

# The “We Can” Campaign in South Asia, 2004-2011

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## *External Evaluation Report*



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*Note: in this report, “I” refers to the author, “we” to the broader evaluation team.*

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
## Executive Summary

*This **summative evaluation** was commissioned by OGB to cover the full 7-year period of the regional “We Can” campaign. A small, external team had a total of some 120 woman-days spread over three months to address a complex set of evaluation questions. The conclusions presented are based on rich – if somewhat incomplete – internal documentation and primary data gathered in key informant interviews, workshops, and field research in India and Nepal. This realist, utilisation-focused evaluation centres on key aspects of the campaign identified with the users of this evaluation, to serve accountability and learning purposes.*

“We Can” has been Oxfam GB’s (OGB) **largest-scale intervention on violence against women (VAW)**, in a sub-continent infested with deeply entrenched gender inequalities and VAW. Its overall goal has been to **reduce the social acceptance of VAW across six countries of South Asia**. Within six years (2004-2010), the campaign would achieve four objectives:

- a fundamental shift in social attitudes and beliefs that support VAW
- a collective and visible stand by different sections of the community against VAW
- a popular movement to end all VAW
- a range of local, national and regional alliances to address VAW

The campaign was developed by the OGB gender working group in South Asia, and first launched in 2004. It was implemented by diverse campaign alliances in six countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. OGB country offices initially invited partners in on-going projects to form fledgling “We Can” alliances. There was no blueprint for alliance development; alliance structures and processes varied from country to country. The campaign allies had much leeway in developing their mobilisation strategies – within a joint, clearly articulated regional strategy. High quality campaign materials were centrally designed, and subsequently adjusted to national contexts and languages.



*Extract from a flip chart for “change makers”*

A “culmination event” in March 2011 marked the end of OGB’s formal involvement in the *regional* campaign. “We Can” has continued in at least four South Asian countries. Several OGB country offices still support it in different ways. A “Global ‘We Can’ Network”, bringing together members of national “We Can” alliances around the world, is expected to be formally inaugurated in November 2011, to facilitate learning among alliances and foster the emergence of a global “We Can” movement.

“We Can” is dissimilar to other OGB campaigns in that it has **triggered gradual, open-ended personal development processes** across all social strata. Some **3.9 million “change makers” (CM)** have pledged (i) to end violence against women and gender-based discrimination in their own lives, and (ii) to convince others to follow their model. The “We Can” theory of change has placed a share of responsibility for social change with each individual, **inviting both women and men to transform their thinking and**

**take action** to end VAW. Such action has ranged from seemingly small changes in daily household routines (e.g. by *not* practising traditions that deny nutritious food to women), to transformation of policies and practice in schools and government institutions (e.g. by integrating VAW prevention into local development initiatives).

This approach **differs from “traditional” Oxfam campaigns** which tend to focus on rallying popular support for specific objectives in policy advocacy. Unlike other OGB campaigns, “We Can” was *not* Oxfam branded and not formally Oxfam-led. Campaign leadership was collective and somewhat informal, shared by some 3,300 campaign alliance members (“allies”) across the sub-continent. The campaign was **created and managed by an OGB regional office**. These unusual features might be partly responsible for uneven levels of appreciation and support within Oxfam headquarters and country offices.

We have found the campaign **relevant, effective and efficient**. “We Can” has prompted sustainable change, but it is difficult to predict to what extent the campaign alliances will continue to function.

**Relevance:** The campaign approach is **coherent with good practice in VAW prevention**, and the **Oxfam International objective** *“to end gender-based violence by changing ideas, attitudes and beliefs of men and women that permit violence against women”*. It is highly **relevant to local needs** – VAW is a major impediment to human development in South Asia – and resources, as it complements previous and parallel efforts to end VAW, and brings the issue of VAW to vast new audiences.

**Effectiveness:** Diverse individual and collective paths of change, different contexts and an infinite range of possible outcomes linked to the multi-faceted issue of VAW have made it **difficult to measure results**. In view of the innovative nature of “We Can”, OGB has appropriately invested in regular consultation among country campaign “leads” and within country alliances; several peer reviews; and large, multi-method assessments. However, **patchy monitoring and documentation**, especially in the first years of the campaign, have yielded an incomplete picture of overall progress and outcomes.

“We Can” has reached its objective to generate *“a collective and visible stand by different sections of the community against VAW”*. The campaign has **mobilised some 3,300 of organisations and millions of individuals**. One can reasonably assume that “We Can” has supported **attitude change among some 7.4 million** women and men. “Change makers” and people inspired by CMs have probably engaged others in some **21 million conversations** on gender equality and VAW, often “breaking the silence” in settings where the subject of VAW used to be taboo. Although it would **be too early to speak of a region-wide movement or a fundamental shift** in social norms across the sub-continent, “We Can” has contributed to individual and institutional transformation in a wide range of localities and situations.

**Factors for success:** CM mobilisation and the degrees of change observed among CMs have varied from country to country. Overall, three types of factors appear critical for effective CM engagement:

- **Action** reinforcing the change, such as daily gestures that bolster gender equality (e.g. men and boys sharing household chores) and frequent exchanges with other CMs and like-minded people
- An **enabling environment**, created by abundant communication materials, campaign events, sympathetic relatives and friends, groups that pursue goals close to those of “We Can”, supportive institutional policies, and favourable macro-level context factors
- **Personal characteristics**, such as expectations, self-perceptions, intentions, social role and physical characteristics, which determine to some extent the range of activities an individual can undertake.

It seems that the degree of support provided by experienced OGB staff, and campaign allies’ knowledge and skills related to gender equality and VAW have been key determinants of effective implementation.

**Efficiency:** Complexity and lack of data from comparable campaigns make it hard to determine whether the considerable **financial and human resources** mobilised could have yielded more or “better” outcomes if used differently. Overall, the considerable resources mobilised (over £10.5mn up to 1 April 2011) appear **commensurate with the scope** of the campaign. The human and financial resources made available varied from country to country; overall, “We Can” has been extraordinarily successful in mobilising public and private donor funds (including UK and Dutch government funding), and £0.5mn from the *Oxfam Unwrapped* fundraising scheme.

Campaign planning and communications development followed **standards of good practice**. The appealing, **context-sensitive** campaign materials have spread beyond the “We Can” alliances, making their way into other projects run by campaign allies and OGB, and such institutions as schools and police academies. **Risk management** focused on preventing “message drift”, and on CMs’ personal safety. It seems that more systematic efforts could have been undertaken to ensure that VAW survivors seeking support from CMs and allies would be referred to appropriate services.

**Sustainability:** Campaign allies in at least four countries agree **“We Can” is worth continuing**. As of August 2011, months after OGB’s exit from the regional campaign, four national alliance secretariats appear **operational, but not fully independent from Oxfam**. OGB continues to provide campaign leadership (Pakistan), capacity building (Nepal, India), participation as an alliance member (Bangladesh) and fiscal sponsorship (India, Bangladesh). Most **national alliance strategies or visions beyond 2011 are vague** on funding and management; and secretariats are struggling to cover their operating costs.

**Impact:** “We Can” has demonstrably contributed to **transforming (i) attitudes**, expressed in broader public awareness for VAW-related issues, “internal” personal development among CMs, and “external” activism, and **(ii) social norms** within participating organisations, other institutions and localised groups. Attitudinal and institutional changes as promoted by “We Can” reflect good practice in VAW prevention, and are therefore **likely to contribute to reducing the incidence of VAW**. Given the multitude of factors that influence the occurrence of VAW, the exact scope and nature of this contribution could not be measured within the scope of this evaluation.

## MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of our findings, I would encourage **Oxfam** to:

1. Recognise that **“We Can” has enriched Oxfam** with a novel campaign model. The “change maker” approach could be of value to other campaigns and projects that aim to influence people’s attitudes and beliefs, frames and values – not only on VAW.
2. **Define, country by country, OGB’s current and future role** for or within the national alliances that currently receive support from OGB country offices. In some countries, it may be appropriate for Oxfam to remain involved in “We Can” over the coming years.
3. **Support the emerging “Global ‘We Can’ Network”** to foster more systematic learning from “We Can”, on the basis of a strategic plan that describes the network’s purpose, structure, membership, decision-making processes, expected outcomes, and monitoring and documentation systems.
4. Elucidate and document the reasons why the national alliances in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka seem to have come to a halt, so that lessons learned can be integrated into future plans.
5. Reflect on ways in which future **regionally-led initiatives** can be linked more effectively and productively to Oxfam’s overall life, learning and global profile.
6. In future campaigns, and alliance- or network-building initiatives, create **transparent, participatory decision-making structures and processes**, and devise “exit” and hand-over strategies early on.
7. In future complex, innovative work, **develop documentation, monitoring and learning systems** that respond to the participants’ and other relevant stakeholders’ key needs and resources.

8. In work on people's attitudes and social norms, **obtain expert support** from practice-oriented specialists in social and development psychology, so as to build robust, evidence-based conceptual frameworks for effective planning, monitoring and reporting.

The **Global “We Can” Network** should:

9. **Fully document and clearly outline** its purpose, structure, membership, decision-making processes, expected outcomes, monitoring and documentation systems, so as to promote full ownership by all members and recognition of the network by outsiders.
10. Create opportunities for **joint reflection among “We Can” allies** around the world through meetings, exchange visits and “virtual” platforms, and **document** deliberations and learning in an easily accessible form (e.g. a password-protected site open to all “We Can” allies).
11. **Invite experienced practitioners** in the fields of social and adult development psychology to help build more powerful planning and monitoring frameworks for “We Can” campaigns.
12. **Engage in action research:** Oxfam affiliates have supported new “We Can” campaigns on four continents. To draw full learning benefits, they could agree on a basic set of indicators and tools for monitoring. Comparative research could provide valuable learning for “We Can”, for future VAW prevention endeavours and other work on attitudes and social norms.

Finally, **donors’** funding decisions exert a strong influence on the way in which recipients plan, implement and value their own work. They should:

13. **Allow for adjustments in** log-frames, and results-based planning and monitoring formats, so that “We Can” campaigners and others who work on social transformation can compellingly describe and value complex processes.
14. **Support research** on “We Can” – possibly participatory, multi-disciplinary research that could involve experienced feminists, public health and social psychology specialists –, so as to contribute to the much-needed development of robust evidence on “what works” in VAW prevention.

*Specific recommendations for the “We Can” alliance members are included in chapter IV of the full evaluation report.*



*Sequence from a campaign flip-chart for CMs*



## I. Brief Introduction to the “We Can” Campaign

Starting from early 2001, the Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) South Asia gender working group (GWG) engaged in planning a campaign to end violence against women, which would (i) link up with existing OGB programmes, (ii) address attitudes and beliefs, and (iii) work with women and men (GWG 11/2001). The campaign would be grounded in research, summarised in Oxfam Briefing Paper 66 “*Towards Ending Violence against Women in South Asia*” (Mehta 2004). It identifies “*the pervasive culture of gender-based violence in South Asia*” and “*the rules of a patriarchal system which reinforces gender inequalities*” as key obstacles to development. It concludes: “*until men’s and women’s belief that violence against women is a ‘private’ matter and culturally acceptable is challenged and changed, the violence and discrimination will continue.*”

### CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES

The public “We Can” campaign strategy paper (CSP 2005) states the following goal and objectives:

*Campaign Goal: Reduce social acceptance of VAW across six countries of South Asia*

*Campaign Objectives: Over the next six years in these six countries, the campaign will achieve:*

- *A fundamental shift in social attitudes and beliefs that support VAW*
- *A collective and visible stand by different sections of the community against VAW*
- *A popular movement to end all VAW*
- *A range of local, national and regional alliances to address VAW*

“We Can” takes up Amartya Sen’s findings on the 50 million “missing women” in South Asia – it aims to mobilise five million “change agents” who would influence 50 million “ordinary men and women” and decision-makers (CSP 2005). The campaign does *not* pretend to reduce the incidence of VAW. But it attempts to create a social environment that prevents VAW: e.g. by encouraging men and boys to adopt and promote more gender-equal attitudes and behaviour; women and girls to protect themselves from violence; survivors of VAW to seek support and break the cycle of violence; and people in organisations *not* primarily concerned with VAW (e.g. schools, local government institutions) to recognise VAW as an impediment to reaching their goals, and to integrate VAW prevention into their work.

### THE “WE CAN” THEORY OF CHANGE

“We Can” has been inspired by a model of intentional change - the “Stages of Change Theory”, which *Raising Voices* in Uganda has applied in much-acclaimed community-based VAW prevention projects. “We Can” rests on three pillars: the “change makers”, mass communication, and large, diverse alliances.

**Change Maker Mobilisation:** “We Can” combines conventional campaigning techniques – like alliance-building and public communication through mass media – with the novel “change maker” (CM) concept. Five million women and men would be persuaded to become “**change makers**”, i.e. to (i) engage in personal development processes (“*internal activism*”), and (ii) involve others (“*external activism*”) in their efforts for gender equality and against VAW.

Phase I of the campaign has focused on awareness-raising that encourages individuals to reflect on VAW and gender inequality in their own lives. Women and men join the campaign with the “**CM pledge**” (i) “*not to tolerate or perpetuate violence against women under any circumstances, and (ii) to motivate at least ten people to help prevent and end gender discrimination and violence against women*”.<sup>1</sup> Phase II was designed to systematically re-engage CMs and support them in “deepening” change, through the participation of CMs in local-level activities and work with institutions they may be part of.

**Mass appeal through appropriate communication materials:** “We Can” campaigners have developed widely accessible, context-sensitive communication materials. Posters, comic booklets, newsletters, flip

<sup>1</sup> Retrieved on 11/8/2011 from <http://www.wecanendvaw.org/change-makers-pledge>

charts, and audio and video clips were designed to trigger reflection among audiences unfamiliar with concepts of gender equality, and accompany the stages of personal change and public activism. A core item was the “change maker kit”: *“The Change Maker Kit is a collection of materials and visual resources, such as workbooks, pamphlets, story booklets, comic cards, posters, and information about the Campaign and the issues, which in the first years of the Campaign were widely distributed and used by the Change Makers. The idea behind the kit [...] is that as Change Makers use it with others, their own understanding becomes enhanced. [...]”* (TSSF: 76)

Unlike typical social marketing campaigns, “We Can” messaging does *not* prescribe a simple, single action (e.g. calling a help line). Instead, it aims to prompt personal reflection and action commensurate with CMs’ abilities and contexts. The campaign has its own distinctive branding and logo (developed in 2004, see cover page of this report). A deliberate choice was made *not* to use any Oxfam “branding”.

**Scale and spread through alliances:** Oxfam started building “We Can” campaign alliances in 2004. In Bangladesh a *national* alliance began with 7 organisational members (WCLM 9/2004). In India, alliances started chiefly at *state* levels; in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, they were created by Oxfam partners in *districts* (TSSF: 40-50). The alliances have followed different paths of development.

- **Bangladesh:** Currently, a 33-strong national committee leads the campaign, which is carried forward by some 500 organisations, including “unusual” allies e.g. boy scouts and girl guides, trade unions, business and professional associations. 517 women and 766 men lead “We Can” alliances in 48 districts, covering three-quarters of the country’s districts.<sup>2</sup>
- **India:** National alliance members are present in 13 states, reaching a total of 219 districts, i.e. about one-third of all districts. In twelve states, the “We Can” alliance is led by a single “nodal agency”, which functions as a state secretariat.<sup>3</sup>
- **Nepal:** “We Can” alliances, animated by some 360 organisations, exist at national, regional (3 networks) and district (37 alliances) levels; an inter-district alliance has been formed by local government bodies who participate in the campaign.<sup>4</sup> The national alliance (20 members) has reached 4 development regions and 41 out of the country’s 75 districts.
- **Pakistan:** The national “We Can” alliance co-ordinates 750 allies (TSSF 11: 42). It reaches 35 districts in 5 provinces, i.e. about one-third of the country’s districts (Pakistan CGM 4/2010 and 4/2011).
- **Sri Lanka:** In 2009, the campaign, run by “district action groups” (DAG) and co-ordinated by a national alliance of some 10 members, aimed to reach 19 districts (out of 25).<sup>5</sup> Up to eight “We Can” centres with dedicated staff facilitated the campaign (TSSF: 65).
- **Afghanistan:** An alliance of six Kabul-based organisations launched “We Can” in a series of public events in late 2010/ early 2011.<sup>6</sup>

There has not been any overall South Asian *regional* alliance. Until March 2011, the OGB South Asia Regional Centre hosted a **regional “We Can” secretariat** within its Global Centre of Learning on VAW.

*A more comprehensive description of the campaign, its history and the underlying “stages of change” theory is available in Annex C, The “We Can” Campaign in South Asia – Brief Description.*

<sup>2</sup> Personal communication from Bangladesh “We Can” secretariat, June 2011

<sup>3</sup> Personal communications from India “We Can” secretariat, July and September 2011

<sup>4</sup> Personal communication from OGB staff in Nepal, July 2011 and WSV

<sup>5</sup> Sri Lanka “We Can” Strategy 2008-2011. Little information has been available from Sri Lanka.

<sup>6</sup> AR AFG 2010-11. Little information has been available from Afghanistan; my findings draw chiefly on the only progress report (AR AFG 2010-2011), occasional communications from Oxfam staff in Kabul and survey forms filled in by “We Can” Afghan allies (July-August 2011). Other sources cite 8 alliances in Afghanistan (TSSF 11: 26).

## II. Evaluation Methodology

“We Can” appears to be one of the most-reviewed campaigns to end VAW. OGB undertook a first round of internal reviews in five campaign countries in 2006-7. Large-scale in-depth outcome assessments were carried out 2007 (phase I, India and Bangladesh) and 2009-10 (phase II assessment in five countries). A 148-page book (TSSF) traces the history of the campaign. “Change maker” stories<sup>7</sup> are available on the campaign web-site and print materials. Yet, the wealth of materials fails to draw an overall, sharp picture of the campaign outcomes and its critical success factors. The current evaluation process has been commissioned to obtain “*a more black and white picture*”, to be sketched by an external evaluator<sup>8</sup>.

I have adopted a utilisation-focused approach (Patton, 2008), making this a participatory evaluation for and with its primary users, to serve specified uses. The evaluation approach and design are described in more detail in Annex D to this report, *Evaluation Methodology*. As per its terms of reference (TOR), the evaluation focuses on OGB’s contribution to the campaign. The TOR list over 30 detailed, fairly complex questions grouped according to the standard OECD-DAC criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability). I have limited the scope of the evaluation in three ways:

- Focusing on the more innovative building blocks of the campaign – the CM concept and the mobilisation of “mixed” alliances on women’s rights issues. This means that more “conventional” features of “We Can” campaigning, such as the quality of its communication materials, are not reviewed in much detail.
- Using case studies based on field research in two countries (India and Nepal), selected to represent diverse forms of campaign implementation.<sup>9</sup>
- Abstaining from primary research on the change experienced by CMs – instead, the comprehensive phase II assessment reports and data sets were used.

In the inception phase, Oxfam’s evaluation questions were translated into broad indicators for each of the five DAC criteria. For each set of indicators, I set a specific level of analysis – regional or case study (see table in annex D, *Evaluation Methodology*). A rich mix of “objective” and “subjective”, “qualitative” and “quantitative” data was collected and analysed, with the support of Laura Ceresna and Rosa Garwood (see annex *Evaluation Team*). In addition to this report, an inception report (20 pages) and a 20-page “good practice” document summarising learning for a broader audience were produced. Two power point presentations provide condensed summaries of the inception and evaluation reports respectively.

In view of the challenges outlined in annex D and the limits of a 30-page format, this report cannot pretend to deliver the ultimate truth on “We Can”. But it offers conclusions obtained through verifiable data collection processes from numerous, diverse sources. These conclusions are the author’s only; they do not claim to represent Oxfam’s position or that of other participants in the “We Can” campaign.

*Annex D, Evaluation Methodology, provides a fuller description of the evaluation approach, its design and implementation, including information on conceptual and operational challenges. Samples of the tools used, information about the team and the TOR can be found in the subsequent annexes.*

<sup>7</sup> The exact number of CM stories collected at various moments of the campaign is unknown, as CM stories have not been centrally recorded. The Indian campaign secretariat estimates that several thousand stories were collected at different levels (August 2011).

<sup>8</sup> Communication from OGB SARC staff member, May 2011

<sup>9</sup> Security concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the onset of Ramadan in early August, and anticipated difficulties in obtaining Sri Lanka visa (SARC) also informed the choice of countries.

### III. Findings

#### III.A Relevance: “Has Oxfam done the right thing?”

##### RELEVANCE TO PEOPLE’S NEEDS AND RESOURCES

The “We Can” campaign addresses a pressing need. Violence and gender-based discrimination against women have reached extremely high levels in South Asia. (UN Women 2011a, UNICEF 2011) Research has established that violence against women is underpinned by gender-inequitable attitudes and social norms.<sup>10</sup> The World Health Organisation (WHO 2010: 53) recommends efforts to transform social norms as key elements in the prevention of intimate partner and sexual violence.

“We Can” is such an effort. It invites its audience – women and men – to discover the forms of gender-based discrimination they experience in their daily lives, and to embark on a journey of personal change. The campaign principle that *“every change has equal value”* (TSSF: 18) potentially empowers anyone to take action commensurate with their abilities and other resources.

##### COHERENCE WITH ESTABLISHED THEORIES ON ENDING VAW

The “We Can” theory of change rests on assumptions that are **grounded in evidence**. Socio-psychological research confirms that attitudes and norms do change. For example, attitudes may be deepened in discussion with like-minded people. On the other hand, attitudes may be weakened or reversed by the discovery that one holds contradictory ideas, or that one’s personal standards diverge from prevailing social norms (“cognitive dissonance”).<sup>11</sup> The importance of social factors in attitude change validates the emphasis on scale and diverse alliances in “We Can”.

Due to the dearth of robust evaluations, publicly available information on **“what works” in VAW prevention** is limited to a few specific interventions in particular contexts (e.g. the response rate to a series of posters displayed in Victoria State, Australia; viewers’ interpretations of TV spots on VAW aired in Morocco).<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, a consensus has emerged among public health specialists and campaigners around the world that the following approaches promise good results in VAW prevention<sup>13</sup>:

- Multi-disciplinary, multi-layered strategies that address structural causes of violence and challenge the acceptance of VAW
- Working with men through strategies that address men’s individual, subjective experience
- Targeting youth, as *“adolescence is a time when attitudes and values about ‘correct’ behaviours are often learned and internalised”* (Barker and Ricardo 2005)
- Context-sensitivity - *“an effective strategy is one that is designed to be culture- and region-specific, [...] and involving the community and individual stakeholders in the design of interventions.”* (UNICEF 2000: 15)
- Sensitivity to the multiple facets of women’s identities to ensure equal voice and access (“intersectionality”)
- Ending impunity – enforcing laws that punish the perpetrators of VAW

“We Can” in South Asia responds to these criteria: it explicitly addresses gender inequality as a cause of VAW; it has built diverse, multi-disciplinary alliances that intervene on various levels and include socially marginalised groups; it has deliberately embraced men and boys as “change makers”; it has targeted youth and educational institutions; it has used locally relevant communication materials and left leeway to individual allies and “change makers” to devise their own, context-specific strategies. Ending legal

<sup>10</sup> Cranwell et al., Flood (2005), Lee et al. (2007), Morrison et al. (2004), Nayak et al. (2003), VicHealth (2006)

<sup>11</sup> Cooper et al. (2004: 252-263); see also Berkowitz (2004), Bohner and Wänke (2002)

<sup>12</sup> Bott (2005), and Raab and Rocha (2010)

<sup>13</sup> Raab (2009) reviewed some 80 publications on VAW prevention, including WHO (2010), UN SG (2006: 21), UNICEF (2000: 13), UNDAW (2005: 3); Ferguson et al. (2004: 51); Barker & Ricardo (2005); UNIFEM (2003a: 77)

impunity is *not* an explicit campaign objective. However, breaking the silence on VAW can be interpreted as ending the “social” impunity of VAW. Judicial means are left to other actors, e.g. police and justice – who have been part of the campaign in some instances, e.g. in Orissa, India. (Pancholi 2011)

#### RELEVANCE TO VAW-RELATED EFFORTS BY OTHER ACTORS AND LOCAL RESOURCES

##### **“We Can” has offered a common platform for a range of human rights and development groups.**

The Bangladesh “We Can” Alliance appears to have brought together a country-wide “critical mass” of activists and mass-scale civil society organisations. Its national committee boasts members of major women’s organisations (e.g. *Nari Maitree*, *Polli Sree*, *Mobila Parishad*), human rights groups (e.g. *Ain O Salish Kendra ASK*, *Manusher Jonno Foundation*, BLAST), development NGOs (including the giant BRAC), trade unions, academics, media and arts specialists (e.g. *Rupantar*, BITA), and international development actors (UNDP, Concern, Help Age).<sup>14</sup> As of mid-2010, over 2,100 allies have reportedly incorporated “We Can” into their work with grassroots groups (60% of microcredit groups, 60% of adolescent groups, 50% of char dwellers groups, and 30% of indigenous, farmers and health service groups respectively), in 52 out of the country’s 64 districts (MDG3 PR 8/2010). “We Can” developed a 26-episode TV series (*Moner Jalala*), said to have inspired public service announcements (PSAs) by the Ministry of Women and Children’s affairs (AR BAN 2006/07). “Change makers” have shared their experience on several private and national TV programmes (AR BAN 2007/08). Such substantive engagement confirms the **relevance of “We Can” to a wide range of groups** – including organisations that had not focused on VAW before. In other campaign countries, synergy between different initiatives seems to have occurred chiefly at **district levels**. For example, grassroots-level women’s self-help groups (SHG) in India have proven receptive and productive “We Can” allies, regularly discussing and devising practical solutions on VAW-related issues with their constituencies (WSDA MH, WSNA, OR 2009).

**“We Can” has enriched allies’ own efforts to end VAW.** For example, Indian national alliance members have particularly appreciated (i) the quality communication materials, which they reportedly integrated into their own programmes, as well as (ii) the visibility, recognition, and (iii) the productive contacts and (iv) international exposure “We Can” has brought. (WSSV1) *“The campaign has really changed the way we think about domestic violence. We have become more open to working with men.”* (I6) *“We have become a resource centre for police and colleges mainly for information and communication materials.”* (WSSV1)

**Silo effects?** Despite the apparent wealth of “We Can” materials and events, interlocutors from other organisations working against VAW in India and Nepal say they know little about “We Can” (IE 2, 3, 5, 6). Their incorrect assumptions about the campaign confirm this (IE3, 5, 6). Some feel that OGB should have taken more initiative to consult with women’s organisations; a senior women’s activist suggests “We Can” establish a “think tank” to strengthen ties with women’s movements. (I9, IE3, IE12) The data available do not allow judgement on the frequency and quality of the efforts OGB may have undertaken to build such ties; there seems to be considerable variation between countries.

“Silo effects”, i.e. different initiatives working in relative isolation from each other, are an undesirable but common phenomenon in development programming, often exacerbated by competition for donor funds. Yet, in campaigning, even un-coordinated actions may reinforce each other if they pursue similar objectives, as happened in Bhandara (India), where a CM reported that the *Bell Bajao* media messages have been of help in his efforts to influence his father’s attitudes.<sup>15</sup>

**Potential for wider learning:** OGB and other OI affiliates have supported “We Can” campaigns on four continents. To draw full learning benefits, “We Can” allies around the world could develop a basic set of

<sup>14</sup> Communication from Bangladesh “We Can” Secretariat, August 2011

<sup>15</sup> (FGDCM MH) *Bell Bajao* is a multi-media campaign that encourages “bystanders” to take low-risk action to stop VAW. E.g. in one video spot, a man who hears a violent domestic fight next door rings the neighbours’ doorbell and asks for milk. He disappears before the neighbour returns. See also [www.bellbajao.org](http://www.bellbajao.org) (retrieved 22/8/2011)

standard indicators and tools for their monitoring routines. Comparative research based on these data could generate priceless evidence for “We Can”, for other future VAW prevention endeavours and different work on attitudes and social norms. An appropriate action research proposal could find external support; as such evidence is rare and sought after (e.g. by UN Women and the WHO).

### RELEVANCE TO OXFAM PRIORITIES

One of the three objectives under **Oxfam International’s** gender justice change goal is to “*work [together with partners and allies] to end gender-based violence by changing ideas, attitudes and beliefs of men and women that permit violence against women.*” (OI 2007) “We Can” focuses precisely on that. However, there has been criticism from some OI affiliates (see also below, *Effectiveness*) – while others have demonstrated growing support to the campaign, co-funding “We Can” across the world.

Arguably, most campaigns – not only those on women’s rights – attempt to influence the ways in which their audiences frame and value the campaign issue. “We Can” and its **“change maker” model** could lend an extra dimension to other Oxfam campaigns. For example, the “Climate Change” campaign could gain in credibility, if it invited its audience to think of ways of reducing their own ecological footprint – and not only to express support on (electricity-guzzling) *Facebook* and *Twitter* platforms.<sup>16</sup>

**Within Oxfam GB**, “We Can” has been **the largest-scale initiative on VAW** so far. Conceptually, the “We Can” emphasis on attacking a root cause of VAW – gender inequality – logically flows from Oxfam’s history in that field. (The *Oxfam Gender Training Manual* was first published in 1994.) Yet, a recent review of OGB work on gender-based violence (GBV) has noted a lack of an organisational agreement on the definition of GBV and VAW, and on appropriate ways to reduce violence. Globally, only 14 OGB programmes squarely address GBV/VAW. The authors point out that “*the ‘We Can’ campaign [...] has one of the clearest articulations of a model of change or theory of change*” (Wilson-Garwood and Lindley-Jones, 2011). “*Power is central to the ‘We Can’ approach, which is focused on personal and collective responsibility and power*” (*id.*:9).

“We Can” has absorbed the highest level of “unrestricted” funding among OGB’s VAW-related initiatives (*id.*), which suggests strong organisational commitment. The campaign has proven “sellable” to a wide audience, which is rare in campaigns against VAW. “Change maker kits” have been a massive success in OGB’s “*Unwrapped*” catalogue, which invites readers to “buy” symbolic gifts by donating to Oxfam.<sup>17</sup> Yet, Oxford-based staff members find it difficult to describe the position of “We Can” in OGB’s global strategy, even though OGB as a whole has been supportive to the Campaign. (I2, 3) They estimate that “We Can”, conceived and driven outside of Oxford, has not become a central part of OGB’s overall life, learning and global profile. (I1, 3) Apparently, Oxfam GB HQ-based campaigning experts were only intermittently involved in “We Can”, chiefly during the preparatory phases. Some interlocutors felt that “protective” attitudes among regional “We Can” leaders may have contributed to the lack of broader OGB ownership of the campaign. (I2, 3)

The limits of this evaluation have not permitted a close exam of the internal dynamics that might have prevented Oxfam GB headquarters (HQ) from drawing fuller benefits from, and lending unambiguous support to this regionally led campaign. It is a common challenge for international organisations to find a productive balance between central, regional and country leadership.

**Within the OGB South Asia Regional Centre**, “We Can” is seen as a unique and important campaign in Oxfam’s history, “*a huge curiosity within Oxfam*”, as it focuses on changing ideas, beliefs and attitudes rather than specific policy changes (I4). Before “We Can” started, OGB programmes on women’s rights

<sup>16</sup> See <http://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/climatechange/sow-seed>. Retrieved on 24 August 2011.

<sup>17</sup> TSSF 11: 113. The catalogue even prompted a member of *Rape Crisis England and Wales* to contact the campaign team in Delhi, who eventually visited the campaign in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand (India; TSSF 11: 122)

in South Asia focused on political participation (Afghanistan), monitoring government action on VAW (Bangladesh), economic empowerment (India), and education (Pakistan). (GWG 11/2001)

The current OGB South Asia Regional Vision and Strategy 2009-2012<sup>18</sup> places *“women’s rights at the heart of the South Asian development agenda”*. It foresees, as the first element of its women’s leadership programme, *“continued growth of ‘We Can’ campaign across all countries in South Asia”* (OGB 2009). *“‘We Can’ sits squarely in the South Asia strategy”*, as former OGB Regional Director Biranchi Upadhyaya put it. The campaign has also enriched humanitarian intervention in post-tsunami Sri Lanka and in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake. Two SARC publications include case studies that show how *“‘We Can’ materials and ‘change makers’ have contributed to preventing violence against women, and promoted gender equality in camp situations.* (Williams, 2010 and OGB SARC, 2010)

**At country levels**, the status of *“We Can”* and broader gender issues appears to vary widely, and so do the expectations placed on *“We Can”*.<sup>19</sup> The OGB **Bangladesh** 2009-2014 National Change Strategy (NCS) reserves a prominent place to women and the transformation of gender relations. It envisages the expansion of *“We Can”* to a nation-wide *“social movement for change”*. Inversely, in **Afghanistan**, *“We Can”* appears in the 2008-2011 OGB NCS as just one out of six *“gender”* activities; potential links between overlapping activities (e.g. *“We Can”* and *“awareness-raising”*) remain unexplored. The **Nepal** NCS 2009-2013 recognises that *“at all levels, social norms and beliefs dictate access to services such as education and health facilities...”*, but contains few references to gender issues; *“We Can”* is only briefly mentioned. In **Pakistan**, the 2009-2014 NCS emphasises gender mainstreaming. A strategic pillar is dedicated *“to facilitate creation of a society where women are secure and safe from all forms of violence by asserting their rights and demanding and securing from the state protection against all forms of violence”*; another pillar is girls’ education. The **Sri Lanka** 2009-2012 NCS proposes to *“integrate the ‘We Can’ campaign throughout our entire programme to build an enabling environment that supports women’s rights, promotes violence free relationships [...]”*; such *“mainstreaming”* is also expected *“to create a supportive policy climate for change.”* Finally, in **India**, the 2007-2011 OGB NCS recognises *“missing women”* as a major poverty issue. Campaigning on attitudes and beliefs through alliances and popular mobilisation is seen as a key delivery mechanism, but *“We Can”* is not mentioned. Gender and women are central to **Oxfam India’s** strategy, but so far there has not been any direct link between Oxfam India’s support for the enforcement of the Domestic Violence Act, and *“We Can”*.<sup>20</sup>

The degree to which strategies are translated into action depends to some extent on the priorities set by country offices. A regional initiative such as *“We Can”* might seem less attractive than projects initiated at country level, or than high profile global campaigns. More resolute Oxfam GB HQ backing of *“We Can”* could have ensured less disparate levels of country support to the campaign (see also below, *Efficiency*).

#### MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON RELEVANCE

The *“We Can”* campaign is **highly relevant** to the needs and resources of its audience and participants, and to OGB priorities in South Asia.

1. **“We Can” addresses major impediments to human development** in South Asia – gender inequality and VAW –, and is coherent with Oxfam’s commitment to place women’s rights at the heart of its development strategies.
2. It **complements previous and parallel efforts**. Until the 1990’s, work against VAW was largely confined to women’s organisations and centred on promoting better laws and policies (Raab & Rocha 2010), i.e. the more *“formal”* aspects of social transformation. *“We Can”* addresses the *“informal”* attitudes and social norms that are key barriers to effective enforcement of laws and policies.

<sup>18</sup> No earlier OGB South Asia strategy documents have been available.

<sup>19</sup> Since country-level national change strategy (NCS) papers have only been available starting from 2007, we have not been able to analyse the likely place of *“We Can”* in OGB country strategies before that date.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with leading Oxfam India staff, August 2011

3. It has **brought the issue of VAW to new audiences**. Extending an invitation to all sectors of society – women and men, women’s groups and “mixed” organisations – to contribute to a transformation by introducing changes into their everyday life and work, the campaign draws from good practice demonstrated by other actors (*Raising Voices* in Uganda).
4. Its well-articulated **theory of change is coherent with tested good practice in VAW prevention**. It combines “classical” campaigning, such as alliance building, mass communication and mobilisation of activists, with elements reminiscent of popular education (Paulo Freire’s “education for freedom”).
5. It is **context-sensitive**: Within the agreed strategy and branding rules, each “We Can” alliance has developed its own campaign, relevant to each context. Its much lauded **communication materials** make it possible to breach the sensitive topic of VAW in a non-confrontational manner.
6. **For Oxfam GB**, “We Can” represents an **engagement against VAW of unprecedented scope** that builds on OGB’s long history in promoting gender equality.
7. It **departs from habitual Oxfam campaign models** geared to influencing precise aspects of public policy (e.g. WTO negotiations): “We Can” aims for broad and diverse self-directed changes in social norms and in personal attitudes among millions of people across the sub-continent.
8. The **novel “change maker” approach** may contribute usefully to other work on the “informal”, “personal” drivers of social transformation, which are recognised in the current OI Strategic Plan *Demanding Justice: “Ideas, attitudes and beliefs are key to change”*.<sup>21</sup>
9. The fact that “We Can” was devised as a **regional initiative** rather than a global or country-level campaign appears to have led to **uneven levels of appreciation and of ensuing support** by Oxfam GB headquarters and country offices.

### III.B Effectiveness: “Has Oxfam achieved the intended effects?”

The original campaign goal is to generate “*a fundamental shift in social attitudes and beliefs that support VAW*”, through “*a range of local, national and regional alliances to address VAW*” which would prompt communities to take “*a collective and visible stand*” in a “*popular movement to end all VAW*” (CSP 2005). Our findings suggest that “We Can” has succeeded in mobilising large numbers of “change makers” and a wide range of allies who have taken a stand against VAW, and thus significantly contributed to transforming attitudes.

#### REGION-WIDE MOBILISATION AGAINST VAW

“Mobilisation” is commonly defined as (i) “*the act of marshalling and organising and making ready for action*”, or (ii) “*the act of assembling or putting into readiness for war or other emergency*”<sup>22</sup>. In campaigning, mobilisation refers to rallying constituencies for a particular cause. That definition works with campaigns for policy change. Its use is less straightforward with “We Can”, which promotes both “external” activism – mass pressure for change – and “internal” change, i.e. millions of personal development processes.

I will examine both aspects, starting with “classical” mobilisation, which is reflected in (i) alliance-building and (ii) activating millions of “change makers” to influence others.

**Far reaching, diverse alliances:** As of mid-2011, the “We Can” publication *The Story So Far* counts **3,300 active allies** across the region. (TSSF 11: 4) OGB has succeeded in mobilising organisations with large outreach structures, thus transporting work on gender equality and VAW deep into rural areas. OGB offices initially shaped embryonic alliances with national, state/ provincial and district-level NGO partners in on-going country programmes. Alliance membership has grown and changed over the years (WSNA IN, I8). In phase II, particular emphasis was placed on bringing in educational and other “formal”

<sup>21</sup> Summary of OISP retrieved on 6/8/2011 from [http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oi\\_strategic\\_plan\\_2007\\_0.pdf](http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oi_strategic_plan_2007_0.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> Webster’s Dictionary, retrieved on-line on 26/8/2011 from <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mobilisation>



institutions, and minority groups (e.g. Dalit and tribal associations, disabled people's groups) so as to address multiple discrimination (I5, I8).

In India, Nepal and Pakistan, alliances exist at three levels – national, state/ inter-district/ provincial and district; in Bangladesh, a “National Committee” is the only co-ordinating body above district level.<sup>23</sup> District alliances tend to bring together women and men from different backgrounds – chiefly education, development, culture and media professionals, plus smaller numbers of homemakers, local government officials, lawyers and other categories.<sup>24</sup> At national levels, development, human rights and women's NGOs appear to predominate. A notable exception is Sultana Kamal, a prominent human rights activist and politician who chairs the Bangladesh “We Can” alliance. We could not establish the overall gender balance in alliance leadership. While women have appeared to be in the majority in national alliance meetings in India, Bangladesh and Nepal; they were a minority among the district alliances representatives we met in India and at the Regional Alliance level in Nepal.

The composition of the campaign alliances and allies' regular work beyond “We Can” seems to have exerted an influence on the behavioural changes reported by CMs. In India and Pakistan, where OGB and allies run programmes on girls' access to education, most CM stories in the PII assessment refer to girls' school enrolment. In Bangladesh, where OGB had supported gender equality and gender “mainstreaming” programmes since 1996, increased participation of men in domestic chores is the most commonly cited “visible outcome”. (PII BAN) Every district alliance appears to have generated its own set of activities and outcomes. Unfortunately, the lack of monitoring and documentation systems has made it difficult to distil learning for other alliances.

**“Change makers”:** “We Can” reportedly recruited some 3.9 million “change makers” across South Asia, i.e. almost four-fifths of the original target. This figure refers to everyone who ever signed a CM registration form. It does *not* include people who, without registering as a CM, followed the “We Can” call to try and end VAW in their own lives and among others. Their number is unknown.<sup>25</sup> Basic CM data are recorded in CM databases. These provide only a rough indication of the scope of mobilisation, as variations in database design and patchy maintenance have caused considerable data loss.

*In India, less than half of the CMs are registered centrally, in a searchable SPSS-based database. Earlier CM numbers were reportedly recorded (i) as part of various proposals and reports submitted by allies in eight states up to April 2006 (some 570,000 CMs); (ii) in an uneven set of WORD, EXCEL and ACCESS files established by state alliances from May 2006 to April 2007 (412,798 CM); (iii) the SPSS database that records all CMs recruited between May 2007 and April 2010 (1,322,621 CM, of whom 1,060,698 with full data). An additional 133,923 CM have reportedly been recruited since May 2010. We verified only the SPSS datasets for 2007-2010; the scope of this evaluation did not allow a thorough examination of earlier or later Indian CM data, part of which were said to be available as “hard copies” and “huge files” in disparate formats only.<sup>26</sup>*

As of August 2011, more than 2.5 million CMs' throughout the region have been recorded in searchable national-level data bases. The following table summarises these data by country and gender:<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> No conclusive data on current alliance structures are available from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.

<sup>24</sup> Data from field work in India and Nepal and Bangladesh district alliance lists.

<sup>25</sup> PII SUM states that over 90% of “COI” (persons designated by CMs as having been targeted by the CM in conversations on VAW) reported change in their attitudes and behaviour as a result of their contacts with CMs. However, there were flaws in sampling procedures and bias issues (interviews administered by CMs).

<sup>26</sup> Information in this paragraph based on a written (e-mail) communication by the Indian alliance secretariat, 12/9/2011, and a short Skype conversation following the e-mail message..

<sup>27</sup> Full CM databases were sent by OGB and alliance secretariats to Laura, who extracted the SPSS and ACCESS data for this table. Data on Afghanistan and India “non-SPSS” numbers are based on written communications from the OGB Afghanistan country office and the India alliance secretariat respectively.

Country	CM Total	Male	Female	Trans-gender	Other gender / not indicated	Date
<i>Afghanistan</i>	7,500	3,975	3,525			Aug 11
Bangladesh	917,577	425,091	492,486			May 11
India (SPSS)	1,060,698	489,151	547,425	1,234	22,888	2010
<i>India non SPSS</i>	1,378,000	<i>(estimate, gender distribution unknown)</i>				Aug 11
Nepal	93,844	35,647	58,197			Aug 11
Pakistan	427,330	299,488	127,842			Aug 11
Sri Lanka	36,193	19,339	15,864		990	March 11
<b>TOTAL SPSS</b>	<b>2,543,142</b>	<b>1,272,691</b>	<b>1,245,339</b>	<b>1,234</b>	<b>23,878</b>	
<b>TOTAL circa</b>	<b>3,900,000</b>	<i>(including Afghanistan and India data not cross-checked in this evaluation)</i>				

The phase II assessment notes “significant” or “some” *deepening of change* among the vast majority of CMs. To qualify for “significant deepening”, CMs must articulate a clear understanding of various forms and contexts of VAW, and present evidence for continuous efforts to reduce VAW and influence others. CMs who report increased knowledge and more interest, but only episodic action, are classified as having undergone “some” deepening of change. (PII REG)<sup>28</sup>

Even though most CMs interviewed condemned VAW in any form, a large proportion did not consider an “occasional slap” by the husband as domestic violence. Male and female CMs’ answers to these two questions are alike<sup>29</sup>, which demonstrates the massive prevalence of social norms that condone VAW. Although somewhat sobering, these figures compare favourably with UNICEF (2011) research, which has found that 54% of 15-49 year-old women in India, 53% in Sri Lanka and 36% in Bangladesh consider a husband to be justified in hitting or beating his wife for at least one specified reason (i.e. if his wife burns the food, argues with him, goes out without telling him, neglects the children or refuses sexual relations).<sup>30</sup>

	<i>Estimated total CMs by mid-2011</i>	CMs interviewed	(A) Significant deepening of change	(B) Some deepening	<i>Wild Extrapolation (A)+(B)</i>	Just more awareness (C=awareness plus)	(D) No change	Full agree VAW is unacceptable	Occasional slap by husband is <i>not</i> DV
<b>BAN</b>	<i>917,577</i>	115	62%	33%	<b>871,698</b>	5%	0%	81%	16%
<b>India</b>	<i>c.2,438,000</i>	116	39%	20%	<b>1,438,420</b>	25%	12%	77%	33%
<b>NE</b>	<i>93,844</i>	100	91%		<b>85,398</b>	4%	5%	65%	no data
<b>PAK</b>	<i>427,330</i>	117	50%	34%	<b>358,957</b>	15%	0%	86%	47%
<b>SL</b>	<i>36,193</i>	112	29%	39%	<b>24,611</b>	29%	3%	no data	38%

*Data from PII REG. Grey shaded columns added by me, based on the data displayed in table at the top of this page. Afghanistan is not listed, as the phase II assessment did not include the fledgling Afghanistan campaign.*

It is difficult to gauge how many CMs have reached out to others, at country or regional scale. The India phase I assessment reported that 90% of the CMs surveyed had engaged with an average of 11 other persons each (PI IN: 3). In Pakistan, most interviewees (84%) designated by CMs as targets of CM activism (COIs) said they had learnt about the campaign from a CM; 85% had become “second generation” CMs (PII PAK). Conversely, in 2010, only 49 out of 100 “re-engaged” CMs in Nepal could produce any names of individuals they had tried to influence. (PII NE)

For a rough estimate, I have boldly extrapolated the findings from the phase II assessment. The middle column in grey shading (title *Wild Extrapolation*) is calculated on the assumption that the phase II findings

<sup>28</sup> Percentages A+B+C+D do not add up to 100% in India because PII IN included 5 “new CM”, not listed as a separate category here. In Pakistan, 1 percentage point is “missing” because of rounded figures. (PII REG)

<sup>29</sup> Additional Chi-Square tests performed with the regional PII data sets (July 2011) show no significant relation between respondents’ sex and their answers to the two sets of variables.

<sup>30</sup> A caveat: average age among CMs surveyed is significantly lower than that of the respondents in the surveys quoted by UNICEF, which makes direct comparison problematic.

on “deepened change” reflect the overall national CM situation. However, the samples drawn, although considerable for NGO standards in absolute terms, are too small to be statistically significant. Sampling procedures were flawed, e.g., the Nepal PII survey dropped an entire district from its initial selection because of inadequate CM “quality”. Several factors may have caused positive bias: many interviews were administered by local “change makers”; respondents received compensation for travel and interview time; questions related to the respondent’s own conduct were likely to trigger socially desirable responses. If we reduce the product of our wild extrapolation (c. 2.779mn) by half to factor in these flaws, we still end up with almost **1.4 million CMs** likely to have drawn others into their efforts to end VAW.<sup>31</sup>

We suppose that – on average – each of these 1.4 million “externally active” CMs has tried to influence 10 persons in their “circles of influence” (COI). The large majority (84%) of the respondents CMs had tried to influence, called “COI” in the assessment, stated that they had begun discussing the issue of VAW with others (PII REG: 25). We – conservatively – suppose that this holds true for 5 COIs per CM, and that each of them has initiated one “second-generation” conversation. As a result, **some 7 million “second-generation” conversations** would have taken place – **in addition to the estimated 14 million “first generation”** conversations started by “externally active” CMs. This is **considerable mobilisation**.

In addition to “snow-balling” CM conversations, mass media messaging (radio in Nepal, TV in Bangladesh) is likely to have broadened the campaign audience. In Bangladesh alone, the “We Can” secretariat estimates that “We Can” has reached 12 million people (MTC1: 13). No estimates are available from other countries, where different contexts and approaches may have yielded different results.

#### “COLLECTIVE ATTITUDINAL SHIFT”

“*Clean the broom before you sweep*” (FGDCM NE): “Change makers” are expected to **change their own attitudes first** – from relative ignorance and indifference, to awareness and disapproval of VAW. After that first stage, they are ready for more externalised action. Allies feel the campaign has demonstrated that such change is possible, and within everybody’s reach. (WSNA IN, 15)

In 2008, nine out of ten CMs surveyed in India reported some change, expressed e.g. in increased knowledge and confidence in discussions on VAW; more respectful behaviour towards girls and women; and successful efforts to stop parents from “marrying off” girls. (PI IN: 3) Although social desirability bias needs to be factored in – as questions about “We Can”-related change amount to asking the CM whether he/she has fulfilled his/her CM oath –, the variety of public activities reported from different sources suggests that many CMs have been active at various moments of the campaign.

*A caveat: natural **maturation** – the fact that people grow older, more knowledgeable and experienced over time –, has surely played a role in personal change processes, and probably a dramatic one among the younger “change makers”. More than half of the CMs surveyed were under 30 years old at the time of the phase II assessment (PII REG: 58). It would take massive research to model the interplay of specific campaign interventions, maturation and a wide range of context factors may have contributed to CMs’ attitude and behaviour changes over the seven-year campaign period. Most likely, each individual CM’s life would reveal a different set of contributing factors.*

The phase II assessment attempted to measure **wider social change** by interviewing women and men designated by the CMs as members of their “circles of influence” (COI). Knowledge and opinions displayed by COI were similar to CMs’, but somewhat less gender-equitable. COIs, who on average were slightly younger than CMs, reported that their exposure to “We Can” had triggered changes, which were similar to those presented in “We Can” communication materials and events:

<sup>31</sup> The results obtained by this procedure are close to the percentages quoted by campaign alliances visited in India and Nepal, who estimate that 10-40% of Indian CMs (WSSA UP, FGDCM MH) and 20-25% in Nepal (WSRA NE) are actively engaged in “We Can”. Afghan CMs are not included in this calculation. Their relatively small number they would not make a significant difference.

- “Greater community awareness of subtle and ‘invisible’ forms of VAW
- Non-acceptance of VAW and the need to intervene to stop it
- Acceptance of the belief in equality between men/women, boys/girls
- High degree of support for equal education for girls
- Support for girls’ mobility through rejecting the associated stigma
- Rejection of early marriage of girl children
- Greater participation of men in housework
- Importance of using non-abusive language towards girls and women” (PII SUM: 7)

**Another indicator for a “collective attitudinal shift” is change in institutions.** A study in four Indian states notes that “We Can” has contributed to changes in educational institutions and local administrations. Colleges have introduced discussions on VAW and girls’ rights into their programmes, and taken measures against sexual harassment and gender-based discrimination, e.g. by putting up “gender complaints boxes”. The Police Academy in Bhubaneswar (OR) has introduced mandatory classes on VAW that use “We Can” materials (Pancholi 2011). In Delhi, *Mission Convergence* (a fully government-funded programme for women’s empowerment and social security) has recognised the need to address violence against women as an important component in its programme. *Mission Convergence* has taken “We Can” campaign messages to its 123 partners in and around Delhi through training and community events; a specific module for community level work has been developed in partnership with “We Can”.<sup>32</sup> In a similar dynamic, “We Can” activism in Nepal has prompted official District and Village Development Councils to take up VAW prevention as part of their activities for women’s advancement. (WSVDC) Only the Bangladesh national alliance offers an estimate of the scope of such change: as of 2010, 375 out of 576 local governance institutions (*Union Parishad*) reportedly work on gender discrimination and VAW issues (BAN Annual Report 2009/10). “We Can” appears to have offered practical ways for local decision-makers to translate improved national policies into concrete action.

These changes are confined to specific geographical regions and institutions; the goal of causing a **fundamental shift in social norms still appears distant**. But they can be considered as significant advances in South Asia, where the implementation of anti-VAW laws and policies has been lagging behind, and rising politico-religious fundamentalisms impede progress on women’s rights.

#### CRITICAL FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

Key factors for “deepening of [attitude] change” identified in the phase II assessment (PII SUM) could be divided into three broad categories. These categories reflect the main factors of social and moral behaviour change identified in Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory, a key reference in health-related prevention programmes.

- **Factor 1 – Action** that reinforces the change, for example adjustments in daily lives that bolster gender equality (e.g. boys and men sharing household chores); frequent exchanges among CMs and campaign allies; and participation in other initiatives for gender equality. Smaller-scale, frequent activities, whereby people engage in direct dialogue and take practical actions, are considered more effective than mass communication. (PII SUM: 27)

*The Raising Voices model (Naker & Michau, 2004) was designed for intensive, community-based interventions. Transposing the model to sub-continental scale has resulted in less thorough engagement with the target audiences. In terms of intensity, Bangladesh may have come closest to the Raising Voices model, combining twice-yearly mini-campaigns (several weeks of rallies, marches, performances and other events across the country) with mass messaging through mainstream media and regular small group discussions, e.g. in courtyard meetings. (BAN campaign documentation)*

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Naseem Khan, *Mission Convergence*, July 2011

Higher proportions of “deepened change” were observed in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, where more CMs had participated in repeated, small-scale campaign events and other work on VAW than in India and Sri Lanka. (PII SUM: 16)

- **Factor 2 – An enabling environment:** Abundant communication materials, frequent campaign events, membership in an organisation that pursues goals close to those of “We Can”, and sympathetic relatives and friends create a safe setting for personal change and broader activism. The campaign materials translate the abstract concept of “gender equality” into everyday reality, with non-threatening examples that appear easy to follow. CMs report that “We Can” has enhanced their status within their families and communities. This is likely to encourage CMs to engage even more in personal and social transformation. Mobilisation of educational institutions and local administrations for “We Can” eventually contributes to an enabling environment. Sharing experience and consulting with women’s organisations outside of “We Can” may strengthen the confidence of female CMs.

Finally, **macro-level context factors** (e.g. law and law enforcement), may foster change. For example, a “We Can” ally in India reportedly assisted a divorced woman in a case against her ex-husband; the successful case prompted other women to sign up as CMs (WSDA MH). Nepali CMs effectively mobilised police against abusive husbands, thus encouraging other CMs to use the law as a deterrent against DV (PII Nepal: 29, 51).

- **Factor 3 – The Person:** A person’s expectations, self-perceptions, intentions, social role and physical characteristics, formed throughout his/her life history in interaction with his/her environment, shape his/her attitudes and options for action. For example, a married woman in a tribal region of Pakistan may have few opportunities for public activism – but she can find ways to transform her household. On the other hand, a CM who happens to be the principal of a school or college is well-placed to introduce changes in the way their institution prevents and reduces violence against women and girls. An individual’s previous exposure to GBV may also play a role (PII SUM, Aldred & Williams 2011) – a factor that is arguably commonplace on a continent where at least one in two women and probably most children, have experienced physical violence.

Campaign allies emphasise the importance of **CM “quality”** vs. quantity (WSNA IN & NE). A quality CM, who has undergone her own development process, understands what “We Can” is about and serves as a model for others: “[...] if I position myself as someone who has changed herself, I have the maximum impact. So I tell people, I am not here to change you, that is not in my capacity. But I can tell you how I have changed, and how it has changed my life. This strategy works very well.” (CM quote in Aldred, Williams 2011: 32)


Factors 1 and 2 appear to have been reinforced by **allies’ knowledge and experience**. Since OGB provided little “We Can”-specific capacity building to allies, those with previous experience in women’s rights work – e.g. PCVC in India, WSPG in Nepal and Polli Sree in Bangladesh – were in a better position than others to understand and disseminate accurate campaign messages, and to involve CMs in appropriate activities. Furthermore, allies’ outreach structures and networks influenced the extent to which “We Can” reached beyond cities and district towns. In some cases, outreach was increased by joining efforts with other initiatives, e.g. the *Mabila Vikas Parishad* women’s development groups in Maharashtra (FGDCM MH), India, and vast grassroots NGO networks in Bangladesh.

**Supportive OGB country offices**, typically experienced in women’s rights work, have assigned substantial personnel to the campaign and created synergies with on-going programmes within and beyond Oxfam. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, where such support seems to have been more vigorous than in other countries (see below, *Efficiency*), the PII assessment reports the highest percentage of CMs to have undergone significant personal change and engaged in constant campaign activism.

### TOO SOFT, TOO LITTLE?

“We Can” has been accused of neglecting *“issues of power in society or households”* (OI 2009b). The images and messages that have been most extensively used in the campaign tell a different story. They show the manifestations of gender inequality and patriarchy in common everyday situations, and promoting more gender-equal alternatives. Even “sensitive” issues such as marital rape are breached.

The campaign materials represent the “traditional” nuclear or extended family as a main setting of women’s lives, and abstain from messages that might shock the audience. In a way, the materials attempt to challenge patriarchy “without offending anyone”. This is widely considered good practice in campaigning on VAW – familiar, positive image (as opposed to “villains” and “victims”) make it easy for the viewers to recognise and identify with the pictures. (See e.g. UNIFEM 2003b)



*Pictures from phase I CM workbooks – “patriarchal” (left) vs. “egalitarian” (right) household scenes*

None of the “We Can” materials reviewed show a woman leaving her abusive husband. This may be a deliberate choice: the lack of adequate support systems places this option out of reach for most women in South Asia; part of the audience may feel “alienated” by images they cannot picture within their lives. Yet, one could argue that the emphasis on violence-free, harmonious *families* may discourage women and girls from taking legal or other confrontational action against DV perpetrators.

Some 30% of CMs interviewed in 2010 found that *“women should tolerate domestic violence as it is their responsibility to keep the family together”*; 33% agreed that *“women should not talk about their experiences of domestic violence with anyone”*. (PII REG: 25) In the absence of data from comparison groups, it is unclear whether this is above or below average “South Asian” perceptions of domestic violence.

### WINDFALL BENEFITS

Following the Asian Tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake, *“Change Makers [in Sri Lanka and Pakistan] proved to be a ‘ready-made’ cadre of people for work in the emergency response, alert to VAW.”*(Williams 2010: 12) CMs formed “gender watch groups” which monitored women’s and girls’ issues in camps. “We Can” campaign materials were used widely in Sri Lanka and adapted to local camp situations. The print materials have also spilled over into regular Oxfam initiatives. For example, the *Raising her Voice* programme for women’s participation in politics in Nepal has reportedly used them in training sessions.

### UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES?

Interlocutors in India and Nepal report that “We Can” activities have led to an **increase in women and girls seeking support** against VAW (I6, WSSA MH & UP) – an outcome that could have been planned for, e.g. by establishing standardised referral procedures and, in an ideal scenario, securing funding for acceptable effective service providers. Only few “We Can” allies specialising in protection and counselling of VAW survivors (e.g. PCVC in India) have been able to offer direct support to survivors.

## MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS

OGB in South Asia has effectively developed and implemented “We Can” with the campaign alliances. However, lack of data as well as and large variations in campaign implementation from country to country (and even within countries) make it **difficult to gauge the full extent of the outcomes achieved**.

1. The ambitious goal of causing a **fundamental shift in social norms seems distant** – but localised groupings and certain sectors of society appear to have made significant progress in difficult contexts, including highly traditional communities, poor rural areas and regions with armed conflict.
2. “We Can” has mobilised **large numbers of “change makers”** who have transformed aspects of their lives in relation to gender equality and VAW. It is impossible to verify whether the target of five million CMs has been reached (or maybe exceeded), and how many CMs and people influenced by CMs have performed an **“attitudinal shift”**. It can be safely assumed that some **1.4 million CMs have engaged in activism and triggered some 21 million conversations** on VAW and women’s rights – chiefly among friends, students, colleagues and extended family members.
3. **Broad, diverse alliances** have taken a collective stand against VAW, and thus contributed to creating an enabling environment for change. The “We Can” alliances have included organisations with wide and deep outreach, many of which did not work on VAW issues before joining the campaign. In that sense, work against **VAW has been “mainstreamed”** into “mixed” and rural organisations.
4. There is **variation between and within countries** in terms of campaign implementation and outcomes. The Bangladesh and Pakistan alliances appear particularly successful in fostering significant change and activism among many CMs. In both countries, OGB staff experienced in work on gender equality has delivered high levels of support – a likely key factor for quality outcomes.
5. Although it seems **too early to speak of a “social movement”**, co-operation with local administrations, schools and other public institutions appears to have made VAW a concern among large numbers of local decision-makers and their constituencies.
6. “We Can” **monitoring systems have failed to capture the scope and complexity** of the campaign, although valid efforts were invested into national CM databases and large-scale, externally facilitated assessments, which have proven a precious resource for this evaluation.

### III.C Efficiency: “Has Oxfam used its resources in the best possible ways?”

In the context of a novel, unusual campaign model, there is no blueprint from which one could measure efficiency. Necessarily, some resources will have to be spent in trial and error until a coherent implementation model emerges. Rather than attempting to measure cost-effectiveness, this section examines the mechanisms OGB has used to design and manage “We Can”, and generate learning from its development and implementation.

#### CAMPAIGN PLANNING

**Conceptualising “We Can”:** Strategic planning for “We Can”, initially led by the OGB regional gender working group (GWG) stretched over four years, punctuated by regular GWG meetings and research. The process, documented in internal reports (CWG, CLM 2001-05), included discussions of national contexts, campaigning principles and ideas for fundraising (with input from Oxford-based specialists). A 20-page campaign strategy paper (CSP 2005), published on the dedicated “We Can” web-site and distributed as a “We Can”-branded brochure, outlined the campaign rationale, its goal and objectives, direction, approach, audience, allies, identity and activities. One aspect initially remained vague – the 5 million CMs, cited as “change agents”: *“people who will help alter existing gender-biased attitudes and behaviour within the communities they live in”*; *“change agents will spread the message that VAW is unacceptable [...]”*. (CSP 2005) The idea of personal change preceding – or, in some cases, replacing “classical” campaign activist roles – evolved during campaign roll-out. For “ordinary” people who could not engage in “classical” activism, the concept of

“internal activism” acknowledged the efforts they undertook to change their lives. The term “agent” was abandoned because of its confusing connotations.<sup>33</sup>

Even though the campaign development process was quite thorough, it would have gained from the involvement of experts in social or adult development psychology. *Raising Voices*, the programme that has inspired “We Can”, draws on psychological theory. But since “We Can” was conceived for a different context and scale, it would have made sense to reflect on other, maybe more straightforward models than the “stages of change”. Expert input could have reduced uncertainty about the likely paths of change. It could have provided tested concepts and methods to help define the types of change that the campaigners needed to monitor, and how such change could best be measured and documented.

**Iterative planning:** “We Can” was new to OGB on several counts: (i) it was OGB’s first campaign to focus on transformation of people’s attitudes (as opposed to policy change); (ii) it brought together women and men, women’s and “mixed” organisations in a joint campaign against VAW; and (iii) it introduced the novel “change maker” concept. (I1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Since there was no precedent for “We Can”, *“each phase has been an exploration”*. (TSSF 11: 98)

In each country, the “We Can” allies, more or less loosely co-ordinated by OGB, devised their own ways of launching the campaign, growing alliances and recruiting CMs. Such **flexibility** – within the limits of a fairly clear strategy paper and unified “We Can” campaign branding – was appropriate, in view of the differences between social contexts and OGB’s varying history in programming on women’s rights. The downside of this open-ended approach has been limited regional steering and support. “We Can” staff in country offices which showed little interest in the campaign, or which faced difficult situations (e.g. security risks and high staff turnover in Afghanistan), have complained about feeling “left alone” at times. (WSVO) Allies reportedly lacked clarity as to what would happen after the campaign launches (PI PAK 2006, WSVO); what CMs were supposed to do after having talked to 10 others (WSNA NE); or how the “stages of change” and the phases of “We Can” were connected. (NAM IN 2006) Allies in India and Nepal link the loss of CM data to uncertainties as to what CM forms would be used for and whether it was necessary to maintain contact with CMs. (WSVO, WSNA IN&NE, WSSA MH & UP, WSRA)

#### **DIFFUSE CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP**

“We Can” was devised by Oxfam GB in South Asia. Up to March 2011, OGB was the executive manager of the campaign, maintaining control over the campaign funds. Yet, the campaign is not Oxfam-branded, and its “official” leadership rests with the national alliances.

**Allies or fellow travellers?** Following a model familiar from global Oxfam-initiated campaigns, OGB country offices initially invited existing partners– mainly NGOs – to form fledgling “We Can” alliances within their radius of operation (TSSF: 41), i.e. mainly at district and intermediary (e.g. provincial) levels. This arrangement has been expedient: it would have taken extra efforts to identify “new” partner(s) who would have managed the campaign, or to build a new, independent legal entity for campaign management.

The OGB “We Can” campaign “leads” met as a group twice a year up to 2007, then annually. It is not documented which precise steps OGB took to introduce its allies to “We Can”, and how allies participated in shaping campaign policies and plans. “We Can” documentation states that *“one of the basic strategies [...] is to build common conceptual understanding of the Campaign among the front-line team consisting of Oxfam staff, core members of national and district alliances, who share, exchange their views and planning on a regular basis”*. (TSSF 11: 98) In every country, annual campaign planning was undertaken by the national alliance steering group; the Oxfam “leads” provided overall parameters in terms of available monies.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Communication from OGB SARC, September 2011

<sup>34</sup> Written communication from Mona Mehta, August 2011



The mechanisms through which allies in each country contributed to discussions and decisions on campaign concepts and strategy have varied. In Bangladesh, the first national alliance meeting in 2005 assembled representatives of 150 organisations (AR BAN 2005/6). The Pakistan alliance has been firmly led by Oxfam (AM PAK 2010, 2011). In India, more diffuse decision-making processes across the vast tissue of alliances (over 1,800 members in 2011) have led some allies to note a “*lack of transparency and openness*” (WSNA IN). In Nepal, similar opinions were voiced: “*When the [campaign] secretariat was in Oxfam, it was hard to know what would come next*” (WSNA NE).

Disappointment among allies who expected to have more of a say in or more benefits from the campaign (I8, 9, WSSA UP), an indication for uneven levels of understanding of the campaign, may have been one of the reasons for shifts in alliance membership. In India, some 25% of the initial allies are estimated to have left the “We Can” alliance since inception (I8). Another much-quoted reason has been confusion as to the appropriate alliance membership structure; for example, uncertainty about the desirability of institutions of local governance as alliance members. (MTC2: 12, WSSA MH)

### RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND MANAGEMENT

**Income:** Oxfam GB has been the main funder of “We Can”, providing a total of some £5.7 million up to 2011. This includes more than £0.5mn from the *Oxfam Unwrapped* fundraising scheme, i.e. private donor money dedicated specifically to “We Can”. In addition to OGB “We Can” staff (up to 8 campaign “leads” across the region), OGB contributed annual salary costs for other staff participating in the campaign. These extra staff costs are not included in the £5.7mn total (TSSF 11: 110)

Up to 2011, other Oxfam affiliates (Australia, Hong Kong and the Netherlands) furnished some £2.5mn; a range of external donors – most prominently the Dutch MDG3 Fund (some £1.6mn) and DFID (UK, some £1.1mn) – have contributed some £3,2 million. Overall, some £10,5 million were invested up to April 2011.

**Financial management:** OGB regional and country offices have raised and managed the “We Can” budget in all six countries, with the exception of mainly *pro bono* and in-kind contributions mobilised by alliance members. Funds were disbursed through different processes, e.g. as one-year grants to “budget holders” within the national alliance, or for certain specific activities. We have not investigated the financial procedures and their effectiveness. Oxfam GB staff report it has been necessary – and complicated – to adjust OGB’s financial management systems so that relatively small amounts could be disbursed to a multitude of allies and at short intervals (down to three months in some cases).<sup>35</sup>

I have noted a few points in India, which are not necessarily representative of other countries. Funds were disbursed through state allies that served as “budget holders” and who followed divergent procedures in financial management and control (Chatterjee 2008). According to the allies, grants were proportional to anticipated CM numbers (WSNA IN). Allies have complained about the late disbursement of funds by Oxfam, which reportedly led to a crunch of campaign activities in the latter half of each year. (*id.*)

As pointed out earlier, **cost-effectiveness** is difficult to assess in the absence of comparable campaigns. Only few campaigns in South Asia focus on changing VAW-related attitudes. Those that have published data on results rely to a great extent on mass media and social media; they have not yet presented any conclusive data as to their effects on attitudes.<sup>36</sup> We have no data to assess whether “We Can” is more or less “expensive” in terms of the *outcomes* achieved. But there are indications that key processes have been carried out in cost-effective ways.

<sup>35</sup> Communications from OGB SARC staff, July and August 2011

<sup>36</sup> E.g. Bell Bajao [www.bellbajao.org](http://www.bellbajao.org), which publishes its monitoring data, focussed chiefly on message recall rates. 8/2011 from [http://bellbajao.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/FINAL-Report-RAS-2\\_March-8.pdf](http://bellbajao.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/FINAL-Report-RAS-2_March-8.pdf)

About one-third of overall campaign expenses were reportedly spent on campaign materials. (TSSF 11: 112) Overall, the development and production of materials appear to have been cost-effective. The materials, based on models proven effective by *Raising Voices* in Uganda, were adapted to South Asia and pre-tested in regional workshops. After that first design round, national alliances worked with local designers to make the generic images and text more context-specific (WSNA NE, I10).

Allies in India, Nepal and Pakistan found that “We Can” could have reached deeper into rural areas if more materials had been available, or if materials had been adjusted to different contexts at sub-national levels. (WSDA MH, WSNA NE, PII PAK) Some felt that money could have been saved, or more materials been produced and distributed, if OGB had used less glossy supports and more modest meeting venues (WSDA UP, WSVO), or had reduced the range of give-aways (such as badges and key rings) (I14).

**People:** The OGB SARC and country offices created dedicated positions for “We Can”, as illustrated in the examples below (data from OGB country offices, 8/2011).

Oxfam country office	2006	2008	2010
Bangladesh	4 full-time staff	4 full-time staff	2 full-time + 20% staff
Nepal	1 full-time staff	1 full-time staff	1 full-time staff
Pakistan	6 full-time staff	5 full-time + 70% staff	2 full-time + part-time <sup>37</sup>

The figures for Bangladesh and Pakistan appear appropriate for a campaign of this scope. Conversely, the sole OGB officer in charge of “We Can” in Nepal admits having felt overstretched. (WSVO)

OGB funding supported the establishment of **national secretariats**, several initially run by seconded Oxfam staff. (TSSF 11: 104). “Budget holders” within national alliances received modest monies for accounting and administrative costs.<sup>38</sup> As a rule, campaign funds did *not* cover any administrative or staff costs incurred by “ordinary” allies (TSSF 11: 115). This has been efficient in that it has saved money – but it is difficult for allies who rely on project grants to eke out resources for “We Can”. Leading state alliance members in India report long extra working hours for “We Can” (WSNA IN, OR 2009).

Considerable **volunteer** time appears to have been mobilised at district levels as well. For example, two district alliances in Nepal reportedly mobilised 50 volunteers as well as government funding (from the local Women's Development Offices and the National Human Rights Commission) for a two-day event around 8 March 2009. In Rajasthan, “We Can” ally VIKALP organised a CM mobilisation rally across several districts; motorcycle owners donated their time; petrol stations offered the fuel. (TSSF 11: 111).

**Knowledge:** The novel character of “We Can” meant that much effort was – appropriately – invested in learning and exchange, as exemplified in the long preparation, several assessments (see below, M&E), regional and national “learning events”, and CM assemblies. Yet, national allies in the countries visited have felt inadequately prepared for CM recruitment and re-engagement: *“It felt like we ourselves became key people, but we didn’t know how to build the capacity of others”* (WSNA NE). Allies have complained about lack of formal capacity-building for “We Can” (WSNA IN, NE). Regional learning events, cited as useful in terms of learning and motivation, tended to be reserved for leading national allies, most prominently OGB staff. The wealth of experience gathered by allies at district levels has hardly been documented at all.

Oxfam staff involved in “We Can” report that rapid campaign growth made capacity building an overwhelming task. They have admitted that *“the absence of a structured monitoring framework from the start prevented staff from learning more systematically”*; which was compounded by a *“lack of consistent documentation”*, patchy support within OGB some country offices and simply, *“lack of time to think”* (TSSF 11: 99).

<sup>37</sup> Two full-time staff are based at the “We Can” secretariat. The campaign is still managed by an OGB officer based at the Oxfam office; her salary is *not* charged to “We Can” (communication by Hajera Pasha, OGB in Pakistan).

<sup>38</sup> Communication from Mona Mehta, August 2011

**External contacts and networks:** Critics within Oxfam International have accused “We Can” of neglecting and marginalising **women’s groups**, and thus diminishing women’s agency (OI 2009b, I9). It would take a separate research project to learn to what extent this holds true, and in which countries. In Bangladesh, major women’s groups have played a prominent role in “We Can”, while in India some women’s organisations have left the campaign (IE7, I9, 12). To interpret that as an indication of diminished women’s agency seems overstated. Women do play leading roles in the national alliances we have reviewed; the central campaign messages are about strengthening women’s agency.

The “We Can” model was taken up with enthusiasm by some Oxfam affiliates, who have explored or supported the emergence of similar campaigns in the Americas, South-East Asia, Africa and Europe. South Asian “We Can” allies, mainly in India and Bangladesh, have hosted study groups from these regions; OGB staff working on “We Can” has provided guidance to the emerging campaigns world-wide. In November 2011, a “Global ‘We Can’ Network” will be launched to foster learning; the South Asia “We Can” web-site will take on a global vocation. (I5, I8)

**Risk management:** The main risk that campaign reports refer to is “**message drift**” – i.e., allies and CMs straying from the original “We Can” messages. Unambiguous design of the campaign materials, and extra training for “connectors” or “volunteers” introduced in 2008, are intended to limit this risk.

Women’s rights activism is commonly accused of pursuing an agenda of undermining “traditional” local traditions and values.<sup>39</sup> In that perspective, it has been an appropriate choice to build a dedicated, South Asian “**We Can**” brand rather than using Oxfam branding or that of any particular “We Can” ally. Co-operation with traditional institutions can also mitigate the “Western agenda” risk and foster incremental change: in Pakistan, a traditional *Grand Jirga* district council formally banned *Sawara*, the practice, illegal in national law, of forcibly marrying young girls to settle blood feuds.<sup>40</sup>

Yet, in Pakistan, a male CM was killed, allegedly for mobilising teachers on “We Can”; a female CM’s son was kidnapped, reportedly as a punishment for her involvement in women’s rights. (TSSF 11:68) These events must be seen in their context – work on women’s rights in Pakistan has been extremely dangerous.<sup>41</sup> “We Can” messaging attempts to limit risks by valuing “invisible change”, and leaving it to the individual CM to determine which actions he or she is prepared to take, and at what pace. “We Can” materials provide a language that allows CMs to challenge violence in a non-confrontational manner.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M & E)

**Evaluation:** “We Can” is probably unique among OGB’s campaigns and women’s rights programmes for the large number of assessments it has undertaken throughout its implementation period:

- Internal and peer reviews in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (2006-2007)
- Externally facilitated phase I assessments in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (2007)
- An external mid-term review in Nepal (2009)
- An externally facilitated 5-country phase II assessment which stretched over 2 years (2009-2010)
- Reviews of specific aspects, e.g. a report on “institutionalisation” of “We Can” in parts of India.<sup>42</sup>

The methodologies for the phase I and II assessments, built on each other, were designed with a mainly formative purpose – i.e. to inform adjustments in the campaign strategy and roll-out. These assessments appear to have played crucial roles in campaign development. However, the rather unwieldy reports, most of which were written in elaborate English, may have been difficult to access and interpret for most allies.

<sup>39</sup> See for example the entries on “Western” influences on the website of the “Save Indian Family” Foundation <http://www.saveindianfamily.org/component/search/western.html?ordering=&searchphrase=all> (12/8/2011)

<sup>40</sup> Aldred & Williams 2011: 47

<sup>41</sup> See for example the regular news updates and protests against death threats on <http://www.shirkatgah.org>

<sup>42</sup> For full references, see literature list in annex (1<sup>st</sup> part: Documents produced/ commissioned by Oxfam)

**Monitoring:** To tell from the dearth of **progress reports** from most countries,<sup>43</sup> monitoring was to a great extent informal and focused on experience sharing at regular alliance and campaign “leads” meetings. It seems that such sharing has effectively informed campaign management at local levels. However, lack of documentation may have limited sharing to relatively small numbers of allies. Little documentation of alliance activities is available up to 2008. Only the Bangladesh alliance has published annual progress reports throughout the campaign period. Reportedly, thousands of individual **“change maker stories”** were collected in all countries; CM stories were published in a range of media (web-site, campaign reports, PII assessments, comic booklets and campaign newsletters). But no centralised archives of CM stories appear to exist (WSNA IN & NE). Other data, such as the rich and diverse “process documentation” gathered on phase II campaign events in India, have been stored centrally but resist easy access by their sheer abundance and diversity in format and language.

Each country secretariat has maintained a **CM database**. In phase I, focused on CM mobilisation, CMs were asked to fill in forms, which were collected and entered in formats which differed from country to country or even within a single country (as in India). These databases turned out to be incomplete or inadequate by the time research for the PII assessments started – e.g. many student CMs had filled in their college address, making it extremely difficult to trace them for research and “re-engagement”. (PII REG) As of 2011, all national databases are centralised, chiefly in ACCESS or SPSS formats. It is unclear to what extent “We Can” secretariats maintain and use the databases: our difficulties in obtaining accurate CM data suggest that most national secretariats have not integrated the databases into their monitoring routines.

The initial emphasis on **numerical CM targets** – e.g. 4mn for India, 100,000 in Nepal, with funding for campaign events tied to the amount of prospective CMs – may have distracted allies from keeping detailed records. Allies in India and Nepal claim they did not know about the purpose and importance of the CM database when they started recruiting CMs. (WSNA IN, NE) In India, first-time participants at large campaign gatherings were asked to make a “CM pledge” right away<sup>44</sup>; three years later, it appeared that CMs would be re-engaged (WSNA IN). *“We Can’ came to our school and the youth got very enthusiastic, but there was no follow-up and nowhere to go”* (IE8). The necessity to engage in multiple contacts with CMs only emerged after the Phase I assessments in India and Bangladesh.

As “We Can” entered into radically new campaigning terrain for Oxfam, it was appropriate to start with an **open-ended plan**, allowing allies to try out different techniques and tactics. However, to reap the benefits of this “let 100 flowers blossom” approach, a more formalised monitoring system could have...

- Spelled out the most desired campaign outcomes: Even though every change counts, certain changes may have a more direct or stronger influence on the campaign objectives than others. Records of such critical changes could have given an idea of likely impact.
- Developed and refined, over the seven years of the campaign, simple ways to record key outcomes regularly and in ways that would have allowed one to draw clear links between outcomes and activities
- Made good practice and “lessons learnt” from mistakes available to all allies

Continuous learning, a key factor in campaign development and management, has been an integral part of “We Can”. However, a more formal, adaptable monitoring and documentation system could have ensured more systematic learning throughout the alliances and within OGB as a whole, and made the phase I and II assessments less arduous and onerous.

<sup>43</sup> The exception is Bangladesh, where detailed documentation is available in English.

<sup>44</sup> Personal communications from OGB SARC, June-August 2011; direct observation in Orissa, 2008

### CONCLUSIONS ON EFFICIENCY

The **resources mobilised for the campaign seem commensurate** with its 7-year duration, scale and innovative nature.

1. The campaign issue, its novel approach and its contexts are extremely complex. This makes it **impossible to determine** whether similar outcomes could have been obtained at a lower cost, or whether other interventions with comparable aims (e.g. mass-media social marketing) would be more **cost-effective**.
2. **Campaign planning and materials development have been of good quality**; they have included regional consultations, research, advice from successful external practitioners, and the elaboration and testing of an explicit theory of change.
3. **Resources mobilised and used** have varied from country to country. Overall, “We Can” has proven **unusually successful** for a campaign in raising funds from bilateral, NGO and private donors. Allies and CMs at various levels have contributed and mobilised considerable in-kind support.
4. **OGB country office support** appears to have been a critical factor for success, with Bangladesh and Pakistan demonstrating the most encouraging results.
5. Some interlocutors felt that some **money could have been saved** by printing more modest materials, distributing fewer campaign gadgets, and booking more modest venues for regional meetings.
6. **“We Can” leadership was diffuse**: The alliances, structured differently in each country, formally lead the campaign while OGB held the **executive and financial management**. This could be interpreted as efficient, since no new formal organisations had to be built. But it may have generated tensions within the alliances and hampered the development of fully autonomous national alliances.
7. The novel nature of the campaign has **justified considerable expenditure on learning**, mainly in the form of externally facilitated assessment. However, regular monitoring and documentation systems have been incomplete and of uneven quality.

### III.D Sustainability: “Will the benefits of ‘We Can’ continue?”

“We Can” has not ended yet, but OGB has formally handed over executive leadership of the campaign to the “We Can” national alliance secretariats; OGB regional funding to “We Can” ends in 2011. (Communications from SARC, July 2011) In four countries, the national alliances have voiced their commitment to continue campaigning. The Afghanistan and Sri Lanka alliances appear dormant.

#### OXFAM’S EXIT STRATEGY

OGB’s Programme Framework includes guidance on programme closure.<sup>45</sup> It seems that OGB country offices and the SARC have followed standard procedures, communicating about OGB’s exit, handing over responsibilities to country alliances. The history of the campaign is documented in an update of “*We Can’ – The Story So Far*” (2011); a companion volume to this evaluation will summarise lessons learned. However, it is unclear to what extent national alliance members have been involved in planning the hand-over and/ or are sufficiently prepared to continue campaigning without OGB support.

In May 2010, the OGB “We Can” campaign “leads” (CL) held a three-day meeting devoted to OGB’s exit from “We Can” in South Asia, and its future role in “We Can” campaigns world-wide. The participants decided OGB would withdraw from the regional campaign as initially planned, i.e. by 31 March 2011. “*Each country would then work on its new format which it will have to define.*” Campaign management would be fully “*devolved*”: “*no further staff management, fund management, fundraising will now happen at the country level*”, with the exceptions of Nepal and Pakistan. No OGB staff would remain in the secretariats beyond 2011; national secretariats would be strengthened to take over their new role. Continued CM re-engagement and

<sup>45</sup> From *OGB Programme Framework* pp. 106-108, as communicated by Ivan Scott

institutionalisation throughout the 2010/11 fiscal year would “embed change” and thus secure sustainable results. (CLM 2010)

However, the transfer of **executive management** would not take away “*thought leadership*” from OGB, sketched as the “*strategy/approach/ knowledge management role*”. This exit seems somewhat ambiguous, as the CL meeting notes do not explain what forms such future OGB leadership would take, and what influence such leadership would have on campaign management by autonomous alliances.

### ALLIANCE CAPACITIES

The OGB campaign “leads” decided that “**We Can**” **national secretariats** would be strengthened as **collective bodies** that would not be tied to any one particular partner organisation. (CLM 5/2010) As of August 2011, **four national secretariats** have demonstrably been shaped around “core groups” of national allies. The Bangladesh national alliance was first to set up its secretariat outside the OGB premises in 2006. Nepal’s “We Can” secretariat was established in 2008; India and Pakistan followed in 2009. (TSSF 11: 48) As of August 2011, these four “We Can” secretariats appear operational but fragile.<sup>46</sup> Two of them are at different stages of their formal **registration processes**. Only in Nepal, the national alliance and two regional alliances are formally registered (since May 2011) – but even so, OGB and allies agree that extra support is needed to develop a vision and strategy (NE debriefing). The India alliance has decided *not* to set up its secretariat as a legal entity, but to maintain it as a “learning and sharing hub”.<sup>47</sup>

Without formal registration, alliance secretariats may experience **difficulties in mobilising donor funds**, which for some has seemed an unreal prospect anyway: “*Our alliance never thought of other donors [apart from Oxfam].*” (WSNA NE) In India, DFID funding to “We Can” will continue up to early 2013; pending registration of the alliance secretariat, OGB and Oxfam India have served as account holders for these funds. The Bangladesh Alliance has secured some funding up to 2014, under a four-year US\$ 3 million grant by the Dutch Embassy on “*Women’s and Girls’ to Health and Freedom from Violence*”; “We Can” is partner within a wider coalition. In Pakistan, the “We Can” core group contributes allies’ “own” time and funds to support the national “We Can” secretariat (NAM 2011, WSV0); similar arrangements are planned for India (I8) and Nepal (NE debriefing). In Nepal, district alliances co-operate with District and Village Development Councils, which hold budgets for women’s issues, but only limited contributions to campaign-related expenses are available from these budgets (WSRA).

Oxfam GB’s “*behind the scenes*” management (TSSF 111: 48), supplying a reasonably continuous stream of funding and “thought leadership”, arguably shielded the alliances from some difficult choices, and thus enabled them to focus on campaign activism. However, such protective upbringing may have prevented them from developing full, joint “**ownership**” of the campaign and from acquiring the **skill sets** needed to function as independent alliances. Although national alliance meetings in India (since 2009)<sup>48</sup>, Nepal (since 2007) and Pakistan (since 2010) have touched upon these issues, few clear directions as to future alliance management structures and processes, fundraising and financial systems appear to have emerged. Only the Bangladesh secretariat has commissioned a formal review on the *Effectiveness and Future Direction of WE CAN Alliance and Secretariat* (OGB 2010) in time to prepare for OGB’s hand-over.

**OGB support beyond March 2011** is planned in Pakistan, where “We Can” management has remained with the OGB office, and in Nepal, where the OGB “We Can” PO will organise capacity-building for the alliance throughout 2011.<sup>49</sup> Oxfam remains an active member of the Bangladesh “We Can” alliance. In New Delhi, as the OGB Regional Centre is about to be closed, DFID funding to the India alliance will be transferred via Oxfam India. Where OGB remains involved in “We Can” national alliances, it would seem

<sup>46</sup> In Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, the available data suggest that national alliances are dormant (August 2011).

<sup>47</sup> Written communication from Rashmi Singh, August 2011

<sup>48</sup> Dates in brackets refer to the earliest available reports that refer to discussions on secretariat functions.

<sup>49</sup> Personal communication from OGB Pakistan country office, August 2011, and Nepal debriefing

appropriate for OGB to determine, with the respective alliances, on its precise role, a clear framework for its support and “milestones” for monitoring.

### FOREVER CAMPAIGNING?

OGB staff and allies in four countries agree that “We Can” is worth continuing to spread and deepen change. (WSVO, WSVVA) Only in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, grants have been secured beyond 2011. Where country secretariats have engaged in registration procedures, it can be assumed they will seek donor funds for future campaigning. How that would happen remains to be defined.

Three national secretariats have produced plans for “We Can” development beyond 2011. The Pakistan “We Can” strategic plan (SP) 2011-15 seems solidly rooted in the “We Can” theory of change. It lists convincing priority targets for further CM mobilisation, but does not elucidate the future management structures and sources of funding. The draft Nepal “We Can” SP 2011-15 reads like a broad programme for women's rights that would use CMs as “classical” campaign activists in policy advocacy. It is imprecise on alliance leadership and management structures, and lists ideas for fundraising that would require considerable investment with uncertain returns. Only the draft five-year vision document by the India alliance includes a fairly precise action plan, indicators for monitoring outcomes, and a description of the campaign management structure.

Alliances are temporary structures that serve a specific purpose. The national “We Can” alliances may need to determine more precisely their future purpose, and start thinking about their own “exit strategies”: Are they expected to last until VAW ceases to exist, or should they be dissolved at some point? What can the national alliances do to ensure that the changes triggered by “We Can” will continue, or to prevent they are reversed, after the end of formal “We Can” campaigning?

### CONCLUSIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY

1. Campaign allies in at least four countries agree **“We Can” is worth continuing.**
2. As of August 2011, five months after “culmination” and the OGB “handover” of executive leadership to the country alliances, four out of six “We Can” national secretariats appear to be operational, but **Oxfam support continues** in different forms – direct campaign leadership (Pakistan), much-needed capacity building (Nepal, India), active participation (Bangladesh) and fiscal sponsorship (India, Bangladesh).
3. Most **national alliance strategies or visions beyond 2011 are vague** on funding and campaign management; secretariats struggle to cover their running costs.

### III.E Impact: “What difference has Oxfam made through ‘We Can’?”

“We Can” has contributed to transformations in people’s attitudes which are likely to last. More work is needed to end VAW in South Asia – a change that could not be expected from any single programme.

#### CHANGE IN ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL NORMS

The ambitious goal of “We Can” has been to make VAW socially unacceptable – in six countries, within less than a decade. It is unclear whether the campaign outcomes announce a **“popular movement”**, or an imminent “tipping point”<sup>50</sup> towards widespread social transformation. Overall, “We Can” campaigners and external women’s activists in South Asia report significant, encouraging changes in social norms, despite other, unhelpful trends such as the rise of religious fundamentalisms. *“For sure the silence has been broken”*: VAW is publicly discussed and condemned (IE6).<sup>51</sup> Young women seem *“not as submissive as they*

<sup>50</sup> PII REG has attempted to identify “tipping points” at levels where “We Can” may have provoked a “social epidemic”. The term has been coined by journalist and marketing consultant Malcolm Gladwell (2000).

<sup>51</sup> Corroborated by virtually all interviews and coverage of gender-based crimes against women in three Indian English language newspapers – some 3-4 stories/ day during the week of 25 July 2011

*used to be*” (IE9); more survivors of VAW are seeking support (I6, IE3, WSNA NE). Men’s and boys’ engagement in initiatives against VAW has reportedly increased (IE1).

Probably, some 7.4 million women and men who participated in “We Can” and related activities, have **started transforming their perceptions of gender roles and VAW, as well as their behaviour.** However, the lack of reliable statistics (which, due to issues of complexity and because of taboos surrounding VAW, would be difficult to generate) makes it **impossible to gauge** the precise degree to which people and their ideas have changed, and what share in such change can be attributed to “We Can”. This is a common phenomenon in campaigning for social change. Campaigning is a blunt, indirect form of action that can encourage large audiences to contribute to a healthier society – as opposed to more limited, “surgical” interventions that would “treat” specific, localised problems in greater depth.

#### “MAINSTREAMING” VAW INTO DEVELOPMENT WORK

For many OGB partners who joined “We Can”, e.g. those engaged chiefly in rural development, the campaign was their first involvement in VAW-related work. In India and Nepal, this has been perceived as enriching the allies’ strategies – some allies have adjusted their regular programmes to reserve more attention to VAW prevention. (WSSV1) This in turn may enhance the sustainability of change generated by “We Can”, and contribute to the wider social movement “We Can” attempts to create.

#### LIKELY CONTRIBUTION TO A REDUCTION OF VAW

The “We Can” campaign has *not* ended VAW, just as the Oxfam “Make Trade Fair” campaign has not eliminated inequity in global trade. Campaigns are meant to create popular pressure for change - change which may be expressed in rather distant goals.

Epidemiological research shows a link between the social acceptability of domestic violence against women (DV) and its prevalence, and recommends public education efforts that *“challenge these attitudes of tolerance [of DV] and transmit the idea of social responsibility concerning issues of domestic violence”*.<sup>52</sup> “We Can” fits that description, as it makes the manifestations of VAW understandable for a broad audience, and it asks women and men to take responsibility for change in their own lives.



“Change makers” and allies we met in India and Nepal seemed convinced the campaign was a decisive force for change in their districts. Without “We Can”, they said, fewer girls would be at school; women would perform all household chores and have few or no opportunities to participate in community meetings (aspects of inequality portrayed by “We Can” as subtle forms of violence). There would be more domestic violence, more polygamy and more despair among women, who would not know whether and where to seek support against VAW – and fewer perpetrators would be arrested. (FGDCM UP, MH, NE) The limits of this evaluation and general difficulties to obtain data on VAW and community mental health, have made it impossible to determine to what extent these assertions reflect overall trends.

OGB staff and alliance members agree that it will take years until South Asian societies reach the “tipping point” whereby “mainstream” society would consider VAW unacceptable (WSVO, WSVA). Work against attitudes promoting VAW is young in South Asia; it takes place in contexts where gender inequality is entrenched. Even when the tipping point will have been reached, VAW may still exist – but women and girls, men and boys will be in a much better position to end the violence.

<sup>52</sup> Gracia & Herrero (2006)



### CONCLUSIONS ON IMPACT

1. “We Can” has demonstrably contributed to **transforming attitudes**, expressed in broader public awareness for VAW-related issues, “internal” personal development among CMs, and “external” activism triggering millions of conversations.
2. **Work against VAW has been “mainstreamed”** into development organisations, schools, police and institutions of local governance.
3. Attitudinal and institutional changes as promoted by “We Can” reflect good practice in VAW prevention, and are therefore **likely to contribute to reducing the incidence of VAW**. However, due to the complexity of the issue and the diffuse nature of “We Can” campaigning, the exact scope and nature of this contribution is unknown.
4. It would be excessive to expect any campaign or single intervention of the scope Oxfam could afford to have a substantial impact on the incidence of violence against women across an entire sub-continent in seven year’s time.

## IV. Overall recommendations

### TO OXFAM: IT IS RECOMMENDED OXFAM

1. Recognise that **“We Can” has enriched Oxfam** with a novel campaign model on an issue that is an Oxfam International priority but which has received relatively little attention in OGB work so far. The “change maker” approach could be of value to other campaigns and projects that aim to influence people’s attitudes and beliefs, frames and values – not only on VAW.
2. **Define, country by country, OGB’s current and future role** for or within the national alliances that currently receive support from OGB country offices. Where the national secretariat is run by Oxfam staff, it may be useful to assess whether OGB management should continue throughout the lifetime of the national alliance. If not, then a realistic plan for the gradual transfer of campaign leadership from OGB to the collective should be made.
3. **Support the emerging “Global ‘We Can’ Network”** on the basis of a strategic plan that describes the network’s purpose, structure, membership, decision-making processes, expected outcomes, and monitoring and documentation systems.
4. For the sake of **learning** for future work, elucidate and document the reasons why the national alliances in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka seem to have come to a halt.<sup>53</sup> The Sri Lankan case could be particularly enlightening, as considerable OGB funding and staff were invested in it.
5. Reflect on ways in which future **regionally-led initiatives** can be linked more effectively to Oxfam’s overall life, learning and global profile in ways that **foster creativity and shared ownership at headquarters, regional and country levels**.
6. In future campaigns, and alliance- or network-building initiatives, create **transparent, participatory decision-making structures and processes** from the start so as to promote shared ownership, and devise “exit” and hand-over strategies early on.
7. In future innovative campaigns, **develop appropriate, evolving monitoring, learning and documentation systems** that (i) respond to the participants’ needs and resources, and (ii) facilitate reporting to donors and other external stakeholders.
8. Enforce basic **standards for documents** generated by OGB staff for greater clarity on authorship, the date of the document, its status (draft or final version) and storage, so as to ensure accurate data are available and easily accessible for monitoring, evaluation and other research.

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<sup>53</sup> Lack of documentation (including in OGB’s internal OPAL system) and difficulties in obtaining timely and clear response to e-mail messages made it impossible for me to elucidate the reasons within this assignment.

9. In work on people's attitudes and social norms, obtain expert support from practice-oriented specialists in social and development psychology, so as to build robust, evidence-based conceptual frameworks for effective planning, monitoring and reporting.

#### TO THE GLOBAL "WE CAN" NETWORK

The "Global 'We Can' Network" is expected to be formally launched in November 2011. It builds on several intercontinental networking events that have punctuated the evolution of "We Can". This fledgling structure should:

10. **Fully document and make explicit** its purpose, structure, membership, decision-making processes, expected outcomes, monitoring and documentation systems, so as to promote shared ownership by all members and recognition of the network by outsiders.
11. Create opportunities for **joint reflection among "We Can" allies** around the world through meetings, exchange visits and "virtual" platforms, and **document** deliberations and learning in an easily accessible form (e.g. a password-protected site open to all "We Can" allies).
12. **Invite experienced practitioners in the fields of social psychology** and adult education to help build more powerful planning and monitoring frameworks for "We Can" campaigns.
13. **Engage in action research:** Oxfam affiliates have supported new "We Can" campaigns on four continents. To draw full learning benefits, could agree on shared standards for monitoring. Comparative research based on these data could generate valuable evidence for "We Can", for future VAW prevention endeavours and other work on attitudes and social norms.

#### TO THE SOUTH ASIA "WE CAN" ALLIANCES

Four national alliances appear committed to continuing "We Can" campaigning beyond 2011. These recommendations build chiefly on the "lessons learnt" and ideas shared by allies, and findings from PII and other assessments commissioned by OGB. They are also addressed to OGB country offices that participate in or work closely with national alliances. **Regarding campaign implementation**, the allies who will continue "We Can" campaigning should:

14. **Create frequent opportunities for "change makers" to continue transforming** their lives and influencing others. This may include:
  - a. Providing **outlets for CM activism**, within the campaign (e.g. CMs [co-] organising events) and beyond, e.g. by linking CMs with other initiatives on women's rights
  - b. Enabling **experience sharing, reflection and mutual support among CMs**, which could be regularly facilitated by "connector" and "volunteer" CMs
  - c. Exploring **virtual platforms for sharing** adapted to the (overwhelmingly young) CMs, e.g. the "social web" (*Facebook* and other "virtual" social networking technology).
15. **Contribute to building a supportive environment** for "making change", e.g. through
  - a. **Persuading key institutions** who can play a role in VAW prevention, e.g. schools and colleges, local governments and police, to discuss and deal with VAW and gender inequalities
  - b. Providing **ideas and models for action** through context-sensitive campaign communication
  - c. Joining, supporting or **co-operating with other initiatives** that share "We Can" goals and models of change
  - d. Sharing experience and consulting with **women's organisations** that are not part of "We Can", informally and formally, e.g. by establishing national advisory boards to "We Can".
16. Establish simple **guidelines for referral of VAW survivors** who approach campaign allies, in need of accessible, acceptable organisations where they can obtain support. Ideally, each CM should have a list of phone numbers and addresses of service providers in or near their location where women who seek support can be referred to.
17. Where alliances continue to recruit **new generations of "change makers"**, place an emphasis on CM "quality", i.e. their genuine interest in engaging in transformation, rather than mere "quantity".

**Regarding the future of the national alliances**, the allies should:

18. Decide on concrete management and funding arrangements for their visions and **strategic plans** beyond 2011 – i.e., what are the next steps the alliances need to take to prepare for full independence from Oxfam, and what can OGB do to support them in these steps?
19. Decide on **what needs to be monitored and how**, so that alliances gets sufficient, accurate and timely information. A monitoring system should enable allies to (i) verify progress against plans, (ii) identify any difficulties that need to be addressed, (iii) recognise new opportunities and unexpected results, and (iv) generate compelling information for outsiders, including donors. Only data that are genuinely needed should be gathered, preferably by those who need them. Findings from the PII assessment (e.g. the types of “deepened change”) and advice from social psychology or adult development specialists could help define appropriate indicators.
20. Determine the future **shape** of national alliances in a way to serve their strategies beyond 2011. If the main purpose of an alliance will be to share experience, then a light, informal arrangement may be sufficient. Conversely, if an alliance plans to continue joint, high intensity campaigning for several years, it may need to formalise its structure and processes. There are different options, e.g.:
  - a. **A registered alliance**, i.e. an independent legal entity – this may make it easier to channel donor funding, but could create competition for donor funding between the new entity and its members
  - b. **An informal alliance**, led e.g. by a jointly designated or elected steering group that would serve for an agreed period – this may maintain the “movement” character of an alliance, but could confuse external interlocutors including donors
  - c. **A combination of collective leadership and secretariat registration**, with the secretariat serving as the “office” and information clearinghouse for an open alliance – this may combine the virtues of the former options

Regardless of the form of (non-)registration, clear, possibly written agreements on alliance structure and leadership may help prevent internal crises and reassure donors.

21. Think about **life after “We Can”**: How can allies continue to support the individual and community dynamisms “We Can” may have created in the future? At what point should the alliances be dissolved or turned into something different? How can those who have integrated “We Can” into the programmes of their organisations continue to exchange experience and co-ordinate activities? What needs to happen to develop a broad, inclusive movement to end VAW?

### **TO DONORS**

Donors’ funding decisions exert a strong influence on the way in which recipients plan, implement and value their own work. The OECD aid effectiveness agenda<sup>54</sup> justifies the donors’ call for demonstrable results. On the other hand, there is increasing recognition that social change – for example, in the domain of women’s rights – may follow complex paths that resist straightforward measurement. (Batliwala & Pittman 2010, Westley *et al.* 2006) Therefore, donors should:

22. **Allow for adjustments** in log-frames, and results-based planning and monitoring formats, so that “We Can” campaigners and others who work on social transformation can compellingly describe and value complex processes. (Ideas for adjustments are available from people working with complexity and systems concepts, e.g. Hummelbrunner 2010)
23. **Support research** on “We Can” – possibly participatory, multi-disciplinary research that could involve experienced feminists, public health and social psychology specialists –, so as to contribute to the much-needed development of robust evidence on “what works” in VAW prevention.

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<sup>54</sup> See Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, retrieved on 28 August 2011 from [http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_3236398\\_35401554\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html)

## ANNEXES

### A. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

5C, 6C	Data from 5 (or 6) countries
AFG	Afghanistan
AM	Alliance meeting report
AR	Data from annual “We Can” progress report (followed by country & year)
BAN	Bangladesh
BLAST	Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust
BP	Briefing paper
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
c.	<i>circa</i> (approximately)
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CGM	Core group meeting notes
CIVIDEP	Civil Initiatives for Development and Peace
CLM	Campaign “leads” meeting (OGB South Asia “We Can” campaign leaders)
CM	Change maker
CS	Case study
CSP	Campaign strategy paper
DAG	District action group (Sri Lanka)
DDC	District development council (Nepal)
Dvpt.	Development
e.g.	for example
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGDCM	Data from FGD with “change makers”
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDI	Gender-related development index (UNDP)
GEI	Gender equity index
GEM	Gender empowerment measure (UNDP)
GGI	Gender gap index
GRG	Global reference group
GTZ	<i>Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Dvpt. Cooperation)
GWG	Gender working group (OGB South Asia)
HQ	headquarters
I	Interview (followed by number)
<i>id.</i>	<i>idem</i> = “the same” (i.e. the same reference as in previous quote)
<i>i.e.</i>	that is
IE	Interview with external stakeholder
IN	India
incl.	including
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDG3	Millenium Development Goal N°3
MDG3 PR	(followed by month/ year) Progress report to the MDG3 Fund
MEECIS	Middle East, Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MH	Maharashtra
MH HDC	Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre
mn	million

MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MTC	“Making the Case” (see literature list)
NAM	National “We Can” alliance meeting
NCS	National change strategy
NE	Nepal
NFIW	New Federation of Indian Women
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OGB	Oxfam Great Britain
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OI	Oxfam International
ON	Oxfam Novib
OR	Orissa
OR 2009	Evidence gathered during Oxfam Novib visit to Orissa, 2009
PAK	Pakistan
PCVC	International Foundation for Crime Prevention and Victim Care
PD	Programme Director
PM	Prime Minister
PI	Phase I, Phase I assessment
PII	Phase II, Phase II assessment
PII SUM	Summary of phase II assessment (by Suzanne Williams, in print)
PSA	Public service announcement
RDC	Regional development council (Nepal)
REG	Regional
SARC	Oxfam South Asia Regional Centre
SARVS	South Asia Regional Vision and Strategy
SCM	National “We Can” steering committee meeting
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIGI	Social Institutions and Gender Index
SL	Sri Lanka
SP	Strategic plan
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (statistics software)
TOR	Terms of reference
TSSF	<i>We Can: The Story so Far</i> (publication)
UN SG	United Nations Secretary General
UN Women	United Nations Agency for Women
UNDAW	UN Division for the Advancement of Women
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
UP	Uttar Pradesh
TN	Tamil Nadu
TV	Television
VAW	Violence against women
VDC	Village development council (Nepal)
VicHealth	Victoria Health (Australia)
WCLM	We Can leads meeting
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organisation
WS	Workshop
WSDA	Data from District Alliance Workshop

WSDA MH	Data from Bhandara District Alliance WS
WSDA UP	Data from Lucknow District Alliance WS
WSNA	Data from National Alliance Workshop (incl. separate steering group WS)
WSPG	Women Security Pressure Group (Nepal)
WSRA	Data from (Nepali) Regional Alliance Workshop
WSVDC	Data from (Nepal) Workshop with Village Development Committees
WSSA	Data from (Indian) State Alliance Workshop
WSSA MH	Data from Maharashtra State Alliance Workshop
WSSA UP	Data from Uttar Pradesh State Alliance Workshop
WSSV1	Data from written survey 1 during national alliance WS (India)
WSSV2	Data from written survey 2 during national alliance WS (India)
WSVA	Written survey with national alliance secretariats
WSVO	Written survey with Oxfam staff working on “We Can”
WTO	World Trade Organisation
YUVA	Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (India)

## B. List of Documents Reviewed

### *Documents produced/ commissioned by Oxfam affiliates and the “We Can” alliances*

- *A Contribution to the Oxfam International Conversation on the ‘We Can End All Violence against Women’ Campaign from the We Can Campaign Coordinators.* Delhi (September 2009)
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- Aldred, Allison and Suzanne Williams (in print) *We Can – The Story So Far.* Updated version. “We Can” Regional Secretariat, New Delhi. (cited as TSSF 11)
- *Assessment of Phase II WE CAN Campaign Bangladesh Report* (2011). Draft. “We Can”, Dhaka.
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- Chatterjee, Riya (8/2008) *We Can Process Documentation Report – Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal.* OGB SARC, New Delhi.
- Chhabra Anand, Mona (2010) *Ideas That Work – preventing VAW through WatSan interventions in early emergency response.* Oxfam GB SARO, New Delhi
- Dhungana, Bishnu Maya, Rashmi Adhikari and Tej Prasad Adhikari (2010) *Assessment of the “We Can” Campaign Nepal.* Edited by Oxfam (Quoted as PII Nepal)
- Divakalala, Cayathri (12/2010) *The Assessment of WE CAN Campaign, Phase II Sri Lanka Report.* WE CAN Secretariat, Colombo. (cited as PII SL)
- Khan, Rabia (3/2008) *Mid Term Review – We Can End Violence against Women / Honour Killing in Pakistan.* OGB, Islamabad. (cited as PI PAK 2008)
- *Making the Case – Lessons Learnt from reviews of the “We Can” Campaign. Part One – Overview and Part Two – Summaries of Documents Reviewed* (11/2010). Oxfam SARC, New Delhi. (cited as MTC)

- Mehta, Mona (August 2004) *Towards Ending Violence Against Women in South Asia*. Oxfam Briefing Paper 66. Oxfam, Oxford
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## C. The “We Can” Campaign in South Asia – Brief Description

### VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH ASIA

In 1990, Amartya Sen noted a shortfall of more than 100 million women in South Asia, West Asia and China due to sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, and discrimination against girls and women in health care and nutrition. One in two women in the Asia-Pacific region has experienced physical and sexual violence at the hands of an intimate partner (UN Women 2011a); other forms of violence, e.g. sexual harassment at work and in public spaces (euphemistically referred to as “eve-teasing”), are even more widespread. Violence against women (VAW) is accepted as normal. UNICEF (2011) data show that 54% of women between the ages of 15 and 49 in India, 53% in Sri Lanka, 36% in Bangladesh and 23% in Nepal consider a husband to be justified in hitting or beating his wife. A WHO study (2005) suggested that two-thirds of Bangladeshi women would not tell anyone about physical abuse by their husband, mainly because “they did not think the violence was very serious”.

Overall, South Asian countries rank extremely poorly in terms of global gender indices (MH HDC: 215). There has been some progress in national policies: Since 2003, the six countries involved in “We Can” have adhered to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Sri Lanka adopted a law prohibiting domestic violence (DV) in 2002; India in 2005; Nepal and Pakistan in 2009; Bangladesh in 2010. In Nepal, a landmark judgment of the Supreme Court outlawed marital rape (2002). Sexual harassment in the workplace was recognised in the *Vishaka* judgment by the Supreme Court of India (1997), and prohibited in a 2007 bill. Bangladesh and Pakistan have passed similar laws (UN Women 2011a). However, these changes in legislation are not effectively enforced. Thus, a 2009 review in India found that half of the magistrates participating in training on the DV Act subscribed to statements that “for a successful marriage, sometimes a man needs to discipline his wife” or “too much fuss is made about domestic violence” (Kapur 2010: 4).

**Apparently, policy change has not been accompanied by a transformation of social norms.** As Rao and Kelleher (2005) postulate, sustainable transformation of gender relations needs to be grounded in work on “formal”, “systemic” development (e.g. policies and institutions) as well as on “informal”, “individual” realms (e.g. attitudes). “We Can” has been designed to influence such “informal” individual attitudes and agency, with the goal to transform social norms that condone VAW.

### CAMPAIGN RATIONALE

In late 2000, an Oxfam International South Asia meeting identified VAW as a key issue for the region. Starting from early 2001, the Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) South Asia gender working group (GWG) engaged in planning a campaign to end violence against women, which would (i) link up with existing OGB programmes, (ii) address attitudes and beliefs, and (iii) work with women and men (GWG 11/2001). In June 2002, it was decided the campaign would need to be grounded in research presenting “killer facts” to demonstrate the magnitude of VAW in Asia. Mona Mehta’s briefing paper *Towards Ending Violence Against Women in South Asia* (Mehta 2004) fulfilled that purpose, building on Amartya Sen’s research, and identifying “the pervasive culture of gender-based violence in South Asia” and “the rules of a patriarchal system which reinforces gender inequalities” as key obstacles to development. It concludes: “until men’s and women’s belief that violence against women is a ‘private’ matter and culturally acceptable is challenged and changed, the violence and discrimination will continue.”

Amartya Sen found that 50 million women were “missing” in South Asia. The “We Can” campaign strategy takes up this figure, aiming to mobilise 5 million “change agents” to influence 50 million “ordinary men and women” and decision-makers (CSP 2005).

### CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES

The public “We Can” campaign strategy paper (CSP 2005) states the following goal and objectives:

*Campaign Goal: Reduce social acceptance of VAW across six countries of South Asia*  
*Campaign Objectives: Over the next six years in these six countries, the campaign will achieve:*

- *A fundamental shift in social attitudes and beliefs that support VAW*
- *A collective and visible stand by different sections of the community against VAW*
- *A popular movement to end all VAW*
- *A range of local, national and regional alliances to address VAW*

The campaign would “provide a common platform to various individuals and organisations making efforts to empower women facing violence [...]”. National campaigns would “respond to the unique social, cultural, political and economic environments and thus have different focus areas”, with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka focussing on DV, Pakistan on “honour killings” and Nepal on trafficking of girls and women. (CSP 2005)

The campaign does *not* pretend to make an immediate impact on the incidence of VAW. But it is designed to create a social environment that prevents VAW, e.g. by encouraging:

- men and boys to adopt and promote more gender-equal attitudes and behaviour
- women and girls to protect themselves from violence
- survivors of VAW to seek support and break the cycle of violence
- “bystanders” to prevent VAW among peers or within their family
- police and justice to enforce anti-VAW laws
- people in organisations not “traditionally” concerned with VAW – e.g. government institutions, development NGOs, schools – to recognise VAW as an impediment to reaching their goals and “mainstream” VAW prevention into their work.

### THE “WE CAN” THEORY OF CHANGE: (A) “CHANGE MAKER” MOBILISATION

“We Can” combines conventional campaigning techniques – alliance-building, public communication through mass media, celebrity endorsement – with the unique “change maker” (CM) concept.

**Focus on individual agency:** The campaign is inspired by a model of intentional change – the “stages of change”<sup>55</sup>, known to Oxfam through the work of the NGO *Raising Voices* in Uganda.<sup>56</sup> It builds on well-established theory first formulated by Kurt Lewin, a founder of social psychology. He found that internalised social norms must be “unfrozen” to make change possible – i.e. an issue hitherto considered “normal” must be recognised as a social construct, a man-made thing that can be changed. When such change has occurred, the new attitude must be strengthened, i.e. “frozen”.<sup>57</sup>



<sup>55</sup> TSSF: 17

<sup>56</sup> For rich information and materials, see [www.raisingvoices.org](http://www.raisingvoices.org)

<sup>57</sup> Personal communication from Prof. Alexander Redlich, Hamburg University, June 2011

“We Can” has attempted to convince 5 million women and men to become **“change makers”**, i.e. to (i) engage in personal development processes (*“internal activism”*)<sup>58</sup>, and (ii) involve 50 million others (*“external activism”*) in their efforts for gender equality and against VAW.




Their experience of personal change turns CMs into **credible models** for gender-equitable and non-violent behaviour within their social contexts. A fundamental tenet of “We Can” is that *“change can only come from within, and from sustained action at individual level. It needs to be born of personal reflection and understanding and replicated on an even larger scale through demonstration and mutual support. [...] The campaign invites Change Makers to encourage others to change and to come together for mutual support, and concerned organisations of all kinds to join their efforts within a campaign alliance.”*<sup>59</sup>

Phase I focuses on awareness-raising through messages that encourage individuals to reflect on VAW and gender inequality in their own lives. They formalise their engagement with the **“CM pledge”**:

- *Not to tolerate or perpetuate violence against women under any circumstances*
- *To motivate at least ten people to help prevent and end gender discrimination and violence against women*<sup>60</sup>

Phase II of the campaign is designed to re-engage CMs and support them in “deepening” change, i.e. “action”/ “consolidation” in the “stages of change” model. This is to be achieved through systematic re-engagement of CMs (left quadrants) and work with institutions they may be part of (right).

*Table (application of Kelleher/ Rao, 2004) from Pancholi (2011)*



## THE “WE CAN” THEORY OF CHANGE: (B) COMMUNICATION MATERIALS

**Mass appeal through appropriate communication materials:** All reviews of “We Can” have emphasised the importance of widely accessible, context-sensitive communication materials. Posters, comic booklets, newsletters, flip charts, and audio and video clips were designed to trigger reflection among audiences unfamiliar with concepts of gender equality, and accompany the stages of personal change and public activism. *Raising Voices* expert Lori Michau advised on materials development in three regional workshops between 2004 and 2007.<sup>61</sup> A wide range of supports and events were used which carried appealing, positive images and messages. A core item was the “change maker kit”: *“The Change Maker Kit is a collection of materials and visual resources, such as workbooks, pamphlets, story booklets, comic cards,*

<sup>58</sup> The terms “internal” and “external” activism are from TSSF 11: 64

<sup>59</sup> Retrieved on 11/8/2011 from <http://www.wecanendvaw.org/understanding-change>, highlights by me

<sup>60</sup> Retrieved on 11/8/2011 from <http://www.wecanendvaw.org/change-makers-pledge>

<sup>61</sup> TSSF: 71-72 and personal communication from OGB SARC staff

posters, and information about the Campaign and the issues, which in the first years of the Campaign were widely distributed and used by the Change Makers. The idea behind the kit [...] is that as Change Makers use it with others, their own understanding becomes enhanced. [...] The kit comes in a 'We Can' branded bag, and includes different kinds of items in different countries. [...] The materials in the kit have evolved over time, and are used and adapted differently in different countries." (TSSF: 76) Phase II messaging, builds on and repeats earlier messages to encourage "deepening of change" and intensified activism.

Unlike typical social marketing campaigns for behaviour change, "We Can" messaging does *not* prescribe any single, simple action (e.g. calling a help-line). Instead, it calls for personal reflection and action commensurate with CMs' abilities and contexts. "Change making" is also different from "peer education" in that CMs are *not* systematically trained to pass on pre-determined information to a specific audience. A key message is "every change has equal value" (TSSF: 18), leaving it to each CM to determine which action to take within her or his context.



*Does society treat women and men equally? Images from Phase I Change Maker Kit*

**Visibility through a shared campaign identity:** The campaign has its own, distinctive branding and logo (developed in 2004, see cover page of this report) which emphasise the breadth of the campaign alliance. The logo has been consistently used in a wide range of communication materials, produced at regional, country and also more local levels. Poster-drawing competitions in districts have enhanced campaign visibility through systematic use of the logo (WS SA UP & MH). Although OGB held the regional executive leadership of "We Can" up to March 2011, a deliberate choice was made *not* to use any Oxfam "branding".

#### **THE "WE CAN" THEORY OF CHANGE: (C) SCALE AND SPREAD THROUGH ALLIANCES**

Starting from 2004, Oxfam built "We Can" campaign alliances around pre-existing programme partnerships with various organisations and individuals at different levels, including development NGOs, women's and broader human rights groups, media professionals and other groups. There was no blueprint

for alliance creation; campaigners at various levels had considerable leeway in trying out different ways of engaging with their highly diverse audiences (WS NA India, WS SA UP). In Bangladesh a *national* alliance began with 7 organisational members (WCLM 9/2004). In India, alliances started chiefly at *state* levels; in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, they were initially created by Oxfam partners in *districts* (TSSF: 40-50). The alliances appear to have followed different paths and paces of growth. Alliance structures vary.

There has not been any South Asia *regional* alliance. Until March 2011, the OGB South Asia Regional Centre hosted a **regional “We Can” secretariat** within its Global Centre of Learning on VAW. All OGB staff leading “We Can” implementation in “their” countries (“campaign leads”) met at semi-annual intervals; information was shared through reports and the regional web-site [www.wecanendvaw.org](http://www.wecanendvaw.org). In early 2010, OGB established a “global reference group” (GRG) of individuals from OGB, “We Can” alliances throughout the world and others who had advised the “We Can” Regional Secretariat. In March 2011, the GRG agreed to form a **Global “We Can” Network** representing all active country alliances, OGB SARC staff involved in “We Can” and associated experts, to support learning in and from “We Can”, and the emergence of “We Can” as a *“global, social movement”* (GRG 4/2011).

### THE “WE CAN” LAUNCHES AND ROLL-OUT

**Phase I:** In 2004, “We Can” was launched in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in “classical” campaigning events – e.g. mass rallies, supportive speeches by celebrities and (local) political decision-makers, popular arts (songs, dance, wall painting), billboards, posters, leaflets and radio/ TV clips. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, similar national launches took place in 2006 and 2007. The “We Can” national launches in Bangladesh and Pakistan were organised *after* a series of district-level launches. In Sri Lanka, two regional launches followed a relatively low-key national event. India and Nepal had single launch events in the capitals.<sup>62</sup>

**“Change maker” mobilisation**, usually driven by a core of CMs from the fledgling alliances, happened in different ways. Each country, maybe even each alliance appears to have used a different mix of mass-scale communication and person-to-person interaction, such as:

- Rallies and marches, e.g. on World Women’s Day and during the 16 Days of Activism to End GBV, which integrate elements of folk culture
- Events in colleges, schools, youth and culture clubs
- Visuals – e.g. billboards, posters, murals, rickshaw decoration and the “well paintings” pioneered in post-Tsunami Sri Lanka WASH programmes – and a wide range of print materials
- Audio-visual media, e.g. radio jingles, TV spots and drama (BAN)<sup>63</sup>; songs, dance and street drama
- Street corner and courtyard meetings for small group discussion, and one-on-one communication initiated by change makers within their own social environment.
- “Mainstreaming” of “We Can” messages and materials into NGO outreach structures, e.g. rural self-help group meetings in Orissa.<sup>64</sup>

**Phase II:** Internal reviews and in-depth assessments in India and Bangladesh between 2006 and 2008 found that one-off events typically kept CMs active for 12-14 months only (MTC1: 3). Consequently, phase II activities were designed to re-engage CMs, in a somewhat more standardised manner than in

<sup>62</sup> TSSF: 28-37

<sup>63</sup> “We Can” Campaign Annual Report 2006-2007 for Bangladesh: 18

<sup>64</sup> Direct observation in Orissa, August 2008

phase I, when only the availability of resources limited the alliances' creativity. (WSNA IN, WSSA UP, I12) Three main channels of communication were used:<sup>65</sup>

- Centrally produced **newsletters** to all CMs whose addresses could be traced
- “Mobile **vans**” bringing “We Can” messages back to areas with registered CMs with songs, street performances and print materials (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)
- Designated “**connector**” or “volunteer”<sup>66</sup> CMs interacting regularly with “clusters” of some 50 “ordinary” CMs each; and the “*Thousand Events*” initiative wherein CMs organised a multitude of “small” events – such as door-to-door campaigning and meetings – in their districts.

Parallel efforts were intensified to “**institutionalise**” the campaign by drawing schools, colleges, local government bodies and other formal institutions into “We Can”, with the objective to achieve sustainable change in values and policies. (TSSF 11: 45)

There is no specific “**phase III**” documentation, but conversations with campaign leaders suggest that “We Can” has entered a new phase. The three-day culmination event “*Together for Change*”, held in March 2011 in Kathmandu with the participation of alliances and “change makers” from five campaign countries (Afghanistan was absent), marked the formal closure of the South Asia regional campaign and the hand-over to the country alliances. (TSSF 11: 144)

## D. Evaluation Methodology

### PURPOSE AND USERS

As per the evaluation TOR, *“the main purpose of the planned external end evaluation is accountability, both “internally” to OGB and externally to partners, beneficiaries and donors. OGB, partners and donors need to know whether their contribution to the campaign has been relevant, effective and efficient; what outcomes it has produced; and whether and how it has contributed to sustainable change. The thrust of evaluation should therefore be devoted to the summative purpose of examining what goals have been accomplished and what is the impact of the Campaign on knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practices of target populations [...]. A secondary but important purpose of the evaluation is formative, i.e. to deepen learning among We Can alliances for their future campaigning.”*

The evaluation report, which roughly follows the format fixed in the TOR, is expected to be used by Oxfam, its Trustees, its donors, and the “We Can” alliances. In addition, I have produced a “best practice document” summarising, in an easily accessible form and a structure that has been agreed to by OGB SARC, learning from “We Can” for a wider audience. The evaluation is fully funded by Oxfam GB.

### APPROACH

Given the scope and complexity of the campaign under review, the evaluation can only be “realist” – as opposed to (quasi-) experimental approaches – in that it acknowledges the role of context factors and looks for the mechanisms that elucidate how observed outcomes may have been produced (Patton: 496). Our approach is rigorous in that it rests on standard (OECD DAC) evaluation criteria, describes the sources and methods used and their limitations in a verifiable manner, and triangulates tools and perspectives so as to limit error and bias.

We have adopted an utilisation-focused approach (Patton, 2008), making this a participatory evaluation for and with its primary users, to serve specified uses. The anticipated users are OGB Trustees, management and staff at various levels, other Oxfam affiliates and OI, “We Can” allies, donors and others

<sup>65</sup> The likely exception is Afghanistan – no evidence of such activities has been available from Afghanistan, where the security situation arguably limits public activism.

<sup>66</sup> In most countries, the term “connector” is used. In India, the “connectors” main campaign task is to distribute the newsletter, while those who animate other regular interaction with CM “clusters” are called “volunteers”.

who work to end VAW. Pankaj Shrivastava, Mona Mehta and Malini Gupta from the OGB SARC were near-daily interlocutors on evaluation design and implementation; they also served as members of a wider reference group which included senior OGB staff in Oxford and three national “We Can” secretariats. In the first phase of the evaluation, the reference group discussed and approved my 15-page inception report, which was based on an initial desk review and interviews with key evaluation users. OGB country staff and national “We Can” secretariats assisted in research on national “We Can” campaigns, by facilitating field research in India and Nepal, granting interview time and providing written and audio-visual documentation. The process of data collection has been designed to foster sharing of learning among the participants – e.g. through group discussion and workshops.

### KEY QUESTIONS AND SCOPE

*See above, Chapter 2 of the evaluation report.*

### INDICATORS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

In the inception phase, I translated Oxfam’s evaluation questions into broad indicators for each of the five DAC criteria. For each set of indicators, I set a specific level of analysis – regional (REG), per country (6C, 5C) or case study (CS) level –, as visualised below. A more detailed table (see annex *Evaluation Matrix*) specifies research questions per indicator, and the tools and sources to be used.

DAC	Level	Indicators
Relevance	Reg., 6C	Coherence with (i) Oxfam priorities, (ii) people’s needs and resources, (iii) national strategies, (iv) related efforts by other actors, and (v) established theories of change regarding VAW
	Reg	Internal consistency of campaign design (theory of change/ intervention logic)
Effectiveness	5C	Outcomes regarding (i) social acceptance of VAW, (ii) “attitudinal shift”
	CS	Existence of a “popular movement” against VAW
	5C	Quality of alliances at local, national and regional levels
	CS	Quality of campaign implementation, “Client satisfaction”
Efficiency	CS	Quality of planning and implementation, e.g. purpose-driven, timeliness, decision-making, flexibility, risk management, capacity building, co-operation with others, monitoring, learning
	Reg., CS	Quality of resource mobilisation and management
	Reg., CS	Quality of co-operation with external actors
Impact	CS	Likely contribution to long-term changes in individual attitudes and social norms re. VAW: (i) CM’s own perceptions and behaviour re. VAW and (ii) positive changes experienced by VAW survivors
Sustainability	CS	Likely stability of more gender-equitable attitudes adopted by CM
	6C	Likely continuation of the campaign by alliances after OGB withdrawal
	CS	Capacity of alliances
	5-6C	Quality of OGB’s exit strategy for “We Can”

### DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

A rich mix of “objective” and “subjective”, “qualitative” and “quantitative” data was collected and analysed. Laura Ceresna and Rosa Garwood provided extensive support (see annex *Evaluation Team*).

We have applied qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2008) on the documentation from OGB and alliance secretariats, including, among others, reports on *campaign process* (e.g. TSSF, strategy papers, meeting minutes, budgets and accounts), reports on *campaign outcomes* (e.g. phase I and phase II assessments), and sample communication materials in English. External sources included publications on women’s rights and VAW in South Asia, on good practice in VAW prevention and broader issues of social psychology (literature list in annex). Laura ran quantitative tests with the data sets from phase II to



enrich findings. E-mail mini-surveys combining open and closed (scaled) questions, and anonymous questionnaires distributed in the India alliance workshop provided confidential spaces for criticism.

Laura, Rosa and I led interpreter-assisted workshops and focus group discussions in India and Nepal. The original intention was to bring together allies from all six campaign countries, but OGB SARC staff, preoccupied by the imminent closure of the SARC office, was not in a position to organise an event of that scope. Instead, group work was carried out at national, state/ regional and district levels only. Key informant interviews were held face-to-face or by phone with “We Can” allies at various levels, OGB staff and with external actors (women’s organisations, other campaigning groups, donors). Interviews followed semi-structured guidelines, were recorded in writing and stored safely so as to preserve confidentiality. Some direct observation was possible during field research in India (campaign events in two colleges); I have also drawn on notes from my earlier visit to the Orissa alliance (India, 2008).

## DIFFICULTIES

**Complexity and scale:** “We Can” aims to provoke an **open-ended range of mass-scale change in individual attitudes and social norms** related to VAW. Such attitudes and norms are complex constructs rooted in social and personality structures;<sup>67</sup> the paths and forms of change are linked to social contexts and individual histories. For example, in a conservative rural district of Pakistan, “*a fundamental shift in social attitudes and beliefs that support VAW*” (CSP) will look different from a “fundamental shift” among college students in New Delhi. With each CM starting from her own personal “baseline”, is there a common standard against which attitude change can be measured? And when does a changed attitude trigger changed behaviour? People live with rich repertoires of diverse, sometimes contradictory attitudes; links between professed attitudes and behaviour are tenuous (Bohner & Wänke, 2002).

The effects of **external factors and “natural” personal growth** among target populations over a 7-year period make it difficult to attribute any changes in attitudes and norms to one specific campaign. Substantial differences in campaign implementation models per country add an extra layer of complexity when it comes to drawing “regional” conclusions. In her phase II assessment (2009-2010), Anuradha Rajan and her collaborators developed an interview-based method to gauge “deepening of change” in CMs (PII SUM). This has yielded fertile information on the types of change that may be linked to “We Can”. Yet, sample size, although considerable in absolute terms (1,765 persons), along with other difficulties<sup>68</sup> do not permit any extrapolation on wider social change.

**Ample but patchy documentation:** “We Can” has produced voluminous reports on its phase I and II assessments, its history (TSSF) and CM stories. However, most countries do not seem to have any documented monitoring routines for “We Can”. Much exchange and learning appears to happen in informal, experiential ways. The documentation received on regional and national alliance meetings (key moments of “We Can” management and monitoring) is incomplete; a number of documents are not dated and authorship is unclear. Only Bangladesh has provided a series of annual campaign reports (2005-2009) and comprehensive records of twice-yearly key campaign events (2009-2011). It took some effort to obtain all phase I and II assessments and CM databases. Reports to donors contain little information on campaign structures and activities. Some key documents arrived only after our Asia trip, leaving little opportunity for verification and probing.

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<sup>67</sup> See annex *Change in Attitudes Related to VAW*

<sup>68</sup> A random sample of 5% would be statistically significant – i.e., 135,000 out of some 2.7 million CMs. Furthermore, the phase II sampling processes was only partly randomised or representative. Most interviews were administered by local CMs; COI were selected by the CMs who had interacted with them; interviewees received financial compensation for travel and interview time and; one CM received a special briefing on “We Can” and VAW immediately before the interview (PII REG: 85) – all likely sources of bias.

**Translation** was needed for part of the field research in India and Nepal. In Nepal, OGB hired external interpreters, as I had requested so as to limit bias. This was not done in India, where people involved in “We Can” implementation translated for us – with dedication and interesting insights shared after meetings, but still from an “insider” perspective. Only consecutive interpretation was available. All interpreters were asked to translate sentence by sentence, which cut the flow of our interlocutors’ speech but reduced the risk of distortion.

**Limits to confidentiality and representativeness in field research:** The presence of Oxfam staff in several group discussions in India (MH) and Nepal, and of leading national or state alliance staff in district-level discussions, may have kept some participants from openly voicing criticism. Our interlocutors at district levels were generally selected by leading allies, who tended to choose individuals they found relatively active and articulate. The evaluator’s choice of states and districts to be visited was limited by travel time constraints and criteria set by Oxfam<sup>69</sup>. In India, we visited two states where “We Can” alliances have been led by national “We Can” core group members.

**Limited debriefing:** Ideally, the analysis and conclusions presented in this should have been discussed with OGB and the campaign alliances in all countries *before* I would finalise this report. Due to time constraints, such debriefing happened only in the form of a teleconference with national allies and OGB staff in Nepal, and sharing of a rough draft report with SARC staff working on “We Can”. The India, Nepal and Bangladesh alliance secretariats were consulted on specific aspects of the report.

#### CHANGES TO ORIGINAL PLANS

The evaluation was commissioned a month after Oxfam had formally withdrawn from “We Can” management in most countries (except Pakistan). OGB regional re-structuring and the imminent closure of the SARC hampered communication and planning. A packed OGB regional and global meeting agenda meant that field work had to be shifted deep into the monsoon period, to late July – early August.

After our field research in Uttar Pradesh (UP), I developed a serious bacterial infection that required four days of stationary treatment in a (New Delhi) hospital, and antibiotic medication over a three-week period. I had to give up the prospect of conducting field work in Maharashtra (MH) and Nepal. Rosa Wilson Garwood, who had assisted me in UP and in work with the national alliance, completed the national-level workshop and led the field research in MH (with support from OGB SARC staff and consultant Rashi Bhargava). Subsequently, she extended her stay in Asia to support Laura Ceresna, who took over the lead for field research in Nepal. We kept in touch through daily phone briefings. The documentation produced by this “emergency team” is of excellent quality.

## E. List of interviewees and participants in evaluation workshops

### INTERVIEWEES (BY COUNTRY)

*All interviews were coded (roughly in the order of their appearance in this report) so as to preserve the respondents’ anonymity. Quotes from interviews that are attributed to specific interviewees have been authorised by the interviewees.*

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Country</b>
Jinat Ara Haque	“We Can” National Secretariat		Bangladesh
Prof. Alex. Redlich	University of Hamburg	Dept. of Psychology	Germany
Anuradha Rajan		Consultant	India
Biranchi Upadhyaya	Ex-Oxfam GB	Ex-Regional Director	India
Deepak Kabir	“We Can” State Alliance, UP		India
Gitanjanli Singh	UN Women	PO	India

<sup>69</sup> In India, state alliances who had undergone large-scale assessments (PI, PII) had to be “spared”.

Gouri Chowdhury	Action India	Director	India
Himalini and Santayan Sengupta		Thoughtshop	India
Mamta Singh	Humsafar	Director	India
Ashi & Kasti Mishra	NFIW		India
Mona Mehta	Oxfam GB	Prog. Quality Manager	India (SARC)
Naseem Khan	Mission Convergence, Govt. of N.C.T., New Delhi		India
Prasanna	PCVC	Director	India
Rashmi Singh	“We Can” National Secretariat		India
Ms. Saumtya	AIDWA		
Siddhartha Kalhans	UP Journalists’ Association		India
Dr. Sudha Bajpaj	Lucknow Model Public Inter College		India
Suneeta Dhar	Jagori	Trustee	India
Bandana Rana	Saathi	Chairperson	Nepal
Anjana Shakya	Beyond Beijing Committee	Chairperson	Nepal
Bishnu Mayadungana		Consultant	Nepal
Anthony Scott Faiia	Oxfam GB	Country Director	Nepal
Dilli Raj Ghimire	Gender Division, PM’s Office		Nepal
Mahima Malla	Gender Division, PM’s Office		Nepal
Sumana	Gender Division, PM’s Office		Nepal
Purna Shrestha	UN Women	Programme Officer	Nepal
Marjolijn Verhoog	Oxfam Novib	South Asia PO	Netherlands
Audrey Bronstein	Oxfam GB	Deputy PD	UK
Karl Hughes	Oxfam GB	Global MEL Advisor	UK
Ines Smyth	Oxfam GB	Global Gender Advisor	UK
Ivan Scott	OGB Head of Programme Performance & Accountability		UK

## WORKSHOPS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

*Note: this list does not include interviews with groups of less than 3 persons (which are listed above).*

### India

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Participants</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
NA Core Group WS	8 NA core group members	3 men, 5 women
NA workshop	14 NA members	from 12 states
UP alliance WS	9 reps from different districts	2/3 men
Lucknow alliance WS	9 Lucknow district alliance members	2/3 men
CM in UP: FGD	10 CMs from Lucknow	6 from LOKAYAT
MH State alliance WS	12 State alliance members	7 from YUVA
Bhandara DA WS	9 DA members (MH)	
Bhandara CMs FGD	10 CMs from/ near Bhandara (MH)	

### Nepal

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Participants</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
NA Core Group WS	8 Core group members	including 1 OGB staff
NA WS	23 NA members from 12 districts	
Inter-district alliance WS	6 DA reps from 5 districts	also called “regional” alliance
Arghakhanchi DA FGD	11 DA reps	4 from J.C.S.M.
Arghakhanchi CM FGD	8 CMs	
Inter-district VDC FGD	6 VDC secretaries	in Arghakhanchi

## F. Field research itinerary

The itinerary below reflects the actual activities undertaken by members of the evaluation team.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Activity</b>
22/7	Delhi	Michaela's arrival from Berlin, Rosa's from Bangkok Briefing with Oxfam GB SARC
23/7	Lucknow	Travel Delhi – Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh State) Briefing with UP state alliance representatives
24/7	Lucknow	Workshop with representatives from c. 10 district alliances in U.P. Focus group discussion with “change makers” Discussion with Naseem Khan, <i>Mission Convergence</i> (Delhi)
25/7	Lucknow	Participation in “We Can” campaign events at Mahavir Prasad college and Lucknow Model Public Inter College Workshop with Lucknow district alliance
26/7	Lucknow	Interviews with external stakeholders (three women's groups, one media rep.) Return to Delhi
27/7	Delhi	Workshop with national alliance core group Interview with Santayan Sengupta and Himalini, Thoughtshop Foundation
28/7	Delhi	National alliance workshop
29/7	Delhi	Interview with Sonaly Khan, <i>Breakthrough</i>
30/7	Nagpur	Travel Delhi – Nagpur (Maharashtra State) Workshop with MH state alliance
31/7	Nagpur	Sunday rest, analysis, preparation of workshop
1/8	Bhandara	Focus group discussion with Bhandara district alliance Focus group discussion with Bhandara “change makers”
2/8	Delhi	Return from Nagpur to Delhi Debriefing within evaluation team, preparation for Nepal research
3/8	Kathmandu	Travel to Nepal Briefing with OGB and national “We Can” alliance secretariat
4/8	Kathmandu	Workshop with core group of national alliance Interviews with external stakeholders
5/8	Kathmandu	Workshop with national “We Can” alliance
6/8	Kathmandu	Workshop with national “We Can” alliance (part II) Interviews with external stakeholders
7/8	Arghakhanchi	Travel to Arghakhanchi District
8/8	Arghakhanchi	Focus group discussion with district alliance Focus group discussion with inter-district alliance
9/8	Arghakhanchi	Focus group discussion with “change makers” Focus group discussion with village development councils
10/8	Kathmandu	Return to Kathmandu Debriefing with OGB and Alliance

## G. Sample Interview Guides

All interviews were semi-structured, i.e. the questions shown below were enriched with probing questions; additional questions could be added. For example, people running services for VAW survivors were asked whether they had noted an increase of VAW survivors seeking support.

### *Interview Guide External Stakeholders in South Asia*

**Name:**

**Organisation, place:**

**Function:**

**Date:**

*INTRO: Thank you! How much **time** do we have for this? 45 minutes will be fine.*

***Evaluation of the campaign “We Can End All Violence against Women”:** external, small team led by me, 75 days for 6-country 7-year campaign in South Asia*

***Confidential**, will not share with anyone. Will touch-type while talking – notes password-protected in my computer. Is it OK if we also take an audio recording as a back-up?*

***Any questions from your side before we start?***

1. What aspects of your work are related to preventing VAW and supporting VAW survivors? Please summarise in a few sentences.
2. First, I would like to learn about the situation in South Asia/ your country/ State/ district. If you look back over the last 6-7 years, do you feel anything has changed in people’s attitudes and beliefs regarding violence against women?  
*[Changed attitudes/ norms re. VAW, “popular movement” against VAW]*
3. Do you think there is a popular movement against VAW in South Asia/ your country/ State/ district? Why?
4. Do you know the “We Can” campaign? In your opinion, what is special about the campaign?
5. Have you had any direct contact with the campaign? Please explain.
6. What did you find useful or enjoyable in your contact with the “We Can” campaign? Were there any aspects that you found difficult or less helpful?
7. In your opinion, how did other people and organisations working on VAW react to the “We Can” campaign? What were the positive reactions, what were the negative ones?
8. Have the reactions to the campaign had any consequences on the campaign?
9. Have you seen any effects of the campaign, positive or negative? Please explain.  
*[Results, sharing of learning, synergy with other projects]*
10. Do you think these effects will last?
11. What advice would you give to the “We Can” campaigners?
12. What advice would you give to me, the external evaluator of the “We Can” campaign?
13. Any other points? *(ask several times)*

### *Interview Guide External Stakeholders - Donors*

**Name:**

**Organisation, place:**

**Function:**

**Date:**

*INTRO: Thank you! How much **time** do we have for this? 30-45 minutes will be fine.*

***Evaluation of the campaign “We Can End All Violence against Women”:** external, small team led by me, 75 days for 6-country 7-year campaign in South Asia*

***Confidential**, will not share with anyone. Will touch-type while talking – notes password-protected in my computer. Is it OK if we also take an audio recording as a back-up? **Any questions from your side before we start?***

1. What is the place of women’s rights in your strategy for South Asia?
2. What types of programmes do you support related to women’s rights, VAW prevention and support to VAW survivors? Please summarise in a few sentences.
3. Since when has your organisation funded the “We Can” campaign, and why?
4. If you look back over the years since then, what have been the main “ups” and “downs” in your funding relationship with Oxfam on “We Can”? What went well, what was difficult or maybe special compared to other projects?
5. Have you seen any effects of the “We Can” campaign, positive or negative? Please explain.  
*[Results, sharing of learning, added value/ synergy with other projects]*
6. Do you think these effects will last? Under what conditions?
7. OGB support to the campaign has ended. Would you continue funding the campaign in the coming years? Why?
8. What advice would you give to the “We Can” campaigners for the coming years?
9. What advice would you give to me – the external evaluator of this campaign?
10. Any other points? *(ask several times)*

### **H. Sample Focus Group Discussion Plan**

FGD formats were adjusted shortly before each FGD to factor in group size, the availability (and appropriateness) of “classical” visualisation on flip charts, and time for translation. With one group (Lucknow district alliance), we used role play to better understand the concept of “We Can” home visits.

#### *Mini-WS Guide District Alliances*

**Date:**

**Introduction Round:** *Many thanks for coming!*

***Evaluation of the campaign “We Can End All Violence against Women”:** It is an external evaluation; I am not part of Oxfam. I lead a small team that will look at the “We Can” campaign in South Asia and try to draw lessons for the “We Can” alliances, Oxfam and others that work to end VAW. **I have asked for 2-3-hour meeting with you, the members of the District Alliance, to find out about your activities around “We Can”.** So this will be mainly about what you did, what worked, what was difficult – not so much about personal stories of change. I have much information on that already. **Confidential**, will not share with anyone. We will take notes while talking, but the notes are just for me. Is it OK if we also take photographs and an audio recording as a back-up? These documents will be strictly used for the evaluation and we will not quote you personally or share the recording. **Any questions from your side before we start?***

**Constellations** (participants take different positions in space to visualise the questions below)

- Question to the group: who has travelled the longest distance to come here?
- Who is here as an individual alliance member, who is here on behalf of an organisation?
- Make a line – who was in the alliance first, who came later?
- 2 sides: who worked on VAW-related issues before joining “We Can”?
- Who has been in contact with Oxfam before joining “We Can”?

**Could someone summarise the objectives of “We Can” to me? ...**

**I have prepared several questions. For each question, I would like to hear answers from different people – also different opinions. Please remember – we will talk mainly about the activities of the alliance here, so unfortunately there won’t be much time to share personal stories.**

1. What have you done as an alliance, since [YEAR of campaign start in district] to reach these objectives? What kind of activities have been particularly useful?  
*[Changed attitudes/ norms re. VAW, “popular movement” against VAW]*
2. What works best to get Change Makers to sign up? What works best to keep them active?
3. Are there any activities that you tried out and decided not to continue, because they were less useful or too difficult? Please explain.
4. How do you make your plans? How do you decide what you will do to (re-)engage CM?
5. How do you know CMs actually act like CMs – i.e. they speak to 10 other people (& what else do you expect from them?)
6. In your district, how many CM have signed on altogether? How many do you consider somewhat active, how many very active? *List: Total number/ Very active/ Somewhat active/ Not active*
7. Who helped you in carrying out the activities for “We Can”? What kind of help did you get? What was useful, what was less useful? *[Oxfam, National Alliance, other stakeholders]*
8. Stakeholder mapping: 3 circles – alliance in the middle; organisations that play a role in women’s rights/ VAW and that the alliance has frequent contact with in 2<sup>nd</sup> circle; organisations re. VAW/ women’s rights with little contact in 3<sup>rd</sup> circle (any conflicts?) → discussion
9. Will you continue campaign on “We Can”? Will anything change in the coming years as to what you will do?
10. If someone else was to start a “We Can” campaign in a district like yours, what advice would you give them? [critical success factors]
11. What advice would you give to me, the external evaluator of the “We Can” campaign – how can I learn as much as I can from your experience?
12. Anything else you would like to add?
13. Feed-back (ball-throwing): What did you find useful in this meeting? And what is your wish for the future, related to “We Can”?

*Optional:* Draw a picture (a drawing) of the situation you would have in your district if the “We Can” campaign had never happened. → *Gallery walk and discussion*

## I. E-mail survey forms

*The original forms contained larger empty spaces to suggest an appropriate length for the answers.*

*We received 8 responses from OGB staff working on “We Can” in all 6 countries (2 each from Nepal and Pakistan).*

*The longer forms for alliances were completed by respondents from 5 countries only: Afghanistan (patchy responses from 5 different organisations participating in “We Can”), Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan.*

### MINI-SURVEY WITH OXFAM STAFF IMPLEMENTING “WE CAN”

This short questionnaire is part of the evaluation of “We Can” in South Asia. The purpose of the evaluation is “accountability, both ‘internally’ to Oxfam and externally to partners, beneficiaries and donors. Oxfam GB, partners and donors need to know whether their contribution to the campaign has been relevant, effective and efficient; what outcomes it has produced; and whether and how it has contributed to sustainable change.” (Evaluation TOR) The questionnaire has been distributed to current Oxfam GB professional staff members who have implemented We Can in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Its purpose is to gather information on Oxfam staff members’ perceptions of “We Can” and prepare for additional research in at least two campaign countries.

***Your information and personal opinions are important.*** You are invited to take ca. half an hour in the coming days to respond to the 10 questions below in English. The questionnaire is meant to be filled in confidentially, by one person only.

Please express yourself freely. Your answers will be read only by myself and – maybe – an independent research assistant, Laura Ceresna (not part of Oxfam). We will store your responses safely on a password-protected computer. Any quotes will be made in an anonymous manner only. Where quotes can be traced to you, I will use them only after your explicit authorisation.

You are kindly requested to type your answers directly into the questionnaire. Feel free to type as much as you wish! Please save the completed form under a new name (e.g. by adding your first to the current file name). The form should be returned to me only, by e-mail to [michaela.raab@gmail.com](mailto:michaela.raab@gmail.com).

If you cannot send your response by 6 July 2011, please let me know as soon as possible.

***Many thanks in advance for your kind participation!***

Michaela Raab

### PERSONAL DATA

Your name	
Your duty station	
Your current position within Oxfam	

### QUESTIONS ON “WE CAN”

1. How would you describe “We Can” to a friend who knows nothing about the campaign?  
*Please use three short sentences only.*

• ...
-------

2. What is special about “We Can” in your country, as compared to other countries in the region?

...
-----

3. In your opinion, how useful has “We Can” been within the overall Oxfam country strategy?  
*Please place “x” next to one box only.*

- |                          |               |                          |                 |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | very useful   | <input type="checkbox"/> | somewhat useful |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | fairly useful | <input type="checkbox"/> | useless         |

**Why? Please explain:**



4. As per the 2005 campaign strategy, the regional objectives of “We Can” are:

- A fundamental shift in social attitudes and beliefs that support VAW
- A collective and visible stand by different sections of the community against VAW
- A popular movement to end all VAW

Do you feel “We Can” has achieved these objectives in your country?

Please place “x” next to one box only.

- totally  moderately
- to a considerable degree  not at all

Why? Please explain:

5. What have been the main outcomes and longer-term impact of “We Can” in your country?

Please place the most significant outcomes and impacts on top of the list.

Outcomes (short- to medium term): up to 5	Impacts (longer term): up to 5

6. Do you feel Oxfam has done a good job designing and supporting “We Can”?

Please place “x” next to one box only.

- absolutely  moderately
- to a considerable degree  not at all

Why? Please explain:

7. Do you feel Oxfam has made the best possible use of its resources (e.g. money, staff time, contacts with other organisations...) for “We Can”?

Please place “x” next to one box only.

- absolutely  moderately
- to a considerable degree  not at all

Why? Please explain:

8. Do you think “We Can” will continue in your country, in the coming years?

Please place “x” next to one box only.

- yes, certainly  not sure
- quite certainly  no  no idea

Why? Please explain:

9. What can Oxfam do in the future to support efforts to end VAW (which may or may not include “We Can”) in your country?

...

10. What have you learnt from “We Can” planning and implementation that can be useful for future Oxfam campaigns and programmes?

Please try to describe this precisely.

...

Please add any other ideas or remarks that may be useful for this evaluation in the box below!

...

### MANY THANKS FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!

Please save the completed form under a new name (e.g. by adding your first to the current file name). The form should be returned to me only, by e-mail to [michaela.raab@gmail.com](mailto:michaela.raab@gmail.com).

### MINI-SURVEY WITH “WE CAN” NATIONAL ALLIANCE SECRETARIATS

This questionnaire is part of the evaluation of “We Can” in South Asia. The purpose of the evaluation is that “Oxfam GB, partners and donors need to know whether their contribution to the campaign has been relevant, effective and efficient; what outcomes it has produced; and whether and how it has contributed to sustainable change.” (Evaluation TOR) This questionnaire is for all national Alliance secretariats. Its purpose is to gather basic information on and your perceptions of the campaign.

***Your information and personal opinions are important.*** You are invited to respond to the 12 questions below in English. The questionnaire is meant to be filled in confidentially, by you only. If you need translation of your answers into English, please choose a person who fills in the form for you. Ideally, the translator should not work with Oxfam so as to preserve confidentiality. Please express yourself freely. Your answers will be read only by me and an independent research assistant, Laura Ceresna (not part of “We Can” or Oxfam). We will store your responses safely on a password-protected computer. Any quotes will be made in an anonymous manner only. Where quotes can be traced to you, I will use them only after your explicit authorisation.

You are kindly requested to type your answers directly into the questionnaire. Feel free to type as much as you wish! Please save the completed form under a new name (e.g. by adding your first to the current file name). The form should be returned to me only, by e-mail to [michaela.raab@gmail.com](mailto:michaela.raab@gmail.com).

If you cannot send your response by 18 July 2011, please let me know as soon as possible.

***Many thanks in advance for your kind participation!***

Michaela Raab

### PERSONAL DATA

Your name	
Your country	
How long have you been involved in the “We Can” campaign?	Since (month, year):

### “WE CAN” AND YOUR NATIONAL ALLIANCE

11. Since when does your national “We Can” Alliance exist?

Month, year:

12. In your opinion, what exactly is special about “We Can” in your country? In what specific aspects is your campaign different from the other national “We Can” campaigns in South Asia?

Please write here (type as much as you wish):

13. In your opinion, what exactly can other “We Can” alliances learn from the alliances in your country? E.g. about Alliance-building, recruiting and re-engaging Change Makers

Please write here (type as much as you wish). Please include specific examples!

14. What were the biggest difficulties that you experienced when running the campaign in your country? Please give specific examples.

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15. What are the main tasks of the national Alliance in your country? Please list up to 10 main tasks, as precisely as possible.

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Additional remarks:

16. Does your national Alliance have any paid staff (e.g. Alliance Secretariat)? If so, please fill in the table below. Feel free to add extra lines!

Staff position	Full time or how many %	Position exists since (year)	Position will end in...	Funded by...	Additional remarks

17. Please list below all members of your national “We Can” campaign alliance. For each province or equivalent level, please also indicate the approximate number of alliance members, and the approximate number of alliance members that exist at lower administrative levels. If such a list is readily available, you don’t need to fill in the form – just send the list (in English).

Name of State (India)/ Province (Pak.)/ District	Number of national alliance members at that level	Number of lower level alliances (approximate)

Please add as many lines as you need!

18. In your opinion, will your Alliance continue to campaign on “We Can” in the coming years?

- yes, absolutely
  probably not  
 probably
  certainly not

Why? Please explain:

19. In your opinion, for how many years will the “We Can” campaign continue in your country?

- less than 1 year
  up to 2015  
 1-3 years
  beyond 2015

Why? Please explain:

20. Do you feel your Alliance is well prepared to continue campaigning in the coming years?

- yes, absolutely
  not sure  
 probably
  certainly not

Why? Please explain:

21. What kind of support have you received from Oxfam GB to build and develop your Alliance? Please fill in specific activities:

Year	Specific activities supported by Oxfam to build and develop the alliance

22. Do you feel your national Alliance needs more or different support from Oxfam? What kinds of support?

Specific types of support needed:

Finally, do you have any other ideas or remarks? Please add them in the box below (up to 2 pages)!

...

**MANY THANKS FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!**

Please save the completed form under a new name (e.g. by adding your first to the current file name). The form should be returned to me only, by e-mail to [michaela.raab@gmail.com](mailto:michaela.raab@gmail.com).

## J. National alliance workshop plan

In both countries, the core group workshop lasted ½ day. National alliance workshops (which typically brought together ½ of the alliance members, representing diverse regions) lasted 1 day in India and 1 ½ days in Nepal (to allow for translation into and from Nepali).

The plans were slightly adjusted (especially re. time!) depending on local contexts.

<b>Core Group Workshop</b>	
Participants: national core group members (up to 12 persons)	
Time	Activity
8:30	<b>Introduction</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OGB staff introduces evaluation team, then depart</li> <li>• Michaela invites participants to pick a postcard → name, place, how long with We Can, why picked this postcard</li> <li>• Agenda of the WS &amp; ground rules. Any questions?</li> </ul>
9:00	<b>Our life with “We Can” in India – Ups and downs</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group work: please form 2 groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Group A will focus on building and growing the ALLIANCES</li> <li>○ Group B will focus on engaging and re-engaging CHANGE MAKERS</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Groups should have similar size, good mix of regions &amp; seniority</i></p> <p>Look back over all the years of “We Can” preparation and campaigning since 2004: what were the “ups” and “downs”, the successes and the disappointments?</p> <p>Were there any TURNING POINTS where you gained new insights, decided to adjust your way of working, do things differently?</p> <p>Please sit quietly 1<sup>st</sup> and think about it individually, take notes for 5 minutes</p> <p><i>Then group discussion → each group prepares a “time line” with “ups” and “downs” and turning points (to be pasted on with training cards) &amp; 5-minute presentation</i></p> <p>Plenary session: presentations, questions</p>
10:30	<b>Break &amp; energiser</b>

11:00	<p><b>Oxfam's role in building and growing the alliance</b>          Today we deepen <i>this</i> topic. We will look at CM engagement in UP and Maharashtra later.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shall we re-mix the groups?           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Group X: Focuses on Oxfam support to the Alliance</li> <li>○ Group Y: Focuses on support from other actors, and on gaps in support</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Individual reflection: look at the history           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ People in group X write green cards: what did Oxfam do with the Alliances that was helpful? And white cards: what did Oxfam do that turned out to be problematic?</li> <li>→ People in group Y write coloured cards: And white cards: What support did we get from non-Oxfam actors? What support was missing (i.e. we would have needed it but could not obtain it?)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Small group discussion: compare cards, cluster them → prepare 5-minute presentation  <i>Please do not throw away any individual cards, just make clusters.</i></li> <li>• Plenary: stick cards to the wall (Michaela makes a start with clustering, then groups turn over); Presentations, plenary discussion</li> </ul>
12:30	<p><b>Feed-back and suggestions for tomorrow (meeting with reps from all States)</b>  <b>Closure</b></p>
<p><b><i>National Alliance Workshop</i></b>          Participants: representatives from all State alliances (18 persons in India)          Or up to 20 representatives of district alliances (Nepal)</p>	
8:30	<p><b>Introduction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OGB staff introduces evaluation team, then depart</li> <li>• Constellations – questions, each time a few Ps introduce themselves:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Make a line – who has travelled the longest time to get to this meeting? (How does it feel to be at this end of the line?)</li> <li>○ 3 clusters: 3 kinds of State alliances (built by a group, built by a central organisation or network, no State-level alliance at all)</li> <li>○ Line: which States have the largest percentage of rural people, which have the most people living in cities?</li> <li>○ Line: In what States do you have more female CM, in what do you have more male CM?</li> <li>○ Line: Which States have launched the campaign, which have come in later?</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Sit down in 3-4 groups of roughly equal size (4-6 persons / table)</p>
9:00	<p><b>The Story of our Alliance</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Each group sub-divides into 2 sub-groups           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sub-group A: alliance creation (up to 2<sup>nd</sup> year of the alliance?)</li> <li>○ Sub-group B: alliance growth? (i.e. NOT from the beginning, but maybe from 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> year of alliance)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Individual reflection – think for 5 minutes – what did we do to create or grow our State alliance? What did Oxfam do (or not do) to support us? What went well, what was more problematic? Write down your thoughts on a note-pad (just key words)</li> <li>• Sub-group discussion: share your thoughts, compare and prepare 2 flip charts together:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ “Good practice”: what did your State alliance do and what did Oxfam do that was useful?</li> <li>○ “Learning”: what did you do and what did Oxfam do that was not so useful or even problematic? Give practical examples</li> <li>○ Differences – was there anything different or special in some States? E.g. something that went well in one State but not another one?</li> </ul> <p>Please make at least 2 flip charts – “good practice” and “learning”; you decide how you present the “special” things (separate flip chart, different colour)</p> </li> <li>• Plenary: each sub-group makes a 5 minute presentation</li> </ul>
10:30	<p><b>Break, energiser</b> (constellation – where does your alliance stand now – still growing, stable or consolidating/ shrinking?)</p>

11:00	<p><b>Our State (India)/ District (Nepal) Alliances and the role of external stakeholders</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quick question – what do we mean by stakeholder in the “We Can” campaign?</li> <li>• Make 3 groups – 3 types of State alliances Each group draws a stakeholder map – inner circle: State alliance, 2<sup>nd</sup> circle: non-alliance members the alliance has frequent contact with, outer circle: non-alliance members the alliance has very little or no contact with Use different colours for special situations</li> </ul> <p><b>Gallery walk</b></p>
12:00	<p><b>Lunch break, energiser</b></p>
13:15	<p><b>How did we engage and re-engage the Change Makers?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 groups:       <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) on your experience attracting/ engaging/ recruiting CM (effective 1<sup>st</sup> contact)</li> <li>(2) on your experience keeping CMs in the campaign and re-engaging them</li> <li>(3) on your ideas for future support to CM activity</li> </ol>       Start with <b>individual</b> reflection: Groups (1) &amp; (2) – what advice would you give to someone else who would start / has been working on “We Can”? What should they DO, what should they avoid? Give some precise advice. DO – coloured cards, AVOID – white cards, max. 5 cards each Group (3) thinks about what you think you should DO and AVOID in the coming years to make sure the CM do their work – try to think creatively, not just what you are planning already     </li> <li>• Group work: cluster &amp; summarise – but don’t remove anything that doesn’t fit in!</li> <li>• Plenary – groups report; 5 minutes each My Q: anything from the group that was missed out in presentation?</li> </ul>
14:45	<p><b>Break, energiser</b></p>
15:30	<p><b>What change have we made?</b> Please form 3 new groups –according to “seniority” of the campaign in your State 3 groups work on the same question</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kinds of change have you observed <b>in your State</b> since the campaign started? I am thinking of changes at society and institutional level, NOT individual State (have plenty of information on that). Think of change in social norms regarding men’s and women’s roles, women’s rights, the situation of women and girls who have experienced violence, institutions such as the police, hospitals and schools, your own organisation, maybe also in your relationship with Oxfam...</li> <li>• 1<sup>st</sup> individual reflection – make your own notes</li> <li>• Then share and make a list of changes that have been observed in ALL States around your table and a list of changes experienced in some States only 5-minute presentation</li> <li>• Plenary – 5-minute presentations, discussions</li> </ul>
17:00	<p><b>Feed-back and extra questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Each participants receive a form in English, to be completed in 10 minutes. The form contains 3-4 questions –       <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Feed-back on the workshop</li> <li>○ Question: is there anything else that you would like to add to what we discussed today? Please feel free to express your opinion or wishes related to the “We Can” campaign since 2004 and for the future. The more precise you are, the better!</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
17:30	<p><b>Thanks and good-bye</b></p>

## K. The Evaluation Team

The evaluation was led and this report was written by **Michaela Raab**, a Berlin-based evaluator specialised in human rights and gender justice. I have twenty-two years of development experience chiefly in East Asia, the Middle East and throughout Africa.<sup>70</sup> Direct South Asia experience has been limited; however, I have cooperated with professionals from all six “campaign” countries, and administered grant portfolios that included projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

I am not new to “We Can”. I was a member of an informal OI advisory group on “We Can” in 2007. In May 2009, I conducted an external evaluation on behalf of Oxfam Novib, *“The ‘We Can’ End All Violence against Women Campaign’ in Oxfam Novib Policy and Practice”*, which was mainly based on a desk study, phone interviews with OI affiliates’ staff involved in “We Can”, a visit to the “We Can” alliance in Orissa State (India) with NGO representatives from Southern Africa, and observation of the “We Can” launch in Kenya. The evaluation focused on the theory of change, and Oxfam Novib’s experience in supporting “We Can” in Africa, Indonesia and the Netherlands. Subsequently, I facilitated a learning workshop for African “We Can” alliance members on campaign monitoring. In early 2010, I participated in a meeting of the informal “We Can” Global Reference Group, created to facilitate learning within OI and “We Can” alliances. Through these activities, I met a range of actors in “We Can”: Oxfam staff, allies and some “change makers”. I gained my own understanding of the campaign idea and its implementation. But I was never involved in planning or implementing the campaign at any stage. I consider myself a well-informed external observer.

To rein in the power of thinking routines, I worked with a social scientist based in Bangalore, **Laura Ceresna** from CIVIDEP, whose inquisitive mind had not been exposed to the campaign before. Laura assisted in desk research and statistical analysis, and ended up leading the field research in Nepal.

**Rosa Wilson Garwood**, Oxfam GB Regional Gender Coordinator for the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (MEEECIS), joined the evaluation as part of her staff development plan. Rosa recently led a review of OGB’s world-wide work on gender-based violence. She initially played a supportive role, then ran field research in Maharashtra State (India) and generously extended her stay to support Laura in Nepal.

Our work in India and Nepal was competently facilitated by OGB staff and allies at different levels – see the “Acknowledgments” page above!

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<sup>70</sup> A full CV has been shared with the OGB SARC office.

## L. TOR Final evaluation of We Can End All Violence against Women Campaign

### I. Background and context of the evaluation

*To be inserted: Basic information on the South Asia Campaign, including:*

- *Rationale*
- *Objectives*
- *Key information on the Campaign's history / major highlights*
- *Start and end (end of OGB support) date*
- *Expected outcomes*
- *Overall budget invested in the campaign, major donors*

An overview of the campaign is available on [www.wecanendvaw.org](http://www.wecanendvaw.org)

The Regional South Asia campaign has culminated in March 2011 and OGB's active role in coordinating the campaign regionally as well as raising resources for the campaign has ceased. The We Can campaign continues in at least four of the six countries through the country We Can alliances and secretariats as appropriate, Oxfam country offices continue to play some role in these national campaigns.

A regional campaign assessment of Phase 2 of the campaign was carried out in 5 countries simultaneously and country reports as well as a consolidated regional report is available. The external evaluation will build on these internal assessments, and gather and analyse additional data as needed.

### II. Purpose of the evaluation

The main purpose of the planned external end evaluation is accountability, both "internally" to OGB and externally to partners, beneficiaries and donors. OGB, partners and donors need to know whether their contribution to the campaign has been relevant, effective and efficient; what outcomes it has produced; and whether and how it has contributed to sustainable change. The thrust of evaluation should therefore be devoted to the summative purpose of examining what goals have been accomplished and what is the impact of the Campaign on knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practices of target populations (women and their immediate families).

A secondary but important purpose of the evaluation is formative, i.e. to deepen learning among We Can alliances for their future campaigning.

The evaluation is intended to be a systematic learning exercise for all Campaign partners. The exercise is therefore structured to generate and share experiences and practical knowledge. It will identify and document lessons learned and make recommendations that might improve design and implementation of similar Campaigns.

### III. Evaluation scope and key questions

Scope: The evaluation is expected to encompass all key aspects of OGB's work over the full campaign implementation period (May 2005 to April 2011), in the six South Asian countries participating in the campaign. Aspects regarding earlier processes related to campaign conception and planning design may be touched upon as necessary, e.g. when exploring questions about campaign relevance.

The evaluation will focus on OGB's contribution to the campaign, at various levels – regional, country and global (Oxford), with an emphasis on the role of the OGB regional team and the OGB Global Learning Centre on Violence against Women in New Delhi –, and the outcomes which have been achieved.

It will address the following key questions, which may be refined during the preparatory phase of the evaluation:

Has the campaign inspired large numbers of women and men, girls and boys? How effectively have people and other resources been mobilised and steered towards appropriate action? What new capacities have been built; what learning has been generated, for whom? Have opportunities been recognised and seized; have risks, disturbances and contradictions been dealt with in a constructive manner? How sustainably will the campaign be taken forward by national and regional alliances?



These questions have been further detailed into the following main headings below (See Annex 2 for detailed guidance on Evaluation Criteria):

### **Relevance**

1. How and to what extent has the campaign been relevant to the OGB priorities and needs of the target population (primarily ordinary people from different sections of society)?

- What is the relevance of the Campaign in relation to the needs and priorities of women and girls in context of violence prevention. What is the relevance of the campaign to needs and priorities of men and boys in the context of violence prevention? ?
- Do relevant Govt. Departments and CBO partners consider OGB's support relevant to their work on EAW?
- Is the Campaign design articulated in a coherent structure? Is the definition of goal, outcomes and outputs clearly articulated? That is - whether;
- The Campaign approach was sound, and the identification of stakeholders, nodal agencies, operational partners, beneficiaries and users of the Campaign results was done appropriately;
- The quantity and quality of Campaign interventions were adequate relative to the targeted outputs;

### **Effectiveness**

(The extent to which progress towards achievement of We Can Campaign's intended results has taken place).

2. To what extent has the Campaign been effective in achieving the intended results?

The evaluation will assess the effectiveness of the activities OGB has undertaken with the aim to achieve the intended results, in the following main domains:

- How effectively were the campaign strategies shaped and implemented, especially at country levels to meet campaign objectives and targets?
- How effectively was the creation and effective functioning of alliances (coalitions of individuals and organisations to implement the campaign) supported at national and more local levels?
- How effective have been the alliances in carrying forward and disseminating the objectives of the Campaign?
- How effectively was the emergence of campaign activists (change makers) facilitated?
- How effective have change makers been in influencing others in their immediate circle of influence and in their communities?

Within the above domains, the evaluation will also explore the following questions on effectiveness:

- What are the reasons, if any, for the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?
- To what extent have change makers been satisfied with the results?
- Did the Campaign have effective monitoring mechanisms in place to measure progress towards results?

Note: Assessing the effectiveness of this specific campaign for change in the complex attitudes and behaviour linked to violence against women is difficult, as human behaviour is shaped by an uncontrollable multiplicity of factors, many of which may have nothing to do with the campaign. However, a well-structured description and assessment of the activities undertaken by OGB allows an informed judgement as to the how the campaign may have contributed to the desired results and other, unanticipated outcomes.

### **Efficiency**

(The measure of how the We Can Campaign resources (e.g. staff time, technical, financial) are economically managed and converted to results)

3. How effectively has the campaign used resources – staff time, funding, contacts, knowledge and other assets – in its pursuit of the campaign objectives?

- What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used?
- Is the Campaign cost-effective, i.e. could the outcomes and expected results have been achieved at lower cost through adopting a different approach and/or using alternative delivery mechanisms?

- How does the Campaign utilize existing local capacities of CBOs and Communities and Government structures where relevant to achieve its outcomes? How has the the campaign leveraged resources from other sources?
- How have regional and country campaign structures and processes, and relationships with relevant stakeholders, shaped campaign implementation and outcomes?

Note: The “how” questions cited under “effectiveness” above will contribute to assessing whether the resources mobilised for the campaign have been in reasonable proportion with its outcomes.

### **Impact**

(The positive and negative changes produced by the We Can Campaign, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended).

4. What is the contribution of the campaign in bringing about any long-term changes in the lives of targeted populations?

These changes may include changes in individual and collective actions and behaviours related to violence against women, as well as policy changes at various levels. Specifically,

- Based on available data, what is the contribution of We Can towards prevention of violence against women. Are there indicators that the changes demonstrated by change makers and others will sustain?
- Based on available data, what is the perception of women experiencing violence re. positive changes due to We Can campaign.
- What medium to long-term changes among the campaign target groups are likely to be related to the Campaign?
- Based on findings, and their knowledge of broader initiatives over this period, what judgements would the evaluation team make on likely situation if the Campaign had not been implemented? (The counterfactual).

Note: It would take a multi-year multi-million-dollar research project to produce a reasonably robust assessment as to the impact of this complex campaign. Hence, the “impact” questions are phrased carefully, to examine the likely contribution of the campaign rather than the precise impact it may have produced.

### **Sustainability**

(The extent to which benefits of the We Can Campaign continue after OGB assistance has come to an end – i.e. the extent to which relevant social, economic, political, and institutional and other conditions for sustainability are present).

5. To what extent are the desired changes that We Can has contributed to likely to be maintained, broadened and deepened for a reasonably long period of time if support to Campaign by OGB were to cease?

Specifically,

- Is the Campaign supported by a range of local organisations? ? Do these organisations demonstrate leadership commitment and technical capacity to continue to work with the Campaign or replicate it?
- What operational capacity of national alliances, such as technology, finance, and staffing, has been strengthened?
- What adaptive or management capacities of national alliances, such as learning, leadership, Campaign and process management, networking and linkages have been supported?
- Do alliance members have the financial capacity or the ability to raise resources to maintain the benefits from the Campaign?

To what extent is OGB’s exit strategy likely to support sustainability? That is:

- Was the exit strategy the most appropriate given campaign developments?
- To what extent do national and more local level campaign alliances appear empowered and resourced to broaden and deepen the campaign over the coming years? What further might be needed from OGB/other We Can supporters to ensure sustainability?

#### **IV. Methodology**

The evaluation will be managed by a lead researcher and carried out by a team of 2-3 members as appropriate. They will apply diverse methods, take into consideration different perspectives, and work with diverse sources of information and stakeholders. Although the focus is on an external assessment of the campaign, data collection and sharing of the analysis will be highly participatory so as to enhance potential learning benefits for the country alliances.

The evaluation will be informed by methods that are suited to the complexity of campaigning to end violence against women and will be based on a methodology proposed by the evaluation team and validated by OGB. The final decision on the methodology in case of any dispute will remain that of the evaluator. The methodology will be finalised after the inception report. Rather than adopting an “audit-type” attitude that would check progress against plans, the evaluators will attempt to gain an understanding of the way whether and how the campaign has worked in its contexts. The Evaluation methodology should:

- Clearly outline the evaluation design, specifying the approach to addressing the purposes of the evaluation and the evaluation questions (including an evaluation framework with key evaluation criteria, questions, indicators and sources of information);
- Determine the qualitative and quantitative instruments and methods for collecting the needed information (e.g. interviews, observations, focus groups, literature, surveys, ratings, knowledge tests, site visits, etc.) including the sample of key informants to be interviewed; preferably, systems approaches such as appreciative inquiry and outcome mapping will be applied.
- Ensure that main evaluation questions are triangulated and addressed by multiple methods and data.
- A schedule for information collection and specify who will be responsible for making the information available.
- Outline the approaches for analysis and interpretation of data.

Throughout the period of the evaluation, the lead Consultant will liaise closely with the OGB Regional Campaign Staff based in Delhi for logistics and information. The consultant can raise or discuss any issue or topic they deem necessary to fulfil the tasks. The Consultants, however, are not authorized to make any commitments to any party on behalf of OGB.

#### **Evaluation Plan**

The outline of a tentative evaluation plan is presented here. It will need to be adapted and refined by the evaluation team in close co-operation with the OGB team and leading We Can Alliance members. Throughout the evaluation, the team will observe the UN ethical guidelines for evaluation (<http://www.unevaluation.org/ethicalguidelines>).

##### ***1st Phase: Inception study (up to mid June 2011)***

The purpose of this 1st phase is to distil knowledge from existing documentation on We Can in South Asia and identify gaps that require additional data collection and analysis.

The external evaluators will review English language documentation on the We Can campaign in South Asia, including the five country assessment reports and consolidated regional report, accompanying documentation, earlier assessment reports, key global, regional and “reference group” meeting records, campaign materials and the campaign web-site. OGB will provide comprehensive information on the documents that have been generated throughout the campaign and share relevant documents with the evaluators.

This phase may also include an e-mail mini-survey, and telephone or Skype interviews with key stakeholders (both in South Asia and beyond, e.g. OGB headquarters, other OI affiliate members, and donor representatives in Europe), and review of other relevant literature.

Note: Given the large geographical scope of the campaign and the limited time available for field work, the quality of the evaluation depends to a great extent on the quality and amount of data made available to and processed by the evaluation team.

Near the end of the 1st phase, the evaluators will have identified a set of provisional findings and gaps in existing data that may need to be addressed to answer the evaluation questions. Based on these findings, a precise evaluation work-plan will be prepared in close consultation with the OGB Regional Office.

**2nd Phase: Participatory data collection and analysis in selected countries in South Asia (July 2011)**

The 2nd phase serves two purposes: (1) gathering and analysing additional data to address the evaluation questions, and (2) facilitating joint learning with key We Can Alliance members and key Oxfam staff.

The activities to be carried out in this phase may include:

- A 2-3-day workshop in June bringing together key national alliance members
- Further telephone/ skype and face-to-face interviews with a range of stakeholders at various levels, within and beyond the campaign
- Field visits and/ or workshops in up to two countries, possibly immediately following the June workshop
- Focus group discussions and other small group activities with a range of stakeholders
- Direct observation of any campaign-related events
- Study of further documentation
- Debriefing with the OGB Regional Office

A precise plan for phase 2 field work will be prepared upon completion of the inception phase. This plan may be adjusted in close co-operation with the OGB Regional Office.

**3rd Phase: Data analysis and report writing (July – August 2011)**

Upon completion of the work in South Asia, the external evaluator(s) will analyse the data gathered and obtain more information as needed, e.g. through further telephone interviews and study of additional documentation.

The lead evaluator will present an advanced draft evaluation report in English language to the OGB Regional Office by 31st August 2011.

**V. Evaluation Report**

The lead consultant will finalise the evaluation report within 3 weeks upon receipt of OGB comments.

The main body of the report will not exceed 30 pages. In addition, it will include a table of contents, an executive summary that can be used as a document in its own right, and annexes (e.g. TOR, list of interviewees, interview guides or questionnaires, itinerary, lists of abbreviations and of documents consulted). The list of products expected from the Evaluation is attached in Annex 1.

**VI. Evaluation Team**

The evaluation will be led an experienced evaluator knowledgeable about campaigning and women's rights issues, and skilled in working with a wide range of contexts. She/ he may co-operate with a junior co-evaluator with expertise in social research. The evaluation team will be assisted by interpreters, to be seconded or recruited by OGB in consultation with the lead evaluator. In addition, OGB will second or appoint English-speaking minute-takers for each workshop to be carried out within the evaluation. Interpreters and minute-takers should not be recruited among OGB staff with management responsibilities within the We Can campaign.

**Expected Experience of Team**

*As a whole, the Evaluation team must offer the following demonstrated experience, knowledge and competencies:*

- At least ten years (for mid-level consultants) and five years (for junior consultants) experience in development, with specialisation in gender, social development and women's rights.
- Significant knowledge and experience of evaluation concepts and approaches;
- Good knowledge of the OGB, national Campaigns, INGOs and IGOs;
- Recent experience with gender equality issues and knowledge of mainstreaming gender equality into policies/programming/development; knowledge of gender related strategies in like organisations;
- Sound understanding of human rights based approaches;
- Consultancy experience in developing countries;
- Facilitation skills, particularly design of stakeholder consultations exercises;
- Strong quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis skills;
- Excellent analytical skills and communication skills;
- Demonstrated writing skills in English;
- Computer literacy with specific regard to Word, Excel and Power Point;

- Post-graduate degree in social sciences, international development or relevant field.
- The evaluating team will ensure that they build in time for effective translations so as to ensure people interviewed can clearly articulate their thoughts, experiences in a language of their choice.

The Team leader must have demonstrated capacity in evaluation and strategy development, especially related to gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Ideally the team leader will be a known leader in the field. The team leader should have:

- Minimum fifteen years working experience in international development and good understanding and experience of Oxfam;
- Experience in conducting and leading corporate/organizational evaluation;
- Experience in assessing institutional capacities on gender;
- Sound knowledge of and/or experience with mainstreaming gender equality to policies/programming/development, and human rights based approaches;
- Excellent analytical skills and communication skills;
- Demonstrated excellent report writing skills in English;
- Computer literacy with specific regard to Word, Excel and Power Point;
- Post-graduate degree in social sciences or international development.

### **VIII. Coordination of the Evaluation by OGB**

Overall the Regional Director, OGB will sponsor the evaluation and the Regional Programme Manager, Women's Leadership and Programme Quality will commission this evaluation. The Regional MEL manager at the Regional Centre, New Delhi will coordinate the evaluation from OGB's side and facilitate contact between the Evaluation Team and key stakeholders. A small reference group will be established to steer the evaluation process of and will include some people from Oxfam GB HQ, South Asia RC and We Can secretariats. This Core Group will also function as a steering group to the evaluation and will be responsible for:

- Consultations with the Evaluation Team during the inception phase to exchange expectations, concerns and interests;
- Providing technical overview and approval of evaluation design and processes, including suggesting any adjustments to TORs
- Perusal and approval of the draft and final deliverables from the Evaluation Team
- Approval of the final report
- Decision on a post-evaluation dissemination strategy

### **Products expected from the Evaluation**

The following deliverables are expected as a result of the evaluation.

#### **1. Deliverable 1 - Inception Report**

The Inception Report will detail the preliminary approach to the study, study tools to be used and the evaluation framework. The Inception report will be used to confirm a common understanding of the purpose, objectives, scope, timescales, and methodology for the evaluation between the evaluation team and the Advisory Committee for the evaluation. It will include:

- Overview of the evaluation purpose and objectives
- Team - Roles and Responsibilities
- Evaluation Framework and Methodology
- Information Collection and Analysis
- Work Scheduling – including Reporting timelines

#### **2. Deliverable 2 - Two Power Point presentations**

At the time of the Inception Report, the team will present a Power Point detailing the salient features of the evaluation, which the team will be sharing with key stakeholders during the evaluation.

The second Power Point is expected from the team during the presentation of the Draft Final Report at the end of the Evaluation Period.

#### **3. Deliverable 3 - Draft Final Report**

At the end of Week 12, the team leader will submit the draft evaluation report to OGB in the structure specified in section 4 below. The outline and main finding of the evaluation mission should be completed and

handed to OGB during the final de-briefing session. OGB will ensure that as soon as the report is received, it is shared with other members of the Advisory Committee.

#### **4. Deliverable 4 - Final Evaluation Report**

Based on the spoken and written comments of the stakeholders during the de-briefing and subsequently, the team will finalize and submit the final version of the report to OGB, New Delhi within ten days of receipt of comments.

The length of the report should not exceed 30 pages, excluding Annexes. While the Consultants are free to use any detailed method of reporting, the Evaluation Report should contain at least the following:

- Title Page
- List of acronyms and abbreviations
- Table of contents, including list of annexes
- Executive Summary
- Introduction: background and context of the Campaign
- Description of the program - its logic theory, results framework and external factors likely to affect success
- Purpose of the evaluation
- Key questions and scope of evaluation with information on limitations and de-limitations
- Approach and methodology
- Findings
- Summary and explanation of findings and interpretations
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- Lessons, generalizations, alternatives
- Detailed future strategy for the Campaign <sup>71</sup>

In the Final Report, the Mission is expected to provide details in respect of:

- Documents reviewed;
- Interviews;
- Field visits;
- Questionnaires, if any;
- Participatory techniques and other approaches for gathering and analysis of data; and
- Participation of stakeholders and/or partners.

In addition, the final report should contain the following annexes:

- Terms of Reference for the evaluation
- Itinerary (actual)
- List of meetings attended
- List of persons interviewed
- List of documents reviewed
- Any other relevant material

#### **5. Deliverable 5 - Good Practices Document**

The team is also expected to submit a separate document on good practices and learning gleaned during the evaluation, which emphasize the conclusions drawn in the Final Report.

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<sup>71</sup> Note (by Michaela Raab): Following an e-mail exchange with Pankaj Shrivastava in August 2011, it has been agreed to limit this last item to “recommendations on future strategies”.