – training workshops, fundraising etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC / NNVAW Partnership Advocacy strategy: - Mobilizing communities, - Media advocacy - Lobbying policy makers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(There is fluidity between actions and outcomes on a horizontal level; the vertical levels are hierarchical - showing the relationship between health promotion interventions and health outcomes.)
The Partnership Evaluation comprised of the following:

- Evaluation of the advocacy initiative which aimed to influence public policy through lobbying government, targeting the electronic and print media to increase coverage of domestic violence, and mobilising communities.\textsuperscript{14}
- Evaluation of the extent to which the intervention succeeded in connecting people to services through setting up the Stop Women Abuse Helpline and providing some support for NGOs that address Violence against Women.
- Evaluation of Health Literacy, which includes knowledge and awareness, self-efficacy and empowerment, attitudes, social norms, interpersonal dialogue, behavioural intentions as well as action on an individual level.\textsuperscript{15}
- A process evaluation component (looking at the impact of the partnership on partners, as well as sustainability of impact and replicability of the partnership) culminated in a section dealing with “lessons learnt”.

Only extracts pertinent to the impact of Soul City 4 on creating a supportive environment are presented in this summary report. Thus the process evaluation is merely referred to where relevant, and Health Literacy (impact on individuals) is presented in Vol I of the Violence Against Women series.

Study design, sampling, data collection and analysis:

The Partnership Evaluation forms part of the larger evaluation of Soul City 4, and as such, draws heavily on results from other components of the overall evaluation. The components of the evaluation conducted by Women’s Health Project (WHP) used quantitative and qualitative methods. Details of the methods of data collection and analysis are presented below.

A: Impact evaluation of the advocacy initiative:

The impact evaluation of the advocacy initiative used primarily qualitative methods, with the exception of the media advocacy component:

1) Lobbying of government:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
    \node (SC) at (0,0) {SC / NNVAW Partnership};
    \node (Provincial) at (-2,-4) {Provincial \& National Government};
    \node (Other) at (-2,-10) {Other stakeholders};
    \node (SC/NNVAW) at (2,0) {SC / NNVAW Partnership};
    \node (Provincial/Other) at (-4,0) {Provincial \& National Government - lobbied directly and not-lobbied directly};
    \node (Other/SC/NNVAW) at (-4,-10) {Other stakeholders};
    \draw[->] (SC) -- (Provincial);\draw[->] (SC) -- (Other);
    \draw[->] (Provincial) -- (Provincial/Other);\draw[->] (Other) -- (Other/SC/NNVAW);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{14} The Media Analysis study was contracted out separately.
\textsuperscript{15} This part of the evaluation was not conducted by WHP. Findings draw entirely on research contracted to CASE and Social Surveys.
Semi-structured Interviews: twenty-two semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives from national and provincial government. On a national level, the members of the Inter-departmental Domestic Violence Act Implementation Task Team were interviewed. On a provincial level, 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Members of the Executive16 of 5 provinces17. Provinces were selected to ensure a geographical spread that would capture well-resourced and disadvantaged provinces. Two interviews with key informants involved in the area of domestic violence, but not involved in the Soul City / NNVAW partnership, were conducted (referred to as “Observers” in this report). Qualitative Thematic Analysis of verbatim transcriptions of interviews was conducted.

2) Media advocacy:

A quantitative content analysis of media coverage around violence against women and domestic violence in particular was conducted: mainstream print and electronic media were monitored over the evaluation period, using pre-determined search terms (“Soul City”, “NNVAW”, “violence against women”, “domestic violence”, and “women abuse”). All articles and bulletins subsequently extracted were coded, using a simple coding system to ascertain key aspects covered – such as issues / themes covered in the article, organizations referred to etc. Simple, descriptive analysis was conducted. The quantitative analysis was supplemented with a qualitative component (consisting of interviews with journalists). This qualitative component incorporates an evaluation of the Journalist Resource Book. Qualitative Thematic Analysis was conducted.

3) Advocacy - Community Mobilization:

Document review and analysis of NNVAW activity monitoring forms was supplemented with focus groups discussions with participants in two specific community events in Mamelodi (Gauteng) and KwaMhlanga (Mpumalange). This component of the evaluation is supplemented by results from the community mobilization component of the Sentinel Site18: 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted with community members representing leadership, services (such as health and education) and civil society in the two sentinel sites (rural KwaZulu Natal and urban Gauteng). Respondents were recruited in their organizational capacity, and participated on the basis of their availability. Once again, qualitative Thematic Analysis was conducted.

National Survey19 results were also used to investigate community mobilization: baseline (pre-intervention) and evaluation (post-intervention)

16 Provincial Government representatives
17 All the data collected on a provincial-level and some of the national government interviews were conducted by Strategy and Tactics.
18 Detailed methodology available in Soul City Evaluation Methodology, Volume I – available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za.
19 Detailed methodology available in Soul City Evaluation Methodology, Volume I – available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za.
Data collection consisted of standardized, face-to-face interviews, conducted on different (but largely comparable) samples of 2000 respondents for each survey. The samples were statistically representative of the Soul City target population nationally. Significant shifts between baseline and evaluation results were determined using Chi Square tests. The association with exposure to Soul City was examined using Binary Logistic Regression Analysis, controlling for demographic variables.

B: Facilitating access to services - the Stop Women Abuse Helpline:

Data collection and analysis comprised of the following:
- Descriptive quantitative analysis of helpline data, using the Telkom database
- Semi-structured interviews with selected respondents from Life Line (contracted to manage the Stop Women Abuse Helpline) and referral organizations (NGOs, Police, Welfare). Data was analysed thematically.
- Focus Groups and semi-structured interviews were conducted with Helpline callers. Data was analysed thematically.
- A sample of Life Line monitoring sheets were coded and analysed quantitatively, using simple descriptive analysis.

C: Evaluation of Health Literacy, or change at an individual level of analysis

This component of the partnership evaluation draws on the National Survey, the Sentinel Site Survey and the National Qualitative Impact Assessment contracted out separately. Detailed results and methodology are presented in Volume I of the Violence Against Women series. Only an executive summary is presented in this report, attached as Appendix A.

Limitations of the study:

1) The Partnership Evaluation was conducted retroactively. The fact that no pre-intervention data exists makes it more difficult to conclusively attribute observations to the Partnership. Consistency amongst multiple sources of data was used to overcome this limitation. In some cases alternative interpretive methods of analysis were used, as specified later in the report. Furthermore, the Partnership was the only integrated mass media and coordinated advocacy initiative around domestic violence of this scope and prominence at the time.
2) Data collection took place very shortly after the intervention period, which means that the longer term (or sustainable) impact of the Partnership was not investigated.

The Soul City adult series targets “African” and “Coloured” previously disadvantaged South Africans. Although the series is suitable for all populations, theory of communication suggests that specific targeting and testing of materials makes it more effective. Soul City is however committed to the health and development of all South Africans irrespective of colour, race or any other characteristic.
Evaluation results:

Connecting people affected by violence against women to services:

The Partnership aimed to improve referrals and crisis counselling for people whose knowledge and awareness of domestic violence and of support services had been raised through the multi-media channels – i.e. the Partnership aimed to connect people affected by violence against women to services. Thus, a toll-free telephone referral and counselling service, called the Stop Women Abuse Helpline (0800 150150), was established through Life Line SA on 1 July 1999. There were four incoming lines that were answered by volunteer Life Line counsellors on a 24-hour basis.

Awareness of, and utilisation of the Stop Women Abuse Helpline (SWAH) are markers directly associated with the Soul City 4 intervention and the partnership with the NNVAW, as the helpline was introduced at the start of the television series as a Partnership initiative, and was originally only advertised by Soul City and the NNVAW.

The helpline increased access to crisis counselling and referrals. Judging by the overwhelming response to the Stop Women Abuse Helpline (SWAH), setting up this helpline addressed a substantial demand as far as connecting people affected by violence against women to services is concerned. The Soul City 4 intervention further succeeded in giving exposure to the NNVAW and its membership organizations, thereby facilitating awareness of and access to local support organizations working in the area of violence against women.

The Stop Women Abuse Helpline and other service organizations:

The response to the Stop Women Abuse Help Line was enormous: figure 1 shows the hourly breakdown of all calls attempted on the telephone lines for 11 -17 August 1999 to the Johannesburg Life Line Centre. The peak number of calls occurred between about 11am and 6pm. At the peak of the traffic on the line, less than 5% of calls were answered. The volume of calls made to the Durban centre was less, and a higher proportion of calls were answered (on average 42%).

21 (A survey conducted under the auspices of the Soul City 4 evaluation indicates that other organizations subsequently took up promotion of the Stop Women Abuse Helpline.)
22 One of the reasons that fewer calls to the Johannesburg line were answered is that the number of calls attempted was vast -- an average of 7 972 per day for the Johannesburg area, while in the Durban area an average of 2 784 calls were attempted per day.
Figure 1: Hourly breakdown of traffic on the Johannesburg line

Source: Telkom SA Ltd

Figure 2 shows the average traffic (all calls attempted) on Telkom lines to the Stop Women Abuse Helpline reported by weekday for the period 1 July 1999 to the end of August 1999 – i.e. for the first 2 months of operation. A peak on Thursday following the broadcast of Soul City on Wednesday evening is evident. There is a gradual decline in the congestion on the line, with Tuesday being the least congested day.

Figure 2: Breakdown of traffic by weekday, July and August 1999

Source: Telkom SA Ltd
Figure 3 shows the number of calls answered over the period 1 July 1999 to 30 November 1999. Approximately 180,000 calls were answered by the four Life Line centres over this period. The initial response to the toll free Helpline going on air was huge, with more than 4,000 calls logged on the first day. Peaks are apparent on key-advocacy days, especially around the week of 11 to 18 August that coincided with Women’s Day and increased community action (such as marches to raise the awareness of violence against women and to call for the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act). A decline in the number of calls is evident when the Soul City television series went off air. (The Soul City radio drama was on air during this time.)

Figure 3: Number of calls answered – 1 July 1999 to 30 November 1999

Councillors reported that a large percentage of these calls were not meaningful calls: children frequently mis-used the line; initially people phoned to speak to Soul City actors or to participate in the Soul City on-air competition, and sometimes “silent calls” were received – i.e. where there is no response from the caller before they put down the phone. Against his background, and in an attempt to identify meaningful calls, a breakdown of the duration of calls answered is presented in Table 2:

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23 This is not unique to the SWAH – it is a phenomenon that characterises tollfree lines in South Africa.
Table 2: the length of all calls to the Stop Women Abuse Helpline answered by Life Line over the period from 1 July to 1 December 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of call</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00 - 10 seconds</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 20 seconds</td>
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It is difficult to assess exactly when a call becomes “meaningful” since simple information exchange or referrals can happen in a call that lasts less than one minute. For purposes of further analysis of calls though, a conservative cut-off point of one minute was decided upon, as indicative of “meaningful” calls, allowing for referral and/or counselling to take place.

- More than 1 in 5 calls answered were from non-urban areas. A couple of factors (such as missing information on obscure telephone exchanges which could not be categorised as either urban or non-urban, and the extent to which callers from rural areas are only able to access public phones in urban areas), may have resulted in undercounting of the extent to which rural callers effectively accessed the SWAH.

- Analysis of monitoring forms completed by Life Line counsellors indicates that nearly half the calls recorded on the monitoring forms were about physical abuse by a spouse.

- A further breakdown of the relationship between the person who had experienced some kind of abuse (e.g. physical or emotional abuse) or was raped and the perpetrator shows that in nearly 80% of the calls recorded on the monitoring forms, the perpetrator was a husband, boyfriend or family member. In only 2.7% of cases was the perpetrator a stranger. Thus, the SWAH played a key role in connecting people affected by domestic violence to services.

- Nearly 25% of calls were about emotional abuse - this informed counsellor perceptions that people’s definition of abuse is broadening, and is
supported by national survey results around increased awareness of emotional abuse amongst the general population associated with exposure to Soul City 4.

- In order to determine whether the pattern on the Stop Women Abuse Helpline was similar to or different from other Helplines, it was compared to the AIDS Helpline, which is a well-established helpline, operating since 1992 and also managed by Life Line. Whereas the SWAH had only 4 active lines rotating to 4 main centres and 4 outreach centres, the AIDS helpline had 6 active numbers rotating to 17 main Life Line centres and 6 outreach centres during the period monitored – i.e. the latter part of 1999.

Comparison of the volume of calls answered looks at a five-month period in 1998 (AIDS Helpline) and 1999 (SWAH and AIDS Helplines) respectively. I.e. it does not compare the initial period when the AIDS Helpline was set up with the initial period of the Stop Women Abuse Helpline - it seemed more appropriate to compare two periods of time when the AIDS Helpline was more extensively promoted, in a way that is comparable to the promotion of the SWAH\textsuperscript{24}. Figure 4 shows that especially during the time that Soul City 4 was broadcast on television, the volume of calls to the SWAH by far surpassed the volume of calls to the Aids Helpline. (Take note that the AIDS Helpline was also promoted through Soul City 4.)

Figure 4: Comparison – number of calls SWAH vs AIDS Helpline

\textsuperscript{24}In 1998, the AIDS Helpline was promoted through Beyond Awareness 1 - the National Department of Health’s communication campaign. The helpline number was advertised on radio and promoted on all HIV/AIDS print material.
The following aspects are dealt with in *Impact Evaluation, Violence Against Women Vol I*

- knowledge and awareness of the SWAH (and other local support services operating in the area of violence against women),
- intention to phone the helpline in future,
- interpersonal communication around the SWAH, and
- the role of the SWAH (and other violence against women services) in support-seeking and support-giving behaviour amongst the larger population.

The following two graphs (based on national survey analysis) encapsulate the association between Soul City 4 and raising awareness of support organizations, as well as making contact with services over the evaluation period: exposure to Soul City TV is significantly associated with support-seeking behaviour around violence against women.

*Figure 5: Violence Against Women: awareness of local support organizations*

**Awareness of VAW support organisations**

The statistics in the following graph is informed by the observation that 8% of respondents in the post-intervention survey reported that they, or someone close to them, had been abused physically or emotionally by their husband or boyfriend. Three percent of respondents in the general sample said that they had made contact with an organization that deals with violence against women over the period that Soul City 4 was on air.
Support-seeking behaviour while Soul City was on air

- Four out of ten respondents who contacted services lived in rural areas:

National Survey, Association with Soul City based on Binary Logistic Regression Analysis
Men did access violence against women service organizations, although women were twice as likely as men to use services:

Figure 8: Contact with services by sex

Sex of respondents who have contacted VAW service organizations during the intervention period

- Approximately 2 out of 5 women who had contacted an organization working in the area of violence against women, came from a rural area:

Figure 9: Women contacting services by area

Location (Urban / Rural) of women accessing VAW service organizations during the intervention period
Advocacy - the impact of the Soul City / NNVAW Partnership:

Background:

The Soul City /NNVAW Partnership advocacy initiative aimed to influence public policy implementation through lobbying government, targeting the electronic and print media to increase coverage of domestic violence, and mobilising communities around domestic violence.

The Partnership advocacy strategy specifically aimed to impact on the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA). The DVA was passed in December 1998 and originally implementation was planned for the first half of 1999. The motivation to focus on the implementation of the DVA was based on the analysis that the momentum after the Act was passed had been lost and that government was not moving quickly to implement – in fact, implementation was constantly being postponed. A coherent, co-operative response from the NGO sector was identified as key to increasing the momentum, through the identification of the problem, the identification of possible solutions and facilitating the process where possible.

Under the auspices of the Partnership, advocacy training and strategic planning workshops were conducted to build capacity and to formulate a national campaign strategy, and funds were raised for the advocacy initiative and the partnership with the NNVAW. To ensure optimum coverage, the campaign would run in synergy with the Soul City 4 broadcast period and would piggyback upon the extensive media hype associated with Soul City’s prime time television and radio series. The campaign’s goal was to secure the speedy and effective implementation of the DVA and demanded of government to:

- implement the DVA by no later than 1 November 1999;
- clearly set out and make known a strategy for implementation;
- allocate resources required for implementation;
- develop and implement a monitoring and recording system to determine the effectiveness and to identify and address weaknesses and gaps in the new Act;
- improve access to justice, especially for marginalized women in rural areas and for women with disabilities, as promised in existing government plans of action.

The Soul City 4 intervention (multimedia and Partnership components) was the first of its kind, conducted on such a large scale, to address domestic violence in particular. Prior to the Soul City 4 intervention, public dialogue and debate around violence against women were primarily framed as “rape” and

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25 The Department for International Development – UK (DFID) was a major funder of the Partnership.
reported on (in the media) in a context of crime coverage. The Partnership aimed to add “domestic violence” to this public debate.

The Soul City 4 intervention worked on “frames” aimed at shaping the debate around violence against women. The frames included:
- domestic violence is not a private affair
- government must play its role – no more paper promises
- women’s rights are human rights
- violence against women is fuelling the AIDS epidemic
- actors speak out
- communities (via NNVAW) mobilise and speak out

Impact on community mobilization and community events / community activities:

Community mobilisation empowers communities to be their own spokespeople and have their own voice heard. It is also an important tool of advocacy in that it helps access media coverage and influences policy makers in this way.

Both the edutainment vehicle (through changing attitudes and social norms around domestic violence, and through modelling collective action in the form of pot-banging as reported in Vol I), as well as the NNVAW’s direct organizing in communities contributed to heightened community action or community involvement around domestic violence over the evaluation period.
The following community based activities were undertaken by the National Network on Violence Against Women during the evaluation period:

Figure 10: NNVAW community based activities undertaken during the evaluation period.

From a public (or community) perspective, participation in these events were often associated with Soul City’s (i.e. the edutainment vehicle’s) awareness-raising effect:

“Soul City influenced us to organize the march, emotions were high … “

[Rural female]

Quantitative results (National Survey) show that exposure to the Soul City multi-media component played a significant role in increasing awareness of, and even facilitating participation in public protest against violence against women: three percent of respondents in the national sample reported that they have participated in public protest against violence against women.
Exposure to Soul City 4 TV, Print and multi-media is significantly associated with participation in public protest against violence against women.

**Figure 11: Domestic Violence: participation in public protest, associated with Soul City exposure**

**Participation in public protest against VAW**

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National Survey Association with Soul City based on Binary Logistic Regression Analysis

**Pot-banging:**

The Soul City story depicted the community’s shift from “silent collusion” with domestic violence to active opposition, at one point, community members banged pots outside the abuser’s home to make him stop. This activity was introduced in the story and has not been heard of in South Africa previously. Thus, pot-banging was used as a marker associated only with the Soul City series and the partnership with the NNVAW.

National Survey data on Soul City’s impact on the actual occurrence of pot-banging is not conclusive, as the numbers are very small. However, anecdotal reports of pot or bottle banging have been gathered; for example, patrons at a local pub in Thembisa collectively banged bottles upon witnessing a man physically abusing his girlfriend. ²⁶

Furthermore, the Soul City 4 intervention is associated with intention to participate in other forms of community events or activities: exposure to Soul City TV, Radio, Print and multi-media is significantly associated with willingness to attend community meetings and workshops on violence against women in future.

²⁶ There were also reports of pot-banging occurring in Khayelitsha, but this has not been confirmed by the research team.
Community action not only raised community awareness about domestic violence and served as an outlet for communities’ empowerment to act against domestic violence. Through helping to access the media, community mobilization added pressure to Government and service providers to speed up the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (reported on in a subsequent section).

Thus, community action generated media interest: 11.5% (approximately 1 in 9 bulletins and articles) of the media coverage on violence against women over the evaluation period referred to or reported on community action. In turn, increased media coverage added to the pressure on Government to speed up the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act.

“There were pressures … there were pressures from occasions where people held marches and stuff like that.”

[SA Police Services]

“If maybe you see an article that says maybe the police are not doing their work, that puts me in a difficult position.”

[Urban Police Captain]

Media Advocacy:

Soul City’s use (in partnership with the NNVAW) of editorial media during the fourth series was aimed at increasing the scope of its domestic violence awareness raising activities amongst the public. Thus it was aimed at shaping dialogue and debate around violence against women towards awareness of,
and inclusion of *domestic violence*. It was further aimed at mobilising support for the Domestic Violence Act demands and to influence policy makers to meet those demands\(^\text{27}\).

Media analysis over the intervention period suggests that the partnership succeeded in increasing public debate in the media, and in giving more prominence to domestic violence through increasing coverage of domestic violence.

Monitoring of the Soul City / NNVAW media advocacy strategy records more than 5 000 (5 140) media “contacts” (i.e. press releases and interviews) over the evaluation period. Due to recording difficulties, this may be an undercount. The following graph depicts the proportionate representation of topics covered in press releases and interviews:

*Figure 13: Soul City 4 media releases and interviews*

Monitoring of print and electronic media coverage was done over the period June 1999 to December 1999\(^\text{28}\). Search terms used were “Soul City”, “NNVAW”, “domestic violence”, “violence against women” and “women abuse”. Application of the search terms resulted in identification of 4 361 articles and bulletins appearing in approximately 280 mainstream print publications monitored (newspapers and magazines), and in mainstream electronic media nationally.

\(^{27}\) Usdin, S – Informal Evaluation briefing document, 2000

\(^{28}\) The official evaluation period was July – December 1999. However the media advocacy strategy was in place and operating even before the airing of Soul City 4 on TV – hence the inclusion of June as part of the intervention period. This, however means that there is no baseline data available as a benchmark to assess trends in media coverage. Alternative means of assessing the association between media coverage and the intervention has been used.
(In the absence of baseline data for domestic violence coverage in the national print and electronic media, other forms of comparative measures and validation were used to investigate the association between the Soul City 4 intervention - including the partnership with the NNVAW - and media coverage of domestic violence: such a direct mention of the Soul City / NNVAW partnership and comparison of press releases and actual media coverage.)

Analysis of media monitored over the intervention period shows that:

- Forty three percent of the coverage (print and electronic media) was either primarily about domestic violence, or referred to domestic violence and domestic violence related topics (such as the Domestic Violence Act etc.)

- These statistics are slightly higher for print media alone: 48.5% was either primarily about domestic violence, or referred to domestic violence and domestic violence related topics.

- As a result of the monitoring system, data is less detailed for electronic media\(^29\), and therefore, it is more difficult to come to a reliable description of the content of electronic media coverage. However, statistics for electronic media are as follows: 22.6% was either primarily about domestic violence, or referred to domestic violence (please note that these statistics may very well reflect incomplete data, and may therefore constitute an underestimation.)

- Comparative trends in coverage between non-domestic violence, (such as rape by a stranger) and domestic violence is provided in the following graph. With the exclusion of September, the graph shows a steady increase in reporting of violence against women. Coverage is also clearly responsive to events, such as Women’s Day (in August) and the 6 Weeks of Activism (in November / December 1999).

Figure 14: Media coverage of non-domestic violence vs domestic violence

\(^{29}\) Data consists of summaries of coverage and not complete transcripts. It is therefore possible that intervention related information was not captured by the commercial service contracted to monitor the coverage.
Analysis of records of press releases that were sent to the media (by the Partnership) shows the following distribution. Note that this data collection system was introduced retroactively, and is thus subject to incomplete record keeping over the total evaluation period. Systematic records are only available until the end of September 1999.

Figure 15: Domestic Violence press release breakdown by month

An overlay of the 2 graphs above (for the period July to September) shows that the pattern of coverage (of domestic violence) approximates the pattern of press releases sent out. This seems to support arguments for attributing domestic violence related coverage to the intervention.

Figure 16: Relationship between press releases and media coverage

The impact of the intervention is further corroborate by the fact that, overall (i.e. for both print and electronic media combined) 15.7% of the coverage directly referred to either Soul City and / or the NNVAW national / provincial offices. (Note that mention of organizations that are members of the network are not included in this statistic – thus it probably represents an undercount of reference to the Soul City / NNVAW partnership.) This amounts to approximately 1 in 6 editorial pieces. For print media only, 18.6% (approximately 1 in 5 pieces) made direct reference to Soul City and / or the NNVAW. (The data is less detailed for electronic coverage – whether the partners were referred to directly of not, is often not available.)
For print media, 60% of the top 10 carriers of domestic violence stories, were Soul City partner media – illustrating the value of having this kind of a relationship with the media.

Indications are that the Journalist Resource Booklet was not used optimally across the board. Journalists who did use it found it helpful in demystifying the Domestic Violence Act - as illustrated by the following quotations:

“Brilliant. It [the Journalist Resource Booklet] just explains it so simply because I had a copy of the actual Act and I’d rather hang myself on the nearest tree than go through all that bumph. It just simplified it and made it so much more accessible.”

[Sunday Times]

“Well sometimes when I’m looking for legislative background on stuff, I can tell you I use it very much. The book explains things but if we want to know the nitty gritty, which is what we actually do in this newspaper, we look for the nitty gritty (from the net).”

[Mail & Guardian]

The prominence of the media advocacy campaign (with specific reference to the NNVAW) is illustrated in the following graph. The general public’s recognition of the NNVAW’s media profile (particularly television and Radio) is notably higher than recognition of other NNVAW activities.

**Figure 17: Public recognition of NNVAW activities**

Government departments involved in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) identified media coverage as a factor that impacted on them in the process around the implementation of the DVA.

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30 Publications that serialised Soul City 4 themes and through which the Soul City 4 booklets were distributed.
"… there was a lot of newspaper reports about the Domestic Violence Act… the concerns, it’s long overdue"

[Department of Justice]

Lobbying of Government for the speedy implementation of the DVA\textsuperscript{31}.

The broader context in which the advocacy intervention took place provided both opportunities and barriers that needed to constantly be monitored and assessed by the Partnership in order to adapt advocacy intervention strategies and action.

Some of the contextual barriers that hampered the speedy implementation of the DVA, and that had to be negotiated by the Soul City / NNVAW advocacy strategy included: complex and bureaucratic lines of reporting and responsibility within Government; delays in the processing and finalisation of regulations of the DVA; opposition to the Act and to regulations from the South African Police Services (SAPS), magistrates and prosecutors; concerns around the repercussions in the case of failure to follow regulations for the implement the DVA\textsuperscript{32}; inadequate budgets; lack of commitment from certain Government Departments to participate in the process, as well as time consuming preparation for implementation with specific reference to training of police and judiciary.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned barriers, The Domestic Violence Act was implemented on 15 December 1999. While this was not the date specified in the advocacy campaign objectives (1\textsuperscript{st} November 1999), the Partnership Evaluation found that implementation of the Act in 1999 was an achievement that can largely be attributed to the advocacy initiative of the partnership between Soul City and the NNVAW, and the multi-media component of the Soul City 4 intervention.

Specific findings of the Partnership Evaluaton Study includes:

1) As significant role-players, the partnership contributed to the changing discourse on, and concomitant prioritisation of domestic violence within National Government. (This does not hold true for Provincial Government.)

When asked how “violence against women” was prioritised in South Africa, the initial response of all the national government interviewees was to formulate their responses in a way that reflected the historical way in which women have been viewed (i.e. as a vulnerable group like children

\textsuperscript{31} Substantiation of all observations summarised here is available in the detailed report. Contact Sue Goldstein (suegold@soulcity.org.za).

\textsuperscript{32} Service providers potentially opened themselves up to law suits should they fail to implement the DVA properly.
that needed protection). However, a couple of departments spontaneously included the broader context of *gender-based violence* and made direct mention to “*domestic violence*”. Thus, a shift in discourse was observed at the level of national government. This is not true of provincial government and provincial implementers though – discourse still primarily reflected “old” terminology (such as reference to “the Family Violence Act”).

In terms of prioritisation, Observers\(^{33}\) to the process around the implementation of DVA felt that at the national level (over the evaluation period), the terrain had shifted dramatically around violence against women. They observed that violence against women, and more specifically domestic violence, was being prioritised far more than before. However, this impact has not been consistent across the country. Thus whilst there has been a shift in discourse at the national level little evidence of any shift on the ground has been perceived.

As the only integrated mass media and co-ordinated advocacy initiative around domestic violence of this scope and prominence at the time, the partnership was an important factor in contributing to the shifts observed above.

Direct mention of the role of the Partnership, and more direct associations between the Partnership and observed change at this level of analysis are provided in subsequent findings:

2) The Soul City / NNVAW Partnership succeeded in putting pressure on National Government to speed up the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act.

In their description and analysis of the process leading up to the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act on 15 December 1999, Government and Observers mentioned various factors that can directly be associated with the Soul City 4 intervention.

Sources of pressure as identified by Government and Observers, associated with the Soul City / NNVAW Partnership are as follows, supported by selected quotations:

1. NGOs as a source of pressure - the Soul City / NNVAW partnership received specific mention:

   All the respondents mentioned Soul City and / or the NNVAW spontaneously in this context. They credited these organisations for being visible and identified them as setting the agenda for speedy implementation of the Act. Mention was also made of the Soul City multi-media edutainment component that highlighted the issues around the DVA. Several respondents discussed the timing of the multi-media

\(^{33}\) I.e. people working in the area of VAW, knowledgeable around the implementation of the DVA, but not part of the partnership between the NNVAW and Soul City.
edutainment broadcast before the implementation of the Act. This added to the pressure for implementation because it increased knowledge of the Act amongst the public.

"I think my work with Soul City and also some of the NGOs, the Network for Violence Against Women, opens your eyes."

[Victim Empowerment Unit, Domestic Violence Task Team]

“The 21st May, last year for instance, there was this Annual NGO Consultative Forum, this was actually an invitation by our previous deputy minister where a lot of NGOs were available ... for instance Soul City, Rape Crisis etcetera. And where they at that point in time really felt very strongly that the Department is ... I don't say actually not doing its job, but I think where they indicated really there's a real need for the implementation of the Act and we need to move fast on that."

[Department of Justice]

“Because they [Soul City] were so powerful - media, the radio, television, work books. And I found the momentum of Soul City very, very crucial to the process. ....I thought that Soul City really contributed to the national network's momentum on domestic violence.”

[Observer]

2. The Media

Respondents commented on the media coverage on the DVA that occurred over the evaluation period. The amount of coverage as well as the content (describing government as dragging its feet) increased the pressure respondents felt to implement the DVA. Government departments were being contacted by the press regularly for comment.

(The association between Soul City 4 and media coverage of domestic violence has been discussed in a previous section.)

"...there was a lot of newspaper reports about the Domestic Violence Act...the concerns, its long overdue"

[Department of Justice]

"I've read The Star, the Mail and Guardian. I think that a lot of articles started to appear in terms of 'This is the extent of domestic violence’ and there's these expectations on the government that come out of these trenches, so to speak. I think that they create expectations in the community which makes the government deliver....The media can play an incredibly powerful role. I think the media can really create awareness around a lot of things."

[Victim Empowerment Unit, DV Task Team]
3. Community action:

Government respondents were aware of, and felt pressurised by community action that took place especially around Women’s Day and the 16 Days of Activism on Violence Against Women. The kinds of action that respondents mentioned included marches and meetings.

(The role of Soul City in partnership with the NNVAW with reference to community action has been discussed in a previous section.)

"There were pressures, there were pressures from occasions where people held marches and stuff like that. I think that was the Women’s Day on the 9th August."

[SA Police Services]

"The 16 days of activism was used by a lot of organizations as an opportunity to push for the implementation of the Act. I remember it being a debate throughout the 16 days."

[Department of Welfare]

4. The Public

Apart from community action, which was a group demonstration of frustration, there were also individual-level calls to action from the public. People phoned the government departments asking how they could go about making use of the provisions of the Act or asking why there was a delay with implementation of the DVA. One of the respondents also noted that she received many counselling / referral calls from women who had experienced domestic violence.

(The role of Soul City 4 - with reference to both the edutainment vehicle and the NNVAW - in educating the public on the Domestic Violence Act has been illustrated in Vol I of the series on Violence Against Woment.)

“You get phone calls every single day from people wanting to know what the hell is going on, why are you delaying the process.”

[SA Police Services]

"...there was a lot of pressure because of the expectations of members of public who wanted to make use of the provisions of the Act."

[Department of Justice]
The following quotation describes the interaction between the Soul City television series and the media response as well as the social mobilisation, and the consequent public pressure.

"this programme [Soul City] was shown on TV. Now a woman goes to the police station saying ‘help me’; the police says there’s no such Act. Now they say… they run to the newspapers and the women’s organisations and they publish in the newspapers and they say the police is not doing their jobs, they are delaying the process. Now, ugh, they phone here you have to explain to them there is such an Act, it has been adopted by parliament, it has been approved by the president but it’s not yet in operation. Now you try and explain that to a member of the public, I mean it’s not that easy. And now you get phone calls every single day from people wanting to know what the hell is going on, why are you delaying the process."

[SA Police Services]

Other factors mentioned, and not directly related to the Partnership, that contributed to adding pressure for the speedy implementation of the DVA were pressure from within the international arena, broader socio political factors (such as the 1999 General Elections), and pressure from within Government itself.

3) The partnership succeeded in playing a facilitating role in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, through mobilizing funding for training of service providers, through facilitating training and support, and through community education.

Mobilizing funds for training

Constraints to speedy implementation of the DVA mentioned by all the respondents were that of budget and training of implementers (see earlier). Throughout the advocacy process, insufficient budgets continued to threaten to delay SAPS training of their personnel. Through Partnership efforts, money was mobilised from the Department for International Development (UK) for the training. Thus, the partnership was instrumental in facilitating the initiation of training of police.

Offering training and support

The training of SAPS personnel was not only an important step towards implementation of the DVA; it was a key factor influencing the service delivery for women who have experienced domestic violence. In recognising this, the NNVAW offered to train SAPS personnel. While SAPS declined this and the police themselves carried out training, discussions with the NNVAW took place around the content of the training. Representatives from both the NNVAW and Soul City were invited to attend training courses.
“I must tell you that our co-operation with them [NNVAW] as well as with Soul City was excellent. We got excellent support from them.”

[SA Police Services]

“And then eventually, you know we work together with several women’s organisations such as for instance the Women’s Network on Violence, we work very closely together with them, they actually attended our training sessions as well because they wanted to monitor the way that we’re approaching it. And they, they assisted us quite a lot in spreading the word, you know that,… …Ja. Amongst the community you know, and the women…. … and even down to grassroots level.”

[SA Police Services]

Community education

The impact of Soul City 4 on individuals is discussed at length in Vol I. The importance of impacting at this level was recognised and articulated by respondents: thus, there was recognition that the public also needed to be educated about the new Act, as key to the successful implementation of the DVA. In this regard, credit was given (spontaneously) to the NNVAW and Soul City for playing a facilitating role.

"Because of course our focus was on the members, training of the members but it was also important to get the public educated and the women in need and… …and they [NNVAW] did that
… and they did that, that was really their purpose because their focus is on the victim and the women so that was…Ja, that was wonderful, [what] they did.

[SA Police Services]

The following quote illustrates how one of the respondents viewed the impact of Soul City multi-media intervention addressing the DVA through the drama series. She felt that it brought the Act to life and showed how it could be used.

“Many acts are passed but I think the Soul City series made it a real Act, people could see how it could actually be used, that there is really an act like that, that we can use it, it is not distorted. I think that really helped.”

[Department of Welfare]

The second objective of the advocacy campaign was to impact on Government and service providers to have strategies for the successful
implementation of the DVA in place\textsuperscript{34}. The extent to which government had effective strategies in place is reflected in looking at how implementation was perceived to be going at the time of data collection (i.e. less than 6 months after implementation of the DVA), and whether any of these factors can be attributed to adequate / inadequate planning by the departments which were lobbied by the Partnership.

Analysis of the implementation process illustrates how concerns originally raised as issues in slowing down implementation of the DVA, did in fact materialise as factors interfering with successful implementation of the DVA after 15 December 1999. A strong argument is therefore made for sustained advocacy and facilitation of the process over a longer period of time.

At the time of data collection, there was a mixed response as to how implementation was going. There were reports of problem solving by police regarding some of the implementation of the regulations. Access and availability of shelters were reported to be problematic. While the Department of Welfare overtly recognised this need, they did not perceive a high level of pressure to make shelters available quickly. Furthermore, inadequate counselling services were identified as a barrier to the effective implementation of the DVA.

Thus, the following factors remained barriers to the successful implementation of the DVA, and illustrates the persistence of larger environmental or systemic barriers that the Soul City 4 intervention either were not able to overcome completely, or barriers that fall completely outside the scope and objectives of the intervention to address: inadequate training of police; inadequate service provision – both in terms of sensitivity of services as well as access to shelters; lack of infrastructure and human resources; inadequate inter-departmental collaboration; inadequate inter-sectoral collaboration between Government and NGOs; the failure of key services in fulfilling their role in implementation; and inadequate monitoring.

Training of police will briefly be elaborated on as the only one of these factors that the intervention did aim to address in the longer term, through the production of a training kit for use with health workers, police, magistrates and clerks:

\textit{Training of police services}\textsuperscript{35}: As mentioned earlier, on the insistence of SAPS, training of police were not actually conducted by the Partnership; Soul City material (initially a rough-cut version of one of the Soul City 4 domestic violence episodes, and later a one-hour training video) was used in the process, and the NNVAW were allowed (by SAPS) to observe the training.

\textsuperscript{34} Note that a distinction is made here between the date on which the DVA was implemented (15 December 1999), and the effective or successful operationalisation of the regulations on a day to day basis after the 15\textsuperscript{th} of December – referred to in the report as “successful implementation”.

\textsuperscript{35} (The Department of Welfare was still to train their officers at the time of data collection.)
Once training finally occurred as facilitated by the partnership through raising the initial funds (reported earlier), respondents identified persistent problems (especially) with regard to the effectiveness of training and with police attitudes. The SAPS training took place through “training of trainers” who then went back and trained the personnel. This resulted in miscommunication around how the Act should be implemented. SAPS’ response to this has been to have workshops and additional training sessions. However, provincial respondents identified negative attitudes as pervasive - despite training. It indicates that training was not aimed at addressing attitudinal shifts, or failed to do so.

"We still have the feedback that the police still don't regard it as that serious; they said all police officers will be trained and they are not."  
[Department of Welfare]

“You know when you look at this thing of a protection order I don't think we the police are supposed to handle it, I mean we don't really know how to work with it. We were not taught about it they just gave it to us and showed us just a little bit what its all about, but we don't know the nitty gritty of the whole thing.”

[Urban police officer]

Qualitative analysis of interviews with police services in the sentinel sites provides some evidence of entrenched conservatism (or lack of awareness of human rights issues in the context of gender violence in general, and domestic violence in particular) amongst police officers, and personal as well as professional opposition to the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act:

“Sometimes - I would say sometimes the women are spoilt because of these new clause of the constitution.”

[Rural police officer]

“Another form of violence that I know of is that of women denying men their conjugal rights, I don't know how it’s named but I know that it’s happening, and again they will tell your children not do your laundry, and nothing is being said about that.”

[Urban police captain]

However, there is also evidence of the beginning of reorientation of police services that has been attributed to Soul City and the partnership with the NNVAW:

“I can say to me personally it [Soul City] encouraged me more to be aware of the situation women are living under. And to be firm when I act against women abuse…. You know - before I could watch Soul City, when the woman came to report a case about the husband
abusing her, it’s easy to say ‘no, no, no - go back and discuss with the family, with the husband, because we know you’re going to withdraw this case’. Some of the women used to leave the station unhappy because we are negative. But after we had watched Soul City, then we could understand how serious it was. Then it changed my attitude towards it.”

[Rural Police Commander]

“It [Soul City] did impact on me. I remember when I saw that part where the police men went to arrest Matlakala’s husband, what it taught me is that when there is such a problem - I should not ignore it; I should do a follow up.”

[Urban Police Officer]

Integrated Discussion

This discussion uses the Outcome Model for Health Promotion presented earlier in the report to structure an integrated discussion of findings across all levels of analysis (individual, community and society) according to three broad areas of intervention - education, facilitation and advocacy. These aim at impacting on health promotion outcomes (people’s control over the determinants of health) and on intermediate health outcomes (the actual determinants of health).

The findings presented in the two summary reports on violence against women document positive changes in both these areas:

Education – change at an individual level of analysis

In the context of the Soul City 4 intervention, education primarily happened through the multi-media component of the intervention. However, there was also an educational component to some of the community events conducted in partnership with the NNVAW, i.e. raising awareness through group screenings of Soul City material, workshops and training, public platforms, etc. The key question to ask here within a health promotion framework is whether the intervention succeeded in increasing individuals’ control over their choices:

Soul City Impact Evaluation, Violence Against Women Vol I gives detail of positive change (significantly associated with the Soul City 4 intervention) in knowledge and awareness of domestic violence, in attitudes, intentions and intermediate practice such as support seeking and support giving behaviour. It also documents increased interpersonal dialogue, positive shifts in social norms and concomitant decreases in negative social pressure. Qualitative data provides evidence for linking the intervention to empowerment of women and greater self-efficacy in decision-making and exerting control over their

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health and well-being. As far as men are concerned, there is (qualitative) evidence of greater self-awareness of their role in the cycle of violence as well as expressions of the intention to change as a result of exposure to Soul City 4. Secondly, there is quantitative evidence of e.g. attitudinal shifts in men - away from attitudes condoning violence against women.

The extent to which these observed changes contributed to shifts in the socially ascribed roles of men and women remains unclear, as it was not measured in the evaluation. In other words (and of relevance to the intervention), despite the positive change documented, men may still feel that they are the decision-makers in the relationship. The evaluation did not measure whether men, in this context, (still) resort to violence despite observable shifts in attitudes and social norms.

Thus, overall, there is evidence that the intervention did impact positively on key aspects that form part of the issues around “having control over choices” in a context where people are involved in or affected by domestic violence. Although there is little quantitative evidence of significant change in certain specific forms of behaviour around domestic violence (discussed in detail in Vol I – see Appendix A for a summary), there is evidence of shifts in intentions that are associated with the Soul City 4 intervention. Thus, on an individual level of analysis, the intervention seemed to have impacted positively on health promotion outcomes (i.e. key aspects in the control over the determinants of health such as knowledge and awareness, attitudes, social norms, social pressure etc) as well as on intermediate health outcomes (i.e. “individual level” determinants of health, such as personal empowerment, self-efficacy, intentions, support seeking behaviour etc).

Health promotion theory states that, provided that there is an enabling environment, this level of change will lead to positive health and social outcomes – such as the safety and well-being of women.

Facilitation of an enabling environment – service provision:

The focus of this aspect of the model is primarily on enhancing organisational and systemic aspects to improve the quality of service provision - i.e. strengthening the capacity of groups to mobilise and /or enhance services. Based on the health promotion model, the key evaluation question to ask here would be, to what extent did the partnership facilitate adequate service delivery?

The Partnership’s operational goal in this regard was to link people affected by violence against women to services. (The goal was not to improve service delivery itself.)

The Stop Women Abuse Helpline (SWAH), together with raising awareness of local services accomplished through the multi-media intervention, fulfilled this objective to a large degree – limited primarily by availability of resources (infrastructure and human resources) in the case of the SWAH and the fact...
that (initially) demand by far outweighed the system’s capacity to deliver. However, the helpline increased access to crisis counselling and referrals. Thus, judging by the overwhelming response to the Stop Women Abuse Helpline (SWAH), setting up this helpline addressed a substantial need as far as connecting people affected by violence against women to services is concerned. The Soul City 4 intervention further succeeded in giving exposure to the NNVAW and its membership organizations, thereby facilitating awareness of and access to local support organizations working in the area of violence against women.

A second objective of the intervention was to impact on the organisational capacity of the NNVAW, so that the NNVAW could continue strengthening and co-ordinating initiatives in the area of violence against women, as well as continue advocacy around the implementation (or operationalization) of the DVA. This aspect of the partnership was evaluated as part of the Process Evaluation, and has not been included in this summary report\(^ {37} \). For the sake of comprehensiveness, however, it is briefly mentioned here: the pressure to deliver on Partnership goals was difficult for the NNVAW, who was still in the process of setting up organizational structures and processes well into the Partnership implementation process. Involvement in the partnership led to growth and maturation of the NNVAW as an organisation. According to respondents, the partnership resulted in the Network gaining experience more rapidly than they might have over the same period of time. There were also indications that training and transfer of skills and capacity within NNVAW structures could have been more optimal.

Although the evaluation did not include an in-depth examination of the role of the NNVAW in strengthening violence against women initiatives on the ground, an analysis of NNVAW activities undertaken over the evaluation period did show that a large part of their activities included workshops, group discussions and public meetings, generally targeted (in full or partially) at service providers. It is important to note here that the co-ordination and strengthening of violence against women initiatives is an ongoing agenda for the NNVAW (i.e. is continuing beyond the Partnership timeframe and beyond the scope of this evaluation).

On a very sober note, the impact of the Partnership on connecting people affected by violence against women to services must be interpreted in relation to the broader context in which services function in South Africa: barriers such as access to and poor quality of services in some areas of the country limit the Soul City 4 intervention’s effective and sustainable impact in creating a supportive environment. However, addressing these barriers systematically or comprehensively was beyond the operational scope of this intervention, and within the context of the goal-based\(^ {36} \) evaluation conducted, is not used as a point of criticism against the intervention. On the other hand, it would be shortsighted not to take the broader context into account in the search for areas in which to increase and strengthen the sustainable impact of the

\(^ {37} \) A detailed report is available upon request.

\(^ {36} \) i.e. shaped by intervention objectives
intervention. Problems with systems and infrastructure, such as adequate police services and shelters as well as sufficient counselling and support services continue to be a barrier to greater efficacy in addressing domestic violence in South Africa. Sustained advocacy can play a role here, and will be addressed in the next section. A second factor, and one of the recommendations coming out of the evaluation of the partnership between Soul City and the NNVAW, is exploration of forging formal and effective partnerships with stakeholders working in health (and other) systems. A third point to make in this context relates to systematic follow-through on (and possibly adding to) strategies originally set in place to maximise use of Soul City training materials aimed at service providers. Attempts have been made to address some of these issues in the medium term; these developments, however, fall outside the scope of this evaluation.

In short, and linking this discussion back to the health promotion framework: the objectives stated by the partnership primarily fall in the “health promotion outcome” category (i.e. facilitating increased organizational capacity, referrals and service delivery). On an intermediate health outcome level (facilitating better services), the quality of services provided by the SWAH is relevant for the purpose of this evaluation. However, in both dimensions of the framework, the intervention objectives did not comprehensively and systematically address this level of change. The objectives that were stated and addressed, were reached to a large extent – i.e. linking people affected by violence against women to services, and building organizational capacity for sustainable impact. Factors that continue to detract from greater success here largely fall outside of the Partnership intervention objectives, and relate to the status of service provision in a South African context: issues range from infrastructural problems such as telephone access, to adequate service delivery (such as counselling, adequate shelters, sensitive police, judicial and health services etc.) – especially in rural areas.

Facilitation of an enabling environment - Advocacy

The partnership operationalised their advocacy objectives through direct lobbying of government (national and provincial), through media advocacy and through community mobilization. With the exception of directly impacting on the implementation of the DVA at a provincial level of government, the advocacy initiative in totality (i.e. all components included, as well as the interaction effect between the components) was successful in reaching its short-term goals.

The Partnership Evaluation found that implementation of the Act in 1999 was an achievement that can largely be attributed to the advocacy initiative, and the multi-media component of the Soul City 4 intervention.

- As significant role-players, the partnership contributed to the changing discourse on, and concomitant prioritisation of domestic violence within National Government. (This does not hold true for Provincial Government.)
• The Soul City / NNVAW Partnership succeeded in putting pressure on National Government to speed up the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act.

• The partnership succeeded in playing a facilitating role in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, through mobilizing funding for training of service providers, through facilitating training and support, and through community education.

Both the edutainment vehicle as well as the NNVAW’s direct organizing in communities contributed to heightened community action or community involvement around domestic violence over the evaluation period. Media analysis over the intervention period suggests that the partnership succeeded in increasing public debate in the media, and giving more prominence to domestic violence through increasing coverage of domestic violence.

Within a health promotion framework, the Partnership, in the short term, achieved their key objective, and was instrumental in creating an enabling environment as far as implementation of legislation goes. In the longer term and against the background of poor service delivery and problems around the sustained implementation of the DVA mentioned earlier, sustained advocacy for successful operationalization of the Domestic Violence Act (i.e. improved service delivery, including more sensitive service delivery) is crucial.

Conclusion

In order to have positive impact on individuals’ health and social outcomes such as quality of life, health status and equity, the determinants of health need to be addressed. Health promotion in its definition includes changing determinants within individuals’ immediate control, as well as impacting on factors largely outside the control of individuals - this includes social, economic and environmental conditions.

Notwithstanding the areas noted for improvement throughout this report, the partnership between Soul City and the NNVAW was a very comprehensive and largely successful health promotion intervention. It set new standards in the field for using mass media and advocacy for health promotion, and supported by findings from the equally extensive evaluation undertaken, it legitimised its status as an example of best practice internationally.
APPENDIX A:

Summary – Soul City 4 impact evaluation, Violence Against Women Vol I

This report presents a descriptive summary of the impact of the Soul City / NNVAW partnership intervention – notably the Soul City 4 multi-media component – on individuals in their immediate interpersonal environment: it investigates changes in knowledge and awareness, self-efficacy and empowerment, attitudes, social norms, interpersonal dialogue, behavioural intentions as well as action. The impact of the Soul City / NNVAW partnership at a broader societal level of analysis is presented in Impact Evaluation: Violence Against Women – Vol II.

Research Results:

Quantitative and qualitative research results suggest an association between exposure to Soul City media and increased knowledge and awareness of the severity of domestic violence, the definition of violence against women (particularly domestic violence), the status of the law on violence against women (i.e. the Domestic Violence Act), as well as increased knowledge of what to do in cases of violence against women (in particular sexual harassment) and where to find support. There was no consistent evidence of positive impact on an understanding of what constitutes sexual harassment.

Attitudinal change across a number of measurements seems to be associated with exposure to Soul City media: improvement in attitudes around 1) whether violence against women is a private affair, 2) whether if a man beats a woman, he probably has a good reason for it, 3) whether women should put up with abuse, 4) whether a women ever deserves to be beaten, and 5) attitudes around the seriousness of violence against women all seem to be associated with exposure to Soul City multi-media, and/or various components thereof. A positive attitudinal shift was shown on the item “As head of the household, a man has the right to beat a woman” but it was not statistically significant. In the evaluation survey positive attitudes on this item nevertheless seem to be associated with exposure to Soul City media, suggesting that Soul City may be associated with maintaining positive attitudes in this regard. No significant improvement was observed on the item “It is culturally acceptable for a man to beat his wife”. However, again, in the evaluation survey positive attitudes on this item seem to be associated with exposure to Soul City media – suggesting that Soul City may be associated with maintaining positive attitudes. There was no evidence that exposure to Soul City was associated with change in attitudes around sexual harassment.

Exposure to Soul City media and multi-media consistently seems to be associated with interpersonal communication around domestic violence. Qualitative analysis suggests that Soul City contributes to changing awareness and attitudes, as well as intention and practice around ineffective or inadequate interpersonal communication patterns, and thus contributes to changing the nature of the relationship in different contexts (within families, as well as in a broader interpersonal context, including friends and neighbours). Soul City seems to contribute to bringing sensitive or taboo subjects out in the open – such as domestic violence. Analysis further suggests that Soul City raised women’s awareness that they need to talk about domestic violence.
as a form of health-seeking behaviour that would mobilise various forms of support for them.

In addition to measuring personal attitudes as described in the previous section, respondents’ perception of a reference group’s view (either their friends, family or community) on the same matter was measured. This subjective norm was subsequently compared to the respondents’ personal attitude. For domestic violence, as a rule, comparison between baseline and evaluation measurement is characterised by positive shifts in subjective norms – i.e. there are positive shifts in respondents’ perceptions of social norms around domestic violence, and subsequently, decreased experiences of negative social pressure. Single-item analysis does not consistently show evidence of an association between all Soul City media and these shifts; an association with Soul City print material is most common. Scale analysis of both National Survey data and Sentinel Site data suggests that exposure to the Soul City 4 intervention is associated with these positive subjective social norms. Soul City’s impact on the one sexual harassment subjective norm measured, is contradictory; on the whole there is no clear and consistent evidence of a positive association between Soul City and this particular subjective norm.

With regards to self-efficacy, thematic analysis of qualitative data (in rural and urban sites), suggests that Soul City 4 played a role in enabling women to more effectively make decisions around their own health and well-being. Soul City 4 seems to have sensitised women of all ages to their rights, facilitated access to services, and raised knowledge and awareness (for both men and women) around general and specific issues related to gender roles and gender equality. Women interviewed report that Soul City 4 encouraged them to act on this (new) awareness of their rights, and enabled them to stand up for their rights in oppressive or abusive contexts, or in contexts traditionally associated with unequal gender power relations. The qualitative data suggests that exposure to Soul City 4 impacted positively on women’s awareness of their self-worth and their sense of identity. It raised their awareness with reference to new options regarding their (financial) independence and access to services and support, and empowered them to negotiate relationships and (safer) sex.

Soul City exposure consistently seems to be associated with support-seeking behaviour around violence against women – with regards to contacting an organisation working in the area of violence against women, as well as using the Stop Women Abuse Helpline as a possible resource.

Exposure to Soul City seems to be associated with intention to act against violence against women – measured as respondents’ willingness to engage in positive behaviour in future; such as talking about the abuse or harassment to friends, family, colleagues, reporting the perpetrator to the relevant authorities, telling the abused person about a helpline, and thinking about doing anything to stop domestic violence.

With reference to sexual harassment, a number of positive shifts in actual behaviour were observed from baseline to evaluation measurement. One such a key shift (i.e. in reporting the harassment) is demonstrably associated with exposure to Soul City TV, but as a result of small numbers of responses, the association with exposure to Soul City could in most cases not be investigated.
The association between Soul City and actual behaviour change in the area of domestic violence remains unanswered though, since the number of responses were generally too small to investigate the association between Soul City and specific domestic violence behaviour\(^{39}\). In very general terms, Soul City exposure seems to be associated with maintaining positive behaviour in domestic violence over the evaluation period - i.e. doing “something” to stop it. An alternative method of analysis employed suggests that there may be an association between exposure to Soul City and positive behaviour for violence against women amongst respondents with primary education over the evaluation period.

With regards to specifics, on the whole, it seems as if behaviour around domestic violence equally wavers between helping the abused person, and doing nothing. Where people opt to do nothing, their inertia is still characterised by uncertainty around how to deal with the matter, fear of repercussions, unwillingness to interfere, or feelings of helplessness.

Notwithstanding measurement and analysis difficulties, however, given the complexity of the issue and the relatively short evaluation period (only 9 months elapsed between baseline and evaluation measurement), combined with the fact that the Soul City 4 intervention was the first attempt of this nature and scale to address domestic violence in South Africa, this is not surprising. Behaviour change is a complex process, with all of the dimensions where the association with Soul City can be documented with relative certainty, as part of that process. Thus, sustaining communication efforts over time is crucial to bringing about observable actual behaviour change.

**Conclusion:**

The number and consistency of associations between exposure to some or all components of Soul City 4 across constructs measured suggested in this analysis, seem to corroborate a conclusion that Soul City 4 significantly impacted on domestic violence at an individual level of analysis.

In the area of violence against women, Soul City 4 aimed to impact comprehensively on the individual determinants of health (as well as larger environmental barriers as documented in volume II of the violence against women series). The evaluation suggests that, with some exceptions as described above, the Soul City Institute for Health and Development Communication largely reached its health communication objectives in the area of domestic violence.

\(^{39}\) Using Binary Logistic Regression Analysis
Executive Summary – Integrated Evaluation Report

The Soul City Institute for Health and Development Communication is a South African non-governmental organisation which uses the power of mass media for social change. Soul City’s approach to health communication is informed by the Soul City model of social change which is an eclectic integration of existing models of social and behaviour change – such as Social Learning Theory, the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Johns Hopkins Steps to Behaviour Change model, Social Network Theory, the Diffusion of Innovation Model, the Stages of Change Model, and the BASNEF Model. Soul City further bases its intervention on the Ottawa Charter of Health Promotion, and maintains a human rights focus.

Health promotion theory and social / behaviour change theory emphasize the importance of impacting on factors primarily outside of individual control in addition to impacting on determinants of health within individual control in order to have a positive impact on health and social outcomes. The Soul City 4 intervention set out to impact positively on health and social outcomes by addressing the broader social and community environment (e.g. policy implementation, public debate as reflected in the media nationally, community action and collective efficacy, community norms and access to services) and the immediate interpersonal environment (e.g. social norms and peer pressure, support-giving behaviour, as well as interpersonal dialogue and debate) in addition to impacting on individual determinants of health (e.g. knowledge and awareness, personal attitudes, self-efficacy, perception of risk, support-seeking behaviour and intention to change) in the behaviour change process.

The Soul City 4 core multi-media edutainment vehicle comprised of a 13 part prime time television drama, a 45 part radio drama in 9 languages and three full-colour information booklets - one million of each were distributed nationally. The vehicle dealt with the following topics: violence against women (domestic violence and sexual harassment); AIDS (including youth sexuality and date rape); small business development and personal savings and hypertension. Soul City 4 extended the core Soul City vehicle to include a partnership with the National Network on Violence Against Women as part of the series 4 initiative to address violence against women, with an emphasis on domestic violence. The NNVAW brought together many sectors, including government, non-governmental organizations and civil society at large: the Network is a coalition of over 1 500 activists and community organisations from rural and urban areas.

Investigating the impact of a mass media communication vehicle is difficult, especially where behaviour is complex and where there are numerous influences on peoples' behaviour - both positive and negative. The Soul City 4 evaluation design deliberately engaged with these evaluation research difficulties, and set out to document in great detail the extent to which the series (and its partners) succeeded or failed as a comprehensive health promotion intervention. A complex evaluation of Soul City 4 was undertaken consisting of nine interlinked components, all

40 The Soul City model of social change is discussed in detail in Soul City – Theory and Impact (synopsis), available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za.
41 Detailed reports on the Soul City 4 evaluation methodology are available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za: Soul City 4 Evaluation Methodology, Volume I and Volume II.
contracted out to external researchers or research organizations - including the overall evaluation management. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were methodologically rigorous and comply with international standards and data analysis conventions as applied in this particular field of study. The evaluation was supported by an international and local panel of experts in evaluation, communication and entertainment-education, and was mainly funded by the European Union.

Reach and audience reception results\(^\text{42}\) show that Soul City is a popular edutainment vehicle with considerable reach across urban and rural populations in South Africa. Soul City 4 reached 79\% of its target population\(^\text{43}\) (more than 16,2 million people) through television and radio alone. While Soul City 4 was on air, it was consistently rated amongst the top 3 television programmes – for both adult and children’s audiences.

Reach amongst the youth audience is of particular importance for HIV / AIDS interventions. More than 2 out of 3 Soul City audience members are youth, between the ages of 16 and 24. Soul City’s prominence as a health and development communication vehicle is further illustrated by the fact that 47\% of the national population in South Africa spontaneously mentioned Soul City on television as a programme from which they feel that they have obtained useful information about HIV/AIDS\(^\text{44}\).

Soul City competes favourably in the South African media environment, and is overtly highly valued by its target audience as a relevant, credible and entertaining educational vehicle. Qualitative data show that Soul City’s impact is related to its constructive, pro-social role modeling, and its modeling of plausible alternatives or coping strategies, in a setting that is very real and very familiar to its audience. Soul City models a range of nuanced, understandable and relevant behavioural scenarios—in a setting or context that the audience can relate to and fully identify with. Soul City enables (in an entertaining and non-didactic manner) its audience to critically reflect on their own attitudes and behaviour, and leaves them with a sense that they have a choice in determining their behaviour, and in impacting on, or changing their lives. In this way the edutainment media contributes to shifts in the various phases and components of the complex process of behaviour change.

With reference to Soul City’s impact on individuals in their immediate interpersonal environment\(^\text{45}\), both quantitative and qualitative evidence across all themes covered in Soul City 4 suggest that exposure to Soul City is associated with increasing awareness and accurate knowledge, stimulating interpersonal dialogue within families and other social networks, increasing self-efficacy and a sense of empowerment (particularly amongst women), decreasing experiences of negative

\(^{42}\) A detailed summary report is available upon request or on [www.soulcity.org.za](http://www.soulcity.org.za), Soul City - Audience Reception.

\(^{43}\) The Soul City adult series targets “African” and “Coloured” previously disadvantaged South Africans. Although the series is suitable for all populations, theory of communication suggests that specific targeting and testing of materials makes it more effective. Soul City is however committed to the health and development of all South Africans irrespective of colour, race or any other characteristic.

\(^{44}\) Independent study conducted by Markdata: HIV/AIDS – Popular Perceptions And Dangerous Delusions, A Profile Of Risk-Awareness And Attitudes To The Disease Among South Africans In Late 1999, February 2000

social- or peer pressure, and with shifting people's attitudes, intentions and intermediate practice (health-seeking / support-seeking behaviour as well as support-giving behaviour) towards sustaining healthier behaviour.

There is a degree of variation in the consistency of quantitative associations observed across topics covered in Soul City 4 and impact investigated in the evaluation. For example, evaluation results suggest that the Soul City 4 edutainment vehicle was largely not successful in reaching its objectives with regards to the following: increasing knowledge around institutional support for financing small business; increasing an understanding of what constitutes sexual harassment; changing personal attitudes pertaining to sexual behaviour; changing attitudes and perceptions of social norms around sexual harassment; and changing behavioural intention in the area of small business development and personal savings.

However, a consistent quantitative association between exposure to Soul City 4 and the following key behavioural processes have been observed:

- increase in knowledge and awareness of violence against women, hypertension and HIV/AIDS / youthsexuality;
- improvement in personal attitudes and beliefs around domestic violence and maintenance of positive attitudes in the area of HIV/AIDS and youth sexuality;\(^{46}\);
- stimulating interpersonal communication around domestic violence and HIV/AIDS;\(^{47}\)
- perception of the social norm becoming more positive around domestic violence and HIV/AIDS / youth sexuality;\(^{48}\)
- improvement in intention towards positive behaviour for hypertension, domestic violence, sexual harassment and HIV/AIDS / youth sexuality.

As a rule, qualitative evidence supports and further illustrates quantitative associations observed. In some areas mentioned above where there is no quantitative evidence of an association between change and exposure to Soul City, there is qualitative evidence of such an association. For example, qualitative evidence suggests that change in personal attitudes around HIV/AIDS and sexual behaviour as well as change in awareness and intention around small business development and personal savings (which were not measured or observed quantitatively) can be attributed to the Soul City edutainment vehicle.

In addition to individual and interpersonal change mentioned earlier, there is qualitative evidence of Soul City’s positive impact on self-efficacy – especially amongst women.

There is no indication that exposure to Soul City 4 directly increased perception of personal risk in the area of hypertension or HIV/ AIDS. In fact, perception of risk generally decreased from baseline to evaluation measurement. Interpretation of such decreases is difficult: it may be related to increased knowledge and positive behaviour which can be associated with exposure to Soul City 4; it may also be related to persistent personal denial despite health communication efforts. There is qualitative evidence that exposure to Soul City at least indirectly increased perception of risk in the sense that Soul City contributes to knowledge and awareness that monogamy is not a safeguard against contracting HIV, that HIV/AIDS is very real, and that hypertension can affect anyone.

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\(^{46}\) hypertension and personal savings attitudes were not measured  
\(^{47}\) hypertension, personal savings and sexual harassment interpersonal communication was not measured  
\(^{48}\) hypertension and personal savings subjective social norms were not measured
Change observed in association with exposure to Soul City 4 is applicable within the
general target audience, as well as specifically amongst harder-to-reach audiences
(such as rural audiences) in most instances. Furthermore, some key messages
seemed to have successfully reached particular audience segments at risk, or
audience segments integral to sustainable change in the particular area / topic: for
example, women in particular showed positive change in intention around HIV testing
for themselves and their partners; men’s awareness of emotional abuse increased,
their attitudes regarding whether women deserve to be beaten changed positively,
and their intention to do something to stop domestic violence improved. A further
illustration is the growing perception amongst youth of a positive social norm around
women’s independence and self-sufficiency.

**Behaviour change:**
In the areas of Hypertension and Small Business Development & Personal Savings,
exposure to Soul City 4 is quantitatively associated with positive behaviour change.
For HIV/AIDS, exposure to Soul City is primarily associated with maintaining positive
behaviour. Soul City 4 is consistently associated with positive intermediate behaviour
(support-giving and support-seeking behaviour) for HIV/AIDS and Domestic Violence.

Although there is qualitative evidence of behaviour change in the areas of HIV/AIDS
and Domestic Violence, there is no compelling evidence of quantitatively measurable
behaviour change in these areas. It must be noted that in the case of Domestic Violence,
the association between behavioural responses and exposure to Soul City 4 could not be reliably investigated due to technical constraints in analysis (the
number of responses were too small to allow reliable analysis). Alternative methods
of analysis employed suggest that there may be an association between exposure to
Soul City and positive behaviour for violence against women amongst respondents
with primary education. Thus, other than in more general terms (referring to “doing
something to stop domestic violence”), Soul City’s quantitative association with
positive behaviour in the area of domestic violence remains largely unanswered.

These observations need to be interpreted against the following background: the
evaluation period was relatively short, with only eight to nine months between
baseline and evaluation measurement. In the case of Domestic Violence, where the
Soul City 4 intervention was the first attempt of this nature and scale to address
domestic violence in South Africa, expecting measurable behaviour change over a
nine-month period may be unrealistic given the complexity of the issues involved in
domestic violence. Soul City has covered HIV/AIDS for a much longer period of time
(since 1994); this may account for the more easily detectable association between
Soul City and positive behaviour in HIV/AIDS. Again (with reference to HIV/AIDS
behaviour), expecting to see “new” behaviour change over a nine-month period may
also be unrealistic, and may support non-linear theories of behaviour change.

In the areas where behaviour is less complex and more under the control of the
individual (Hypertension and Personal Savings), exposure to Soul City is associated
with behaviour change despite the short period of time between baseline and
evaluation measurement.

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49 Theories of social / behaviour change are discussed in Soul City – Theory and Impact
(synopsis)
Soul City's impact on communities and society\textsuperscript{50} was primarily investigated qualitatively. Qualitative evidence (supported by quantitative data) consistently illustrate that Soul City (in partnership with the National Network on Violence Against Women) contributed to creating a supportive environment for facilitating and maintaining behaviour change in the area of Domestic Violence and HIV/AIDS in particular.

The Partnership Evaluation Study systematically documents how the Soul City 4 intervention impacted on the national policy implementation environment through a successful advocacy strategy (including direct lobbying, media advocacy and community mobilisation) which contributed to raising public debate around domestic violence and facilitated the speedy implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA). In the longer term, sustained advocacy for successful implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (i.e. improved service delivery, including more sensitive service delivery) is crucial in order to follow-through on immediate or short term gains made by the Soul City / National Network on Violence Against Women Partnership.

The Qualitative Impact Assessment captures Soul City’s impact on local organisational / institutional policies and practices (particularly with reference to HIV/AIDS and youth sexuality). It influences people in leadership positions in the community, shapes, enhances and supplements communication between community leadership and their constituencies, and begins to impact on reorientation of services.

Furthermore, Soul City is reported to shift community norms, and to stimulate community dialogue and debate: through media advocacy and community mobilization mentioned earlier (with reference to Domestic Violence), as well as through the edutainment vehicle (with reference to Domestic Violence, HIV/AIDS & Youth Sexuality) Soul City raised public debate nationally (domestic violence) and within communities (Domestic Violence, HIV/AIDS & Youth Sexuality).

Soul City 4 increased access to services (in the areas of Hypertension, HIV/AIDS, and Domestic Violence). Given the limitations in resources, the Stop Women Abuse Helpline addressed a substantial need in the South African society, and increased access to crisis counselling and referral services for people affected by violence against women. On a very sober note, the impact of the Partnership on connecting people affected by violence against women to services must be interpreted in relation to the broader context in which services function in South Africa: barriers such as access to, and poor quality of services in some areas of the country limit the Soul City 4 intervention’s effective and sustainable impact in creating a supportive environment for change.

The holistic impact of Soul City on one community in particular (with reference to Soul City 4 and previous series) is well illustrated in the powerful account of community empowerment and collective efficacy documented in detail in a case study that formed part of the National Qualitative Impact Assessment: Soul City fostered a sense of co-operation and togetherness in problem-solving within the community. It increased collective health consciousness; facilitated a sense of collective empowerment to effect change in the community; facilitated collective action and the formalization of community structures; and reinforced social networks. Soul City further facilitated a positive vision and hope for a better future for the community.

\textsuperscript{50} Detailed reports are available upon request or on www.soulcity.org.za, Soul City 4 Impact Evaluation – Violence Against Women Vol II and Soul City 4 Evaluation Results – Integrated Summary Report.
Soul City’s **cost-effectiveness** was investigated on selected constructs in the areas of HIV/AIDS and Violence Against Women\(^{51}\).

Preliminary comparison of **cost per person reached** by the Soul City 4 edutainment vehicle is extremely favourable (under US$ 0.30 for Soul City Television and Print, and under US$0.05 for Soul City Radio) due to the huge popularity of Soul City amongst the South African population.

Notwithstanding the fact that a technically correct comparison between Soul City’s cost effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness of e.g. other HIV prevention programmes is not possible without additional research which overcomes limitations in the behavioural data used in this cost-outcome description, it must be taken into account that this is one of the first cost-outcome studies of its kind. Soul City therefore by necessity becomes a benchmark in itself, and needs to be assessed in this context.

Assessment in this light is bound to be favourable – where (under the joint media assumption\(^{52}\)), Soul City 4 is associated with increases\(^{53}\) in HIV/AIDS knowledge, intention, and action, as well as with increases in Violence Against Women awareness and knowledge for under US$ 0.90, and with improvement in Violence Against Women attitudes for under US$ 3.00. Under this assumption, increases in Violence Against Women action is far more costly at just under US$ 116.

Costs drop remarkably though under the increased reach assumption\(^{54}\): Soul City 4 is associated with increases in HIV/AIDS knowledge, intention, and action, as well as with increases in Violence Against Women awareness, knowledge and attitude for under US$ 0.40, and with increases in Violence Against Women action for under US$ 7.00.

**In conclusion**, data consistently support the overall assessment that holistically seen, as a comprehensive health communication intervention aiming to impact on individual as well as environmental determinants of health and development, Soul City 4 was effective (and cost-effective at face value) in bringing about observable social and behavioural change (including the factors that form part of the broader behaviour change process), and in contributing to maintaining positive behaviour – notably so in the areas of Domestic Violence and HIV /AIDS & Youth Sexuality.

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\(^{51}\) A detailed summary report is available upon request or on [www.soulcity.org.za](http://www.soulcity.org.za), **Soul City 4 – Cost Effectiveness**

\(^{52}\) The joint media assumption suggests that, to gain desired impact, each media integrates together to reinforce messages and therefore acts as a unit that cannot be separated. Cost-effectiveness analysis is based on comparison between respondents with no exposure to any Soul City media, and respondents with exposure to all Soul City media.

\(^{53}\) (i.e. based on single unit increases)

\(^{54}\) The assumption states that Soul City achieves increased coverage through its multi-media strategy, and is therefore based on comparison between respondents with no exposure to any Soul City media, and respondents with exposure to any Soul City media.